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Abstract
The issue of successful implementation of strategic organizational change is not
sufficiently addressed in the literature of organizational change even though there is
unanimity in reporting a high rate of failure. Moreover, attempts to provide supportive
guidelines that enhance implementation success are meager and their validity in
nonwestern contexts is disputed. Thus, the present study tried to address the question
of how a strategic organizational change can be successfully implemented by
developing an implementation model within the context of Ethiopian commercial
banks. In Ethiopia, commercial banking is exclusively reserved for nationals. This makes
the setting a typical national context from where two commercial banks were included
in the present study through maintaining maximum variation in ownership structure.
Embedded in each bank, cases of teams which were established to redesign a specific
type of business process were identified to theoretically sample participants for the in-
depth interviews. Applying an inductive multiple case study strategy, a combination of
within-case and cross-case analyses were employed with the support of the ATLAS.ti
software. As a result, theoretical propositions were made and an implementation
model for strategic organizational change was developed by taking the context of
commercial banks in Ethiopia into consideration. The findings indicate that national
and organizational contexts demand contextualized approaches to implement strategic
organizational change. Although several concepts which are documented in the extant
literature were confirmed, original propositions are also made by the present study. A
triple helix of initiating, designing, and implementing were emerged as inseparable
components of the proposed implementation model for strategic organizational
change in a context where cognitive and technical readiness is ensured.
Key Words
vImplementation model, strategic change, commercial banks, Ethiopia, actor
networking, initiating, designing, power, nonprofit motive, source of initiative,
routines, artifacts
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1CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction
In this chapter, introductory explanations about the thesis are presented. Background
information about the study, the research problem, aims and objectives, rationale of
the research, significance of the research, delimitations and scope of the research,
limitations of the study, and outlines of the thesis are the sections this chapter is
comprised of.
1.2. Background of the Study
Change is being considered as the only constant in this dynamic world.
Organizational change is a notion that existed as long as the formal field of
management thoughts. The scientific management theory of Taylor early in 1911 can
be considered as an initiative to change the way organizations operate and increase
efficiency (worker productivity). Since then, various approaches have been proposed
as a supplement or as critic to predecessors’ works (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011).
Explicit account to the topic is given in the literature since the 1940s. Kurt Lewin is a
pioneer contributor to the present day theories and models of change management
(Elrod II & Tippet, 2002; Burnes, 2004a, b).
Organizational change can be initiated for different purposes. The magnitude of
organizational impacts of change is also different depending on the type of change.
This study is concerned with the implementation of organizational change that has
organizational wide impact. Strategic change, in addition to the scope refers to
“discontinuous changes in an organization’s strategy, goals, form of authority and
technology” (Wang & Wang, 2017:727). These types of changes are what this
research refers to as strategic organizational change.
It is common to hear news of organizational change initiatives in different
organizations. Oftentimes, leaders and managers use various tools of organizational
2change. As a result, these tools that are sought as means of organizational change
are now turned to be management fads (Balogun, 2001). However, change initiatives
record low rate of success (Pasmore, 2011; Schwarz, 2009; Franken, Edwards, &
Lambert, 2009; Brenner, 2008; Gilley, Dixon, & Gilley, 2008; Kazmi, 2008; Dufour &
Steane, 2006; Mankins & Steele, 2005; Sterling, 2003).
The implementation of organizational change gained attention as a result of high
failure rate in the discourse of organizational change. Jacobs, Witteloostuijn and
Christe-Zeyse (2013:773) for example explicitly raised questions of “why do so many
organizational change initiatives fail to deliver?” and “how can organizational change
processes be implemented in a way that assures success?” The second question is of
interest to the present research. While discussing the shortcomings in the literature
(of organizational change) in addressing these questions, these authors argue that
the literature in organizational change is fragmented.
A search for how intended organizational changes could be realized may have
different attributes. As Beer (2011), Pasmore (2011), Stragalas (2010) and other
scholars in the field recommend, attention should be given to the problems that
persist in the implementation of change initiatives and that hinder the success of the
initiative. Worley and Lawler (2010) and Kazmi (2008) claim that managers and
supervisors need to have a clear, theoretically sound and practical change
implementation framework. This idea implies the possibility of enhancing the success
of implementing organizational change through the application of a guideline
framed on the basis of a theoretically sound model.
However, organizational change models that are overrepresented in the literature are
mostly triggered by the challenges faced by U.S. corporations following the great
depression of the 1970 and the accompanying emergence of Japanese companies in
the American market. The realization that American companies had been losing
grounds for Japanese companies provoked American scholars and served as a
turning point for them to embark on turnaround in their businesses. The resultant
3move led to the emergence of several model of organizational change; but all are
targeted towards gaining back the strongholds of the American companies. This
indicates how the literature on organizational change is excessively focusing on the
American context (Pettigrew, Woodman & Cameron, 2001; Hempel & Martinsons,
2009).
Therefore, this research was conducted with an expectation to have a role in
initiating debates on the issue of contextualized models that could be used to guide
implementation of strategic organizational change. To do so, the context of
commercial banking sector in Ethiopia was selected. Context in this research was
considered as an important factor that determines the type of implementation
approach that needs to be applied in order to make strategic organizational change
effective (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999).
Players in the banking industry of Ethiopia are all domestic as foreign banks are
prohibited to enter the country. The biggest players are, thus, state owned banks.
There are also private banks operating in the market since the introduction of
government’s 1994 reform to allow domestic private investor in the financial sector
(Bezabih & Desta, 2014). This liberalization effort by the government is, however, yet
to be open for foreign banks as well. The government’s concern is to give probation
to domestic banks so that they will be able to compete with international banks.
In Ethiopia, banking operation is supervised and regulated by the central bank called
the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). Besides, the government-owned commercial
banks function under the supervision of the government so that it will contribute
towards the priority development programs of the government. With this in mind,
there were reforms in government-owned banks. The reform programs were basically
the same across government banks. Their origin of initiation was also the same (the
government). In this study, one of the two government-owned commercial banks is
used as one case to deeply investigate its experience in implementing a strategic
organizational change.
4The number of private commercial banks is relatively greater compared to the
government owned ones. But they are smaller in size. Most of the private banks are
new to the industry. Only eight of them have longer experience as they were
established within a few years period after the 1994’s reform. Still, there are new
entrants to the market every year. There was no significantly known strategic
organizational change project among private banks. Based on the researcher’s
preliminary investigation, only one of such banks had prior experience in initiating
strategic organizational change and hence became the other case of the study.
This research therefore, took cases of two commercial banks’ strategic organizational
change implementation experiences to inductively develop and propose an
implementation model which may be used as a guideline for leading future strategic
organizational change endeavors in the sector. The cases represent the context of
banking sector in the country which is composed of government-owned and private
banks. Chapter Four provides further details on the cases.
1.3. Statement of the Problem
The importance of organizational change has never been disputed in the literature of
organizational change. Rather, it is becoming a core organizational capability. Its
importance to organizations is increasing because of an alarming increase in the
intensity of competition which demands organizational change. “Competitive
advantage, organizational renewal, technological transformation, international
standards, globalization, innovation and performance” are commonly referred factors
that trigger change (Jacobs, Witteloostuijn and Christe-Zeyse, 2013; Imran, Rehman,
Aslam & Bilal, 2016: 1098).
In other words, organizations need to be flexible enough to fit to environmental
dynamics and to meet changing demands of customers (Wang & Wang, 2017). Thus,
organizational change is assumed to have a positive contribution to organizational
effectiveness (Appelbaum, St-Pierre & Glavas, 1998).
5Accepting the contribution of organizational change to organizational performance
naturally leads to embracing some sort of organizational change. However, mere
initiation of an organizational change does not guarantee better performance;
implementation success does! On the other hand, failure to successfully implement
especially strategic organizational change can be as costly as putting the
organization to its end. The risk of failure is presumably becoming higher as the
environment within which businesses operate is becoming more complex and
dynamic today than it was before.
In the literature, it has been indicated that implementation of strategic change is the
most difficult phase in strategic change management (Balogun, 2001; Pfeifer &
Schimit, 2005). However, the practice of implementing strategic organizational
change is far from success. It is still reported to have continued experiencing about
70% failure rate (Packard, 2017; Imran et al., 2016; Jacobs, Witteloostuijn & Christe-
Zeyse, 2013: Pasmore, 2011; Schwarz, 2009; Franken et al., 2009; Brenner, 2008).
The low track record of implementation led to a growing demand in having an
approach which guides implementation success. Beer and Nohria (2000) pioneered
the assertion of 70% failure rate and implied implementation success as a core
organizational capability. With this logic, scholars accept organizational change as an
integral part of a manager’s standard business practices (Appelbaum et al., 1998; Van
de Ven & Sun, 2011; Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011).
Converging with Pettigrew et al. (2001) to be cognizant of context, Jacobs et al.,
(2013) attribute the low success rate to lack of development in the theory of change
which is faced by the double hurdles of scholarly quality and practical relevance.
Jacobs et al. (2013:773) further characterizes the literature in organizational change
as “debilitating fragmentation”. Young (2009) associates this with the literature’s
focus on comparing change typologies instead of building on common themes.
Young’s (2009) deliberation is reiterated later by Maes and Van Hootegem (2011) by
trying to integrate typologies of dichotomies based on eight dimensions. Reiterating
6scholars’ frequent assertion of seventy percent failure, Young (2009), also calls for the
development of change process theory which may serve as a guide for
implementation of organizational change.
Propositions are made by Stragalas (2010), Real and Marshal (2005), Worley and
Lawler (2010), Kazmi (2008) and Okumus (2003) about the possibility of enhancing
the effectiveness of implementing strategic organizational change through applying
an appropriate implementation model. Packard (2017) also notes the absence of a
dependable framework which may be used as guidance for organizational change
research. However, to the best of the researcher’s effort, there is no widely known
implementation model that is empirically tested across varying contexts and
recommended to be applied in order to reduce the possibility of failure.
Besides, recent literature still acknowledges the dearth of literature in
implementation of change despite the unanimous report about high rate of failure.
Albeit this practical reality, present time organizations even need to be more
effective in implementing organizational innovation and change. Lin, Chen and Su
(2017) explain the importance of innovativeness and change as a source of
competitive advantage among businesses of today which are expected to operate in
a more intensified competition and in a more globalized world than ever before. Lin
et al. (2017) also acknowledge that there is no serious discussion on change
implementation.
The issue of modeling organizational change has gained attention in the literature
especially since the 1990s. But the emergence of these models did not change the
track record of organizational change implementation effectiveness. There is still a
problem of low success rate in implementing organizational change (Packard, 2017;
Pasmore, 2011; Schwarz, 2009; Franken et al., 2009; Brenner, 2008). Why these
models (theories) of implementing organizational change did not solve the problem
of high rate of failure implies the need to critically look into the problems of change
implementation approaches in the extant literature.
7Organizational change (OC) research predominantly focuses on change process (Van
de Ven & Poole, 1995) and takes the American context as a background (Hempel &
Martinsons, 2009; Pettigrew et al., 2001). Applying a list of sequential actions (steps)
in implementing change while no contextual congruence is maintained probably
limits the usefulness of process theories of change implementation (Hempel &
Martinsons, 2009). Pettigrew et al. (2001) argue that the effect of national context on
organizational change remains unexplored despite the fact that it has been pointed
out by different scholars as an important variable in organizational change.
Organizational change literature according to Pettigrew et al. (2001), falls short of
examination of multiple contexts, international considerations and cross-cultural
comparisons. It needs further development in these regards. This idea is also more
strictly pronounced by Hempel and Martinsons (2009). They call for attention to
more comprehensive international and cross-cultural research and a shift from
relying on theories and models which are dominated by American perspectives and
evidences. This straightforward application of US framed models to non-US settings
faces contextual obstacles.  Therefore, as recommended by Hempel and Martinsons
(2009), cultural, economic, social and legal contexts should be taken into account
when developing a change model.
Even though OC literature is dominated by American perspectives and evidences and
has an unwitting tendency to treat context as taken for granted background;
practically, organizational change occurs in diverse contexts (Pettigrew et al., 2001).
Therefore, research needs to be done on “how OC initiatives are influenced by non-
western contextual elements” to come up with more comprehensive OC models and
theories (Hempel & Martinsons, 2009:460) and improve implementation
effectiveness (Stragalas, 2010).
These criticisms to previous works in organizational change do not provide a solution
to the practical problem of high rate of failure except pointing out that there are
different dimensions of limitations in organizational change theory. Many authors
8(e.g. Schwarz, 2009; Kazmi, 2008; Dufour & Steane, 2006) agree in the fact that the
ineffectiveness of change initiatives is caused by the relatively fragmentary nature of
the theory in change implementation. Worley and Lawler (2010); Kazmi (2008) and
Okumus (2003) claim that managers and supervisors need to have a clear,
theoretically sound and practical change implementation framework. Stragalas
(2010:31) emphasized the possibility of reversing the failing track record of change
initiatives through “a comprehensive change implementation model.” This indicates
that the theory of strategic change implementation still needs to be developed well.
More attention and efforts are needed to be given to the development of the theory
of strategic organizational change implementation. This contributes to enhancing the
success rate of strategic organizational change implementation.
This study therefore intends to contribute to the development of organizational
change theory by addressing the context theme and developing a strategic change
implementation model that is applicable in the context of developing economies
specifically in the financial sector. Thus, the question central to this study was:
 How can an implementation model for strategic organizational change be
developed with consideration to the context of Ethiopian commercial banks?
1.4. Aims and Objectives of the Study
This research was conducted in search of a model that may serve as a guideline to
implement strategic organizational change in commercial banks in Ethiopia on the
one side and to develop theoretical propositions in contextual strategic
organizational change implementation on the other. The objectives of this research
were to:
 Explore contextual factors that influence the implementation of strategic
organizational change in the context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia;
 Develop a strategic organizational change implementation model within the
context of commercial banks in Ethiopia; and
9 Put forward theoretical propositions in connection with contextual strategic
organizational change implementation.
This research was initiated because it was believed that it contributes to the
development of knowledge in developing an implementation model for strategic
organizational change through inductive procedures based on empirical data in a
specific national and industrial context. As it is conducted in a developing economy
context, it will add value to the development of organizational change theories in a
non-western perspective as literature is dominated by perspectives which took
western contexts as common ground (Pettigrew et al., 2001).
1.5. Rationale of the Study
African nations such as Ethiopia need to undertake huge transformations to increase
their capacity to participate in the world trade and exploit international opportunities
to growth and poverty reduction. This will be realized through nurturing and
developing business organizations that will be actively participating in the world
trade. The greatest challenge to this end could be competitiveness in the
international market. Hence, exerting an effort to change their organization’s theory
of how to compete (i.e., strategy) which fits to the specific national situations should
be expected of leaders in connection with overcoming this challenge.
As the financial sector in Ethiopia is not permitted for foreign firms so far, extant
players do not have real experiences of competing with multinational banks.
Expected deregulation of the sector in connection with the country’s accession to the
WTO makes domestic commercial banks of Ethiopia relatively vulnerable to the
resultant change in the structure of competition. This implies the potential benefit of
strategic organizational change and its successful implementation with respect to
enhancing competitiveness of Ethiopian commercial banks. This could be a reason to
consider this sector as a setting within which the agenda of strategic organizational
change implementation could be a high priority. Therefore, this study on strategic
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organizational change implementation model for Ethiopian commercial banks is
relevant.
Moreover, the dearth of literature and lack of attention towards formulating models
and theories of strategic organizational change implementation as compared to
theories and models of strategic design and formulation adds to the rationale behind
initiating this research.
1.6. Significance of the Study
This study will benefit management practitioners and change managers in the
financial sector of Ethiopia by providing a strategic organizational change
implementation model that guides implementation of strategic organizational
change initiatives to succeed. As the research targets the Ethiopian context in the
change implementation literature, potential researchers will get a reference for
further or related studies in the context.  Moreover, this research is believed to be a
contribution to the literature of strategic organizational change implementation
trying to develop a model that aims at reducing the rate of implementation failure in
strategic change to the attention of scholars. As the study is based on empirical
data, it provides commercial bank leaders in Ethiopia with a model that may support
them as a guideline during strategic organizational change implementation.
1.7. Scope and Delimitations of the Study
The research is limited to developing a model that may serve as a framework of
implementing strategic organizational change in commercial banks in Ethiopia. The
study is based on multiple cases of commercial banks that are selected because they
undertook strategic organizational change. The implementation of organization wide
initiatives aiming at bringing about an organizational transformation was the focus of
this study. The proposed model is supposed to be applied by Ethiopian commercial
banks in leading future strategic organizational changes. The applicability of this
model to other sectors and other contexts is yet to be tested.
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1.8. Limitations of the Study
To build context sensitive model of implementing strategic organizational change
(Balogun, 2001; Armenakis & Harris, 2009), the present research was designed to be
an inductive multiple case study that is based on empirical data from two commercial
banks in Ethiopia. Even though the researcher believes that the targeted change
initiatives (cases) have unique features that might not be apparent in other business
sectors in the country, the focus on a single industry may limit the transferability of
the findings of the present study.
The uniqueness of the context is the justification for selecting Ethiopian commercial
banking sector. However, despite its contribution in gaining new insights, the
selected context is characterized by low intensity of competition. This may limit
transferability of findings to other business contexts.
Theory of implementing strategic organizational change is not explicitly represented
in the literature (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011). As detailed in Chapter Two, the theory in
strategic organizational change implementation needs to develop yet. This caused
difficulty in sharpening the propositions (in line with extent theory) that are made by
the present study.
Moreover, in terms of level of development, the propositions made by the present
research are limited to dealing with only the descriptive (inductive) part of the
theory-building cycle in the sense of Carlile and Christenson’s (2004) explications of
theory building cycle in management research. Propositions require further
improvement through deductive researches that are conducted in other contexts
before considering the present findings as prescriptive theories (Christensen &
Carlile, 2009).
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1.9. Organization of the Thesis
Chapter One which is an introductory chapter tries to shed light on what the study is
about, and why it is important to conduct it. The second chapter lays the literature
foundation of the research. As the present study is conceptual, that is based on
model development; Chapter Two tries to examine what similar models in what
contexts have already been developed so far, and what reason necessitated the
search for the development of new model. How the research was designed and
executed is explained in the Third Chapter while the Fourth Chapter describes the
cases (commercial banks) that participated in the research.
Chapters Five to Seven are dedicated to the data and concepts that resulted from
analyses of the data.  In Chapter Five, major categories that were analyzed from the
cases are presented. Chapter Six discusses the implications of these emergent
categories to the implementation of strategic organizational change against the
literatures that are presented in chapter two. Cross-case analyses results are reported
in the Seventh Chapter. In this chapter, the emergent propositions which served as
inputs to the developed implementation model are presented. The Eighth Chapter
deals with conclusions and recommendations.
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, a review of literature related to strategic organizational change and
its implementation is presented. Reviewing the literature on organizational change is
a challenging task because the nature of the topic and the subject on which it applies
(i.e., organizations) are very dynamic. The conceptualization of the notions (i.e.,
change and organizations) is evolving and it now appears to have reached to a
tempting level of abandoning all and starting afresh (Nasim & Sushil, 2011); not a
simple decision though.
Scholars unequivocally echoed the importance of organizational change on the one
hand and low success rate of such changes on the other. It is paradoxical that the
change literature is characterized by introductions of applause about the significance
of organizational change with respect to ensuring organizational survival and fitness
to a dynamic environment while at the same time reporting that only few (not
greater than one-third) among those that initiate organizational change succeed in
effectively changing.
In specific terms, this chapter reports literature that is reviewed and organized under
(1) evolution of basic concepts and theories about organizational change, (2) views of
scholars on track records of organizational change initiatives, and (3) selected models
of organizational change implementation. In addition, a synthesis of the reviewed
literature and concluding remarks are also included in the chapter.
2.2. Fundamental Concepts of Organizational Change
The plethora of views on and explanations about organizational change result in
various descriptions about its meanings. For the purpose of this research, only a
focused description is presented.
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2.2.1. Definition of Strategic Organizational Change
To begin with a simpler assertion, an organizational change is “a difference in form,
quality, or state over time in an organizational entity” (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011:60).
This implies that organizational change is manifested by an alteration or difference in
state of some attributes of an organization. Mills, Dye and Mills (2009:4) define
organizational change as “an alteration of a core aspect of an organization’s
operation.” This definition is still about alteration on organizational attributes but
qualified as “core”. Mills et al. (2009) further explicate these aspects to be structure,
technology, culture, leadership, goal or human resources of the organization.
A synthesis from the two definitions could be an alteration on core organizational
attributes. A possible contemplation triggered by these definitions about
organizational change could be diversity of change typologies based on scope of
change which is determined by the nature of organizational attributes affected by a
specific change. Consistent to such thinking, a specific type of organizational change
(i.e., strategic change) is focused on in the present research.
Strategic change refers to the scope of alteration (change) in an organization. As
such, it results in changes in the entire character of the organization as opposed to
convergent changes in component parts of the organization. According to Rod et al.
(2009) strategic change fundamentally alters the very character of the organization
not simply a difference in some attributes such as structure, strategy, and process.
As Wang and Wang (2017:727) explain, “strategic change occurs when a firm makes
difficult-to-reverse corporate and business decisions in its product and market
domains, resource allocation, competitive advantages, and core technologies that
fundamentally alter the relationship between the organization and its environment.”
Strategic organizational change is the reformulation of long term organizational ends
on an ongoing basis by taking environmental turbulence into account (Appelbaum et
al., 1998). Rajagopalan and Sprietzer (1997) also defined it as an organizational
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change that brings a change in the content of a firm’s strategy.  Balogun (2001)
defined strategic change as organizational transition encompassing changes in
strategy, structure, systems, processes and culture.
From the above definitions by different scholars, Rajagopalan and Sprietzer’s (1997)
and Balogun’s (2001) definition do not qualify as a strategic change in the definition
of the others especially by Rod, Ashill and Saunders (2009). As the depth in the
explanation on strategic change implementation increases, one hardly identifies
convergence in views and discourses.
Besides, scholars can be categorized based on their views as those (e.g. Nelson, 2003;
Mento, Jones and Dirndorfer, 2002; Balogun, 2001; Kotter, 1995;) who consider
organizational change as a move (process of transformation) from a status quo to a
desired state and others (e.g. Appelbaum et al., 1998; Pryor, Taneja, Humphreys,
Adnderson & Singleton, 2008 & Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011) who consider change
as an integral part of a manager’s task and an organization’s functions and systems.
A relatively new insight about strategic change comes from the systems perspective
to change. According to this perspective, change is considered as a system in itself
instead of a process of changing a system. As extensively described by Maes and Van
Hootegem (2011), change is a dynamic and complex adaptive system that operates
close to the edge of chaos that engenders individual, group, organizational and
social effects through fluctuating input and process elements and attributes.
Besides, a paradoxical view of dualities of change and continuity consider strategy
and organization as inseparable “single merged duality” (Graetz & Smith, 2010:149).
In their article which reviews various philosophies and recommends pluralistic
approaches, Graetz and Smith (2010) also posit that organizational change is a
natural phenomenon which unfolds continuously in a non-linear complexity. The old
views of managing and leading change in a controllable step-by-step process which
intends to set a new organizational order (structure, system, and process) do not
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result in success. Organizations should shift into organizing and strategizing single
duality from the old either-or dilemma.
The variations in the meanings of organizational change imply that an account of
theoretical underpinnings and their ontological bases could shed light on the
divergence in the literature. However, recent literature puts cautionary message not
to take side into a single camp; instead to strive to understand the complementary
features of paradoxical views. Graetz and Smith (2010:151) assert, “rather than
concentrating on one theoretical or philosophical perspective at the expense of
competing perspectives, the value to practice is in developing an understanding of
the nexus between multiple philosophical perspectives, their differences and
commonalities.” In the following section, a brief discussion on prominent ones is
presented.
2.3. Theoretical Underpinnings behind Organizational Change
The literature on organizational change has roots in some thoughts that have been
evolved since antiquity (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). Two ontological views (i.e.,
process and substance or thing) which are discussed hereafter are pillars of these
evolutions.
2.3.1. Process and Substantive Metaphysics
The knowledge of organizational life can be affected by ontological stance about
reality. Because of its nature, the study of organizational change and theories thereof
benefits from clarifying alternative worldviews. As Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, and
Van de Ven (2013:4) succinctly describe, there are two ontological views—“one a
world made of things in which processes represent change in things (grounded in a
substantive metaphysics) and the other a world of processes, in which things are
reifications of processes ... (grounded in process metaphysics).” As Rescher (1996)
explicates these views in more detail, process philosophy of Americans has roots in
the philosophies of Heraclitus and Democritus back in antiquity. Process ontology
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views reality as different types of processes by taking examples of sun as a flaming
fire and river as an ever-changing flow.
The subject of this research, organizational change, needs to be conceptualized
clearly in terms of what accounts for it. The question of whether an organizational
change is: (1) a process of change in an already existing organization (i.e., an entity
that exists independent of the change), or (2) a process of how an organization
evolves over time affects our concepts of how strategic organizational change
unfolds. This has logical affiliation with the metaphysics of processes (Langley et al.,
2013).
Van de Ven and Poole (2005:6) also discuss the ontology of process into the study of
organizational change. They contrast process ontology which posits process as
fundamental reality with that of thing (substance) which exists independent of
processes as “a world made of things in which processes represent change in things,
and the other a world of processes in which things are reifications of processes
[emphasis in original]”.
A synthesis from the literature reviewed by Lin et al. (2017) indicates the link between
management innovation and knowledge management, dynamic capability and
complex adaptive systems. These are all consistent with the process theory of
change.
There is also an epistemic duality in studying organizational change. There are two
categories of approaches to study organizational change: (1) variance and (2)
process. These two approaches are presented in the upcoming section.
2.3.2. Process and Variance Theorizing
Based on how organizational change is studied (theorized), there are two
epistemologies: (1) variance study and (2) process study. Langley (1999) explains
variance and process approaches of studying strategic organizational change in the
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same way as Van de Ven and Poole (2005) do. According to Langley (1999), process
theory affords to explicate organizational change theory as a loop not as a linear
cause-effect relationship. This captures the dynamic complexity of organizational
reality. The capacity of explaining complex organizational reality in a higher level of
abstraction with the help of process theory is also presented by Chiles (2003). On the
other hand, a substantive metaphysics of process conceives process as sequences
that bring about changes in an organization or its components (as things).
In general, studies of organizational change can be epistemologically categorised
into variance or process approaches as Langley et al. (2013:6) explain:
research questions focusing on how the qualities of an entity (e.g., an individual,
group, organization, institution) change over time may be studied from the
perspective of a substantive metaphysics in which processes represent changes
in things. Other research questions that focus on how processes themselves
("sense making," decision making, performing, identifying, etc.) emerge, develop,
grow, and decline are compatible with a process metaphysics in which the focus
is on how processes (rather than things) unfold over time.
In a shorter way, Langley et al. (2013:4) summarizes it as “variance theorizing
generates know-what type of knowledge, [whereas] process theorizing produces
know-how [type of] knowledge.” This indicates the embeddedness of the two
metaphysics in the two epistemologies (i.e., variance and process).
Van de Ven and Poole’s (2005) expanded explanation combines variance and process
approaches and identifies four typologies of approaches of studying organizational
change: (1) variance study of change in organization, (2) process study of change in
organization, (3) process study of organizing and (4) variance study of organizing.
These approaches are repertoire among which to choose depending on the question
on hand. However, Van de Ven and Poole (2005) contend that a single approach is
not capable of capturing a complete understanding of organizational change
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compared to the rather pluralistic approach which better combines some or all of the
approaches in a single inquiry.
Similarly, Langley et al. (2013) discusses about the missing of knowledge because of
the underrepresentation of process theorizing in the literature of organization and
change. The missing is a result of the incapability of the variance approach to capture
reality in the fly. Chiles (2003: 288) strengthens this idea as:
[b]ecause process models usually address multiple levels and units of analysis
and utilize qualitative (as well as quantitative) analysis techniques to make
sense of time-ordered data, they tend to be rich in context, high in complexity,
and dynamic in character.
Chiles (2003:290) warns a risk of overlooking the process view as managers cannot
gain complete understanding of organizational realities by only focusing on variance
theorizing which dominates the literature:
variance and process theorizing offer very different explanations of
organizational behavior. They provide educators two very different ways of
training managers, and offer managers two very different ways of making sense
of the world. Both theoretical orientations must figure into our scholarly
conversation about the role of theory in management education. ... By
overlooking process theory, we risk sending managers into the workforce ill-
prepared to handle the kaleidic reality that awaits them in the new world of
business.
The understanding of organizational phenomena requires managers to be equipped
with both variance and process theories as the organizational reality is multifaceted,
complex and dynamic in nature. Present reality in organizational systems call even
greater attention to process theory compared to variance theory (Chiles, 2003).
A relatively comprehensive account of process theory of organizational change is
made by Van de Ven and Poole (1995). In an attempt to explain how and why
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organizational change unfolds, they identify four motors of organizational change
resulting in four different typologies of change theories. As they succinctly explain it
in their abstract, the “four theories represent sequences of change events that are
driven by different conceptual motors and operate at different organizational levels.”
They also identify “the circumstances when each theory applies and proposes how
interplay among the theories produces a wide variety of more complex theories of
change and development in organizational life.” (p. 510).
These authors introduced four theories of organizational change: (1) life cycle, (2)
teleology, (3) dialectic and (4) evolution. In their explanation in a two dimensional
matrix, they used prescription as one dimension of the conditions or motors which
trigger the organizational change as explained by each process theory. However,
prescription or deterministic approaches (Howes & Quinn, 1978) overlap with the
variance theory.
2.3.3. Extension into Systems Perspective and Complexity Theories
Burton-Jones, Mclean, and Monod (2011) add systems approach as a third theory in
addition to variance and process. They recommend the possibility of pragmatist
approach by combining them. Moreover, implying the addition of the systems
perspective into and making three in the repertoire, the application of complexity
theory and the notion of complex adaptive systems (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011;
Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) are discussed in connection with the study of
organizational change. Van de Ven and Poole (2005) also suggest extension works
towards systems theory with an intention to afford explanations of more chaotic
organizational realities.
As mentioned earlier, the difference in views about organizations underpin behind
the plethora of change typologies. Organizational changes that are planned or
emergent, episodic of continuous, fast or slow are common dichotomies in the
literature (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011; Weick & Quinn, 1999; Brown & Eisenhardt,
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1997; Mills et al., 2009). However, these added to fragmentation in the literature and
ambiguity in understanding and management of organizational change (Jacobs et al.,
2013; Marshak, 2002; Barnett & Carol, 1995).
Attempting to contribute towards integrating these divergences, Maes and Van
Hootegem (2011) reviewed the literature in the field since the 1970s. They proposed
the systems approach and came up with a notion of change as a system in itself. The
systems approach gives a holistic view to organizational change and considers
organizations as open and complex adaptive systems which operate in a far from
equilibrium paradoxical state. This notion connects systems theory with complexity
theories.
Burnes (2005) explains complexity theories and their implications for organizational
change. As it was explained by other scholars (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997;
Marshak, 2002), complexity theory is described to have a potential of explaining
organizations that are operating in a rapidly changing world. Burnes (2005) tries to
link the notion of applying complexity theory in describing changes in human
behaviour in organizations with the evolution of thoughts about organizational
change. In doing so, Burnes (2005) reminds us that up to the 1980s, the literature of
organizational change was dominated by the planned approach which was greatly
influenced by Kurt Lewin’s three-step model.
However, following the oil crisis in the 1970s and the emergence of corporate Japan,
U.S. companies were challenged by the rapidly changing environment and hence had
to search for quick but at the same time fundamental changes. This signalled the
emergence of an emergent approach to change instead of planned; and continuous
change instead of punctuated equilibrium. The changes are also expected to affect
all organizational parts simultaneously and to treat the change as a whole system
instead of one-at-a-time type of incremental change. These were the bridges that led
organizational change literature into a mention of complexity theory.
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Brown and Eisenhardt (1997:1) also discuss continuous change in connection with
complexity theory. In their discussion, they build on comparisons between
continuous change and punctuated equilibrium model of change (i.e. Weick &
Quinn’s episodic change); and between incremental and radical change. Their
inductive research reveals that innovative projects are associated with “limited
structure around responsibilities and priorities with extensive communication and
design freedom to create improvisation within current projects.” This indicates that
innovation requires freedom to help change surf continuously. The limit of freedom
is also explicated in line with complexity theory—the blend should be “neither so
structured that change cannot occur nor so unstructured that chaos ensues.” (p.1)
From this, Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) assert that, an organizational characteristic
which they termed as “semistructures” emerged (p.28). Semistructure is in the middle
between rigid (mechanistic) structure which does not allow change and organic
structure in which there are few or limited orders which lead to a chaotic
organization. The other emergent organizational characteristic is links in time. Unlike
those in less successful organizations, managers in successfully innovative
organizations create a link among past, present and future times. Brown and
Eisenhardt (1997:30) argue that “organizational change readily occurs because links
in time create the direction, continuity, and tempo of change.”
Chaos theory, dissipative structure theory and Complex Adaptive System (CAS)
theories are engendered the under the umbrella of complexity theories (Burnes,
2005). While chaos theory and dissipative structure theory are applicable for a whole
system; complex adaptive system theory is meant for component parts (on an
individual component system basis). Van de Ven and Poole’s (1995) typologies which
are classified based on the unit of change and model of change combinations can
have potential overlap with these complexity theories. Besides, as Marshak (2002)
and Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) explain, the emergence of third dimension (i.e.
tempo) in addition to unit of change and mode of change on Van de Ven and
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Poole’s (1995) mode indicates the interlink between the process theories of
organizational change and complexity theory.
However, as complexity theory is brought from the natural sciences and it is a
mathematical model which is applied for chaotic (extremely complex non linear
systems); it is very difficult to conclude that complexity theory is being used in
organizational settings in a prescriptive manner. Rather it is a metaphorical level of
use. Therefore, it is imperative to address how complexity theory can replace
previous organizational change theories. Burnes (2005:87) warns that:
[if] organizations are to be re-conceptualised as dynamic non-linear systems
capable of continuous transformation through self-organization, advocates of
this approach will need to show either that it is more than just a metaphorical
device, or that even as such it is able to resolve the problems of managing and
changing organizations more effectively than other approaches that are on offer
(p.87).
Stacey (1995) also discusses complexity theory especially by focusing on complex
adaptive systems. Burnes (2005) does not contradict with Stacey’s (1995) discussion;
rather his work is more extensive and ordered in that it tries to take complexity
theories as an umbrella under which other component theories can be accounted for.
Amongst the communalities is the fact that how complexity theory is applied
replacing previously known management approaches is not developed yet: “how this
is done is a research program of great importance to strategic management” (Stacey,
1995: 491).
Bernard Burnes also discusses complexity theory in connection with Kurt Lewin’s
model. He claims the possibility of implementing new concepts of complexity theory
in organizational change practices by revisiting Lewin’s model and extending on it.
The rationale behind this proposal is explained in line with the model’s (Lewin’s)
common grounds with complexity theory that lays the foundation on which to build.
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Marshak’s (2002) work is a piece which attempts to question the language use of
scholars and practitioners of organizational change alike. According to Marshak
(2002), there is an absence or lack of precise and unambiguous language to address
emerging dynamics of contemporary organizations. Such organizations in the new
context need continuous change of whole systems. This kind of change is referred to
as “morphing” (Marshak, 2002). “When we combine the dimensions of parts-wholes
and episodic-continuous change into a matrix, the emerging nature of contemporary
organizational change is suggested” as depicted by the table below (Marshak,
2002:282).
Table 2.1: The four change scenarios
Dimensions Focus on
parts/segments
Focus on
patterns/wholes
Episodic change Periodic Operational Adjustments
 Gap analyses
 Fix its
Periodic Systemic (Re)
Arrangements
 Re-engineering
 System redesign
Continuous
change
Continuous Operational
Adaptations
 On-going improvements
 Kaizen, TQM
Continuous systemic Alignments
 On-going organizing
 ‘Morphing’
Source: Marshak (2002:282)
Morphing is the new language added when the nature of change is continuous and
the whole system is affected simultaneously. With this exception, the scenarios
identified here are not different from that of Van de Ven and Poole’s (1995)
pertaining to the units of change (i.e. the dimensions on the columns of table 2.1)
and Weick and Quinn’s (1999) third dimension of tempo (which refers to episodic-
continuous divide). Besides, even the row dimensions are not conceptually different
from Van de Ven and Poole’s mode of change dimensions of prescribed and
constructive. Prescribed (which is programmatic) overlaps with episodic (as it is
intentional as per Weick & Quinn’s (1999) explanation) and constructive (emergent)
matches with Marshak’s (2002) continuous.
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The motor notion behind the four typologies of change, as explicated by Van de Ven
and Poole (1995), could rather have implication about relevant implementation
strategies. Moreover, this work does not seem to capture the issue of what will
happen to the four typologies of change when the third dimension (i.e., tempo)
comes with the increasing environmental dynamism. Van de Ven and Poole’s attempt
to link dialectical typology with complexity theory could have served as an extension
slot for later scholars such as Marshak (2002).
Marshak (2002) also differs from Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1997) assertion that
continuous changing which demands organizations to be grown with improvisation
capabilities instead of being assembled at once. This implies continuous change
which evolves through sequences of steps which are situated in different scenario
from Marshak’s (2002) morphing does.
Brown and Eisenhardt (1997:31) brought other insights into implementation of
organizational change and innovation. The first is their assertion that organizations
that are capable of continuously improvising “must be grown, not assembled at a
single point in time” whereas the second relates to “sequenced steps” to implement
the changes or innovations. The third concept which depends on the second one is
about “the inimitability of this important capability.” As they explicate, imitating such
type of change is difficult as it requires knowing the recipe of sequence of steps
being an outsider who can only take a snapshot of organizational practices. From
these insights, it can be inferred that being capable of implementing a continuous
innovation and building an organization which improvises continuously is a core
competency which serves as a source of competitive advantage as it is difficult to be
imitated by others.
2.3.4. Paradox of Change and Continuity in Organizational Routines
Recent discussions on organizational change are building on the paradox of change
and continuity, order and disorder by making use of micro level actions, routines and
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artifacts (Glaser, 2017) as evolving mechanisms of maintaining changing
organizations in a dynamic environment. For example, Bernstein and Barrett (2011)
explored the literature and advocated much on the supremacy of dynamic capability
over ad hoc problem solving approach. However, dynamic capability which conveys a
message about a change in the resource and capability base which serves as a source
of competitive advantage is facing contentions from strict scholars in the paradox
notion. While acknowledging their notion of “Jazz mindset” being closer to ad hoc
problem solving approaches instead of the relatively rigid dynamic capability
approaches, Bernstein and Barrett (2011) strive to build on dynamic capability in an
apparent intension of making it more dynamic. The view of Bernstein and Barrett
(2011:59) intends to stand on the “patterned and practiced performance” in an
attempt to maintain order while letting improvisation as a controlled disorder.
Therefore, their view is also an addition to the rather metaphoric explication of the
application of complexity theory to managing organizational change.
Building on such transitional ideas of making dynamic capabilities even more
dynamic, recent scholars (e.g., Bernstein & Barrett, 2011) are bringing conceptual
level explanations down to a level closer to operations. This is an attempt to provide
the empirical world, which still needs a model through which to guide successful
strategic organizational change, with a usable theory.
Wang and Wang’s (2017) explicit assertion of the inability of dynamic capability to fit
to very dynamic environments marks the shift of organizational change discourse
towards closer to operations levels. In what they refer to as “employee-centric”
approach, Wang and Wang (2017) proposed ad hoc problem solving approaches
instead of dynamic capabilities which do not fit in disruptive change conditions. This
is a clear deviance even from Bernstein and Barrett’s (2011) transitional view.
In the same vein, Wiedner, Barrett, and Oborn (2017) explain the possibility of more
successful strategic change from unexpected places that are not the priority
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(attention) of top management. Such changes are bottom-up driven resulting from
self-initiated efforts by employees or peripheral units of the organization which
nurture themselves within the freedom of less top-management attention.
Magsaysay and Hechanova (2017) converge on the issue of employee-centric
approach to implementing organizational change. Employees’ mental model of ideal
leader needs to be explored in order to successfully foster employee driven changes
to a more successful organizational level routine as a result of leadership intervention
which should be guided by what they refer to as Implicit Leadership Theory (ILT).
Magsaysay and Hechanova’s (2017) mental model of ideal leadership which intends
to orient leader’s strategy of change management is another type of mental model
notion which adds to that of Van de Ven and Sun’s (2011) notion in the action-
reflection model. The intent in both works converges in that knowing one’s mental
model and moving along the flow is an easier strategy for effective change.
Stańczyk-Hugiet, Piórkowska and Stańczyk (2017) offer a platform on which the
notion of organizational routines or routines’ dynamics (as referred to by Lin et al.
(2017)) serve as mechanism of maintaining change and stability in organizations—
paradox. In doing so, Stańczyk-Hugiet et al. (2017) explain about performative and
ostensive aspects of routines. These two indicate how routines serve as sources of
change and stability. The performative aspect indicates the actions being carried out
in the organization. Such actions are evolving as a result of improvisations per
individual level; however, they also have demonstrative/manifestive—ostensive
aspects. For ostensive patterns to be created, retained and modified, performative
aspect is necessary. As interactions of both continue, emergent routines emerge.
Through this process, the organization changes to be a changing one.
Lin et al. (2017) explain how organizational routines evolve and serve as mechanism
of implementing management innovations. According to Lin et al. (2017:457),
organizational routines are “defined as repetitive, recognizable patterns of
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interdependent actions involving multiple actors.” With reference to implementation
of change in general and management innovation in particular, there is no possibility
of effectiveness other than changing such routines (Lin et al., 2017). This is also an
explanation for the views that consider organizational change as part of
management’s daily routines. So, effectiveness in changing organizational routines is
a mechanism of implementing change in organizations.
Contemporary discussions on change and stability paradox, in connection with
emergent routines, are manifestations of how foundational Lawler III and Worley’s
(2006) built to change model is. In this model, the central idea of successfully
implementing organizational change relates to the very design of the organization.
The notion rejects the assumption that organizational effectiveness is the result of
stability and replaces it with change. In explaining their idea, Lawler III and Worley
(2006) claim that organizations that are built to change can successfully implement
change and be kept in a changing state. Such organizations are changing
organizations. However, at the center of their built to change model, there is a
concept which they refer to as identity. Identity is defined as relative stability. They
also coined a notion called temporary advantage in replacement to competitive
advantage. The recent use of emergent routines and mechanisms of intentionally
influencing them represent similar concepts.
The discourse of evolving or emerging routines as a source of change seems a
natural process. However, Glaser (2017) explains how organizational routines can be
intentionally influenced by using artifacts. In so doing, Glaser (2017:2126) identified
three mechanisms of how routines can be altered—(1) “through dynamic interactions
between specific performances of action (i.e., the ‘performative’ aspect), (2) abstract
patterns of action (i.e., the “ostensive” aspect), and (3) human-made objects (i.e.,
‘artifacts’)”. The first two converge with the discussion of Stańczyk-Hugiet et al.
(2017). The third (i.e., artifact) is an addition to the repertoire of attributes of routine
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dynamics. Artifacts are defined as human made objects that are designed for a
particular purpose.
Glaser (2017) furthers the discussion on artifacts by mentioning standard operating
procedures, software and signs as examples of artifacts. Through these artifacts, an
organization can implement strategic change initiatives (Glaser, 2017). Artifacts, as
they are mechanisms of intentionally altering routines, come to the fore in the
discussion of change-continuity paradox. Originally, organizational stability used to
commonly associate with routines; however, recent literature appears to
acknowledge the emergence of routines and dynamic routines as manifestations for
routines to serve at the same time as a source of change. The notion of performative
aspects and artifacts made the assertion of routines as a source of change and a
means of implementation more explicated.
2.4. Common Dimensions of Organizational Change
Organizational change (OC) has basic components that are commonly mentioned in
the literature. Various writers (e.g. Nelson, 2003; Walker, Armenakiws & Bernerth,
2007; Pettigrew et al., 2001) call these OC components as change factors. These
change factors are mostly referred to as: content or substance, context, and process.
Hempel and Martinsons (2009), Okumus (2001) and Armenakis and Bedeian (1999)
put in outcome as a fourth factor in addition to the above three. Okumus (2001)
cited several previous works and extracted four strategic factors—content, context,
process, and outcome. Outcome is also described by Hempel and Martinsons (2009)
as change criterion or change objective. It represents the intended outcomes of
change.
Barnett and Carroll (1995) exerted efforts to give an order to the theory of
organizational change about which they felt fragmentation and rare contradictions.
Change content (i.e., what is to be changed in the organization) and change process
(i.e., how the change unfolds in terms of “speed, the sequence of activities, the
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decision-making and communication system, the resistance encountered, etc.” (p.
219) they assert, have an impact on change outcome and hence content and process
are important dimensions of organizational change. Instead of an attempt to rely on
only one dimension, considering both content and process is more logical. For
example, the assumption that change is an adaptation mechanism whereby the
triggering contextual factors predict a content of change implies that
implementation in turn calls for different approaches (i.e. process). Therefore, the
required content of change should be translated to the context in determining the
approach of change. This implies logical interplay (between the two dimensions) of
change which is shaped by context.
Besides, scholars such as Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997) explain two components
(i.e., content & process) associating them with schools of thoughts. Van de Ven and
Poole (2005) also discussed about process and content literature in organizational
change theory. These two coupled with context and outcome represents the
commonly referred factors of change (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Jacobs et al.,
2013; Pettigrew, 1990).
2.4.1. Outcome of Change
Outcome of change is described as criterion against which the success of change is
measured (Hempel & Martinsons, 2009; Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). It represents
one or more objectives or intended outcomes at organizational, group or individual
level that are expected to result from organizational change initiatives and against
which the success of implementation can be measured (Hempel & Martinsons, 2009).
Barnett and Carroll (1995) propose a model which measures the total impact of
change content and change process on change outcome. If an organization
anticipates a change in strategy, Barnett and Carroll (1995) explain, say from strategy
A to strategy B, the total effect of such change can be measured by the difference in
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the rate of failure when either strategy is applied plus the effect of the process of
change from strategy A to B as depicted below:
r(B)-r(A)+r(AB);
where r(A) is failure rate associated with strategy A, r(B) is failure rate associated with
strategy B, and r(AB) failure associated with change process.
Figure 2.1: The content and process effects of organizational change from
strategy A to strategy B.
Source: Barnett and Carroll (1995:226)
As it is understandable from the model, the content effect (i.e., r(B)-r(A)) when the
organization changes in strategy from A to B will be negative when the change is for
the better. From this explanation, implementation of a strategic change has an
impact added to the content effect that determines the total effect of change. This is
consistent with the assumption that no matter what the content would be, if the
transition fails to deliver it as it is expected to be, the entire outcome of change will
be negatively affected.
Barnett and Carroll’s (1995) attempt would have contributed much to the efforts of
Bunes (2011) towards calling attention of scholarship on the 70 per cent failure rate
as the notion of failure can operationally be linked to the measurement of total effect
of change. The missing of this opportunity is also evident in Hughes (2011) and the
logical challenges on conceptualization of failure too. As sound the arguments of
r(A) r(B)
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Hughes (2011) and Burnes (2011) are concerning the issues they raised, they could
have made their dictum closer to operational for researchers had they had built on
Barnett and Carroll’s (1995) model. In the absence of well established measure of
change outcome, the judgment about failure rate is not acceptable.
2.4.2. Content of Change
Change content reflects the substance of organizational change (Nelson, 2003;
Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). Content refers to the nature of change to be enacted
(Walker et al., 2007). There are two content areas of change: (1) the fundamental
aspects (structural element) of change and (2) human aspects of change which deals
with managing the people side of change (Siegal, Church, Javitch, Waclawski, Burd,
Bazigos, Yang, Anderson-Rudolph & Burke, 1996). In short, content or substance of
change implies the type and scale of change (Nelson, 2003). According to Hempel
and Martinsons (2009); the content of change is described in the literature using
dichotomist expressions such as revolutionary/evolutionary,
transformational/transactional, and major/minor. Contingency theorists propose a
consideration of these dichotomies in an inclusive (‘both’) manner instead of
exclusive (‘either- or’) approach (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995;
Dunphy & Stace, 1988; Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979).
2.4.3. Process of Change
Process refers to the actions to be taken to introduce and implement change (Walker
et al., 2007; Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999).  Lewin’s three phases of unfreezing the
current behavior, movement from the present state of the firm to the future and
refreezing the resultant new set of behaviors (Burnes, 2004a; Elrod II & Tippet, 2002),
systems and processes (Siegal et al., 1996) are foundations to the change process.
Nelson (2003) used “stewardship” as a variation to note this factor to refer to the
leadership, coordinating and controlling efforts during the change process.
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Theoretical underpinnings of the process notion are already discussed in previous
sections.
2.4.4. Context of Change
Context is another common change factor which refers to conditions (forces) that are
internal and external to the firm (Walker et al., 2007; Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999).
External forces are uncontrollable forces outside the firm. These forces may include
the intensity of competition, governmental regulations and rules, technological
changes etc…. Resources, knowledge, and managerial capabilities and attitudes and
emotions of employees and managers in a firm are among the internal forces
constituting context (Pettigrew, 1990). In addition, Nelson (2003) explained that the
static contingency model of change should be replaced by the dynamic model of
change to incorporate the turbulence of the environment in relation to the past,
present and future time dimensions.
Andrew Pettigrew is a renowned scholar on context related discussions. Pettigrew
(1990) discusses about the importance of contextualized approaches of
organizational change; while Pettigrew et al. (2001) made this call more explicit by
recommending organizational change research to be international and cross-cultural.
The validity of the idea of international and cross-cultural research in organizational
change is empirically evidenced later in 2009 by Hempel and Martinsons.
Pettigrew (1990:268) posits that “theoretically sound and practically useful research
on change should explore the contexts, content, and process of change together
with their interconnection through time.” That means these three components of
change must be linked. Pettigrew (1990) further suggests contextualist research as a
way of responding to the weaknesses of change theories being acontextual. The
contextualist approach emphasizes on:
the importance of embeddedness, studying change in the context of
interconnected levels of analysis [, first]. Secondly, the importance of temporal
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interconnectedness, locating change in past, present, and future time. Thirdly,
the need to explore context and action, how context is a product of action and
vice versa; and finally the central assumption about causation in this kind of
holistic analysis, causation of change is neither linear nor singular-the search for
a simple and singular grand theory of change is unlikely to bear fruit (p. 269).
While using the commonly referred change components—content, process and
context, Pettigrew (1990) emphasized the impact of context on the theories of
organizational change. Pettigrew (1990) proposes extending on the traditional view
which is limited to dichotomies—internal and external.
From this explanation, the interplay among the three and the heuristics of
embededeness should be captured in the scholarship of organizational change in
order to address the issue of changing using the language of “how to”. This coincides
with Beer’s (1992) call for usable theory. Besides, the new processual - contextualist
approach includes two key questions: (1) “how many levels of analysis to include in
the treatment of context and (2) complexity” (Pettigrew, 1990:698).
The other problem sought is the impact of the U.S. context on theories of
management as context is considered as “undiscussed background” (Pettigrew et al.,
2001:703). The undiscussed context behind the theories of organizational change is
the American business’s context. This calls for an account of other national contexts
and comparisons to see the homogeneous patterns and the unique features of
diverse contexts.
The third and most abstract level of comprehending context in the scholarship of
organizational change and hence least studied by researchers relates to temporal
and situational features of context. In explaining the extent to which the area is
overlooked by scholars, Pettigrew et al. (2001:704) note:
Where does a change agent begin a given change initiative, and what are the
varying degrees of receptivity to change in this or that organizational division or
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national business context? Even if change agents know about the factors
shaping degrees of receptivity to change, how should they customize the content
and process of change to reflect the contexts of different parts of their
organizations? The pragmatic temporal questions are also largely unstudied and
inadequately understood.
The views of Pettigrew et al. (2001) are consistent with Beer’s (1992) by echoing that
theories of management in general and organizational change in particular have to
pass through double hurdles of scholarship and relevance for practice. This requires
pluralistic approach in terms of engaging with other social science scholarship, with
different levels of context (embeddedness), and with practitioners. Besides, cross-
national comparisons should also be considered to reveal similarities and differences
therein. The purpose is to strengthen the link between theory-practice dichotomies.
This is what leads to a rigorously developed and practically usable theory of
organizational change.
The question of relevant theory which is equivalent to Beer’s (1992) usable theory
also overlaps with what Corley and Gioia (2011) describe as utility. This argument
intends to call for more attention in contributions towards practically relevant
theories of management.
2.5. Historical Background about Change Management
With an exception of Kurt Lewin’s work in the 1940s, the notion of change
management is a recent (1990s) phenomenon in the literature of organization and
management (Greener & Hughes, 2006). As Greener and Hughes (2006) and Burnes
(2004a, b) explain, organizational change before the 1980s was more a concern of
organization development (OD) literature than organizational change and
management in a form it is being referred to now. This first era of organizational
change is characterized by the planned approach for change. Since early 1980s,
however, the planned approach has been facing criticisms and in replacement
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emergent approach gained greater attention (Hughes, 2011; Greener & Hughes,
2006; Burnes, 2005; Burnes, 2004a, b; Marshak, 2002; Weick & Quinn, 1999; Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1997; Stacey, 1995). In line with this movement, the processual
perspective also widened its frontier towards the systems perspective whereby
addressing organizational change as a whole system instead of focusing on
individual components is asserted. This expansion was also associated with the use of
complexity theories (Burnes, 2005; Burnes, 2004b; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997).
Greener and Hughes (2006) review the strategic change management practices in the
1970s being triggered by intensified competitions because of the emergence of
Japanese car manufacturers in the European market. This phenomenon is similar to
the experience of American companies during the same period (Burnes, 2004b). The
discussion of Greener and Hughes’s (2006) is an additional record of the acontextual
nature of organizational development and change theories that dominate the
literature (Pettigrew et al., 2001).
As explained by different scholars (e.g., Burnes, 2004a, b; Elrod II & Tippet, 2002) and
reaffirmed by Mills et al. (2009), change management is a phenomenon in the
literature of management that emerged following the Second World War especially
gaining attention with the seminal work of Kurt Lewin. This is the emergence of it
being referred to as change management. However, the emergence of organizational
change intentions is the same as the emergence of management theories as their
common trigger was the need to change the way organizations used to do (Mills et
al., 2009). Lewin’s work is connected to the classical theories of management and has
footprints in the Organizational Development (OD) movement that gave attention to
organizational behavior. This stage was accompanied by the emergence of Japanese
corporations in the American market and their strong organizational culture.
The recognition of Japanese strength and outperformance in terms of organizational
efficiency resulted in increased attention to Japanese management techniques and
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organizational change towards adopting these techniques. These led to the
management fads which are commonly known as Total Quality Management (TQM),
Business Process Reengineering (BPR), Six Sigma (SS), and others.
The aforementioned organizational change techniques gained momentum following
the great depression of the 1970 and the accompanying emergence of Japanese
companies in the American market and the realization that American companies are
losing grounds for Japanese companies which had outsmarting management
techniques. This marked the turning point for the Americans to embark on
turnaround in their businesses. The resultant move led to the emergence of several
model of organizational change; but all are targeted towards gaining back the
strongholds of the American companies. This is an indication that the literature on
organizational change is excessively focusing on the American context (Pettigrew et
al., 2001; Hempel & Martinsons, 2009).
The Total Quality Management (TQM) has interesting history behind its recognition
as a quality initiative in America. The originator of TQM, Deming, tried to propagate
the idea in the 1950; but the Americans did not hear until his approach proved
successful in Japan and Japanese corporations emerged as strong competitors by
wining customers from American and European companies. In the 1990s, however,
American companies campaigned towards adopting TQM of which only 25%
succeeded. As Mills et al. (2009) explain this failure rate is because TQM was not for
every organization; it may work for some but not for all. This track record of TQM is
also evident in BPR—another process oriented organizational change approach
which is deviant from TQM as it abandons continuous improvement and proposes
radical organization-wide change.
The original contributor of BPR, Michael Hammer, was also concerned on quality and
came up with an idea of fundamentally rethinking about organization and radical
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transformation by avoiding wasteful practices and reconstructing the
organization afresh. It focuses on process while giving less attention to people.
Six Sigma (SS) and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) emerged as initiatives both focusing on
measurements. Though originally meant for measurement of performance, BSC
encompasses strategic management and communication as purposes in addition to
performance management (Kaplan & Norton, 1993). In the story behind the
emergence of the BSC as an infamous model, Art Schneiderman, a manager at
Analogue Devices, contributed the seminal idea while he was assigned in a study
which was expected to contribute towards quality improvement. In the same token,
SS emerged as a result of an effort to improve quality at Motorola.
All the aforementioned fads are considered as buzzwords by recent scholars who
appear to have been curious on the low rate of success. For example Jacobs et al.,
(2013) raise their concern of why change initiatives often fail and attribute it to the
fragmented literature in change management. This converges with Beer, Eisenstat
and Spector’s (1990) early warning about the inability of programmatic changes in
delivering intended outcomes by referring such changes as fallacious. As a
mechanism of avoiding buzzwords and enhancing success, they recommend the
change process to focus on the work itself instead of abstractions that are often
presented with the buzzwords. This marked the beginning of action-oriented
approaches and task-alignment strategies as mechanisms of change implementation
(Beer, 1992; Armenakis & Harris, 2009; Will, 2015; Magsaysay & Hechanova, 2017).
Beer (1992:111) posits that to fit to a rapidly changing environment, “traditional
command and control” organizations should shift “to an adaptive task-driven
organization.” He explains, actual change is implemented through actual tasks not
through useful knowledge. Peters and Waterman’s “7s” model can be a useful theory
to explain culture; but it is not usable as it offers “no help to managers in making
choices about how to sequence interventions in the system” (Beer, 1992:113).
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To execute strategic change, actionable knowledge that specifies the process (i.e.,
sequence of actions to be taken by managers) out of which some specific results are
expected must be defined. Beer (1992:115) explains what defines such sequence of
actions/intervention is an inductive research:
associated with collecting data, diagnosing the organization, inventing a new
organization, and developing a sequence of ‘hard’ and ‘soft changes that will
permit people not directly involved in the diagnosis or invention to become
committed. An action theory of strategic change would also specify the skills
that manger need for enacting the action sequence, as well as identifying the
inner states they must learn to manage to complete the sequence. Finally, the
theory should specify the context required by managers to implement the
specified action sequence.
Documented experiences and data will eventually serve as bases against which
evaluation of the action theory, which is developed to guide the action sequence to
be taken in order to implement strategic change, is carried out. This suggests the
importance of action science. Action science demands joint business-academy action
research “to create processes for strategic change that result in the most innovative
and best practices for developing a competitive learning organization [in America]”
(Beer, 1992:116).
Beer (1992) also emphasizes the challenge from the “normal science” in a form of
advocacy against the “action science” which is based on inductively developed
theories as less rigorous requiring less skill.  However, Beer (1992) argues, to make a
contribution to the competitive crisis facing the U.S., nothing less than a
transformation of our own assumptions about the production of usable knowledge
[notwithstanding the advocacies of the normal science] is required.
This explanation converges with the claim of incompleteness of variance theorizing in
explaining organizational change by other scholars (e.g., Langley et al., 2013; Chiles,
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2003). The inclusion of process metaphysics is reflected behind the need to capture
practical reality on the fly. This is what is needed from practitioners through whom
organizational reality is manifested. Without capturing the experiences of those who
actually make things happen at different levels throughout an organization, and
without taking an account of patterns of events unfolding therein, it is difficult to
think of an organization especially in the face of turbulence. This idea is consistent
with that of process theorists’ (e.g. Van de Ven & Poole, 2005; Langley et al., 2013).
Pettigrew et al. (2001:697) claims that organizational change as a field lacks maturity
especially in terms of “understanding the dynamics and effects of time, process,
discontinuity, and context.” With this assumption, they furthered their explanation on
the following six issues that demand more development: (1) the examination of
multiple contexts and levels of analysis in studying organizational change, (2) the
inclusion of time, history, process, and action (3) the link between change processes
and organizational performance outcomes, (4) the investigation of international and
cross-cultural comparisons in research on organizational change, (5) the study of
receptivity, customization, sequencing, pace, and episodic versus continuous change
process, and (6) the partnership between scholars and practitioners in studying
organizational change.
This is an additional evidence for the need for a non-linear and more complex
representation of organizational change as a means to incorporate reality that is
beyond the explanatory power of cause-effect relationship of the variance approach.
Armenakis and Harris’s (2009) reflection on their research and practices of
organizational change over a thirty years period reveal a relatively comprehensive
account of organizational change factors. Their focus is an exemplar action-oriented
approach to theorizing organizational change showcasing the validity of calls for
practitioner-researcher collaborative works to bring practical touch into
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organizational change theorizing (Woodman, 2014; Beer, 1992; Corley & Gioia, 2011;
Pettigrew et al., 2001).
Magsaysay and Hechanova (2017) converge with Armenakis and Harris (2009) by
promoting employee-centric approach for greater success in implementing
organizational change. Will (2015) is another contributor towards change recipient
focus in change implementation. While Armenakis and Harris’s (2009) focus is
strongest in its employee centric attention, followed by Magsaysay and Hechanova’s
(2017) approach which gives attention to change leader as perceived by change
recipients; Will’s (2015) account is one of win-win. Will (2015) focuses on the interests
of both the change leader and the change recipient as drives towards more
successful change implementation in a way both managers and employees can feel
considered. These discussions are reflections of how evolution of change
management thought from an “either-or” decision from dichotomies to “both-and”
perspectives of maintaining paradox at the same time.
Ever since change management gained attention in the literature of management,
the issue of success remained a central challenge for practitioners and academicians
alike. Therefore, implementing change which is initiated by an organization is the
most difficult stage in the change management process (Mills et al., 2009). The
unanimity in reporting 70% failure rate (Beer & Nohria, 2000) is the most salient
content one can extract from the literature in organizational change.
An exception to this unanimity is recorded by Hughes (2011) as a response to a
special issue of the journal of change management as explained in Burnes (2011).
Hughes (2011) argues that, the claims of 70 per cent failure rate are not sufficiently
supported by evidences. Moreover, all deviant implementations of programmatic
changes such as business process reengineering and total quality management
might not necessarily account for failure as “context-dependent nature of
organizational change” is neglected (Hughes, 2011:457). Notwithstanding the fact
that the 70 per cent failure rate is not supported by an empirical evidence and that
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there are valid arguments which can challenge the claim (Hughes, 2011), Burnes
(2011:447) acknowledges “it would be wrong to deny [the fact] that many
organizations do seem to struggle to implement change successfully.” The intention
is to provoke scholarly debates and contributions towards the question of why
change initiatives fail and how organizations can manage change successfully. This
does not make the issue of enhancing success in implementing organizational
change a least priority to the empirical world.
2.6. Strategic Organizational Change Implementation and Models
The implementation of organizational change gained attention as a result of high
failure rate discourse. Jacobs et al. (2013:773) for example explicitly raised questions
of “Why do so many organizational change initiatives fail to deliver?” and “how can
organizational change processes be implemented in a way that assures success?”
While discussing the shortcomings in the literature of organizational change in
addressing these questions, these authors argue that the literature in organizational
change is fragmented.
Consistent with other scholars, Rod et al. (2009) also assert (based on a review of the
literature) that design of a strategic change is given more attention than
implementation of it and hence at least about half of strategic change initiatives do
not deliver. Even Burnes (2011) and Hughes (2011) who contest the taken-for-grated
claim of 70% failure rate converge with other scholars in acknowledging the fact that
so many organizations are struggling to effectively implement change. In the
subsequent sections, implementation of organizational change and commonly
known models of implementation and/or management of organizational change are
presented.
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2.6.1. Implementation of Strategic Organizational Changes
The literature on strategic organizational change unanimously acknowledges the
difficulty of successfully implementing strategic organizational change that is
manifested by high failure rate. The need for scholars’ greater curiosity on
organizational change theories is an easy conclusion one can draw from reports of
high failure rate in the literature for decades on the one side and absence of
renowned implementation model on the other. Attempting to curb this, scholars
(e.g., Beer, 1992; Lawler III & Worley, 2006; Oakland & Tanner, 2007; Pryor et al.,
2008; Graetz & Smith, 2010; Van de Ven & Sun, 2011; Burnes, 2011; Woodman, 2014)
used to propose what they refer to as “new framework” or call for new perspectives.
However, despite these attempts, the situation is still characterized by high failure
rate coupled with fragmented theories.
Woodman (2014) explicates the practice in changing organizations as an art which is
related to the knowledge generated by science (i.e., theory). However, such
knowledge is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for successful organizational
change. The implementation of change is more of a practice than a science. This
implies the importance of practicable theories to bridge this duality (Glaser, 2017).
Here come the recommendations of Beer (1992), Corley and Gioia (2011) and
Pettigrew et al. (2001) for the partnership between practitioners and academics. This
helps to capture the art of changing organizations into theories of organizational
change.
Eventually, practice orientation and duality concepts led to the growing interest in
scrutinizing the possibility of implementing strategic organizational change with the
help of organizational routines (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Feldman,
2008; Graetz & Smith, 2010; Lin et al., 2017; Feldman, Pentland, D’Adderio & Lazaric,
2016).
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Nasim and Sushil (2011) identify dilemmas of organizational change based on an
extensive review of the literature in the field as (a) planned vs. emergent, (b) static vs.
dynamic, (c) incremental vs. revolutionary, (d) piecemeal vs. holistic view and (e)
macro vs. micro approaches. These polar views (as referred to by Nasim and Sushil
(2011)) were also reviewed by the systems theorists (e.g., Maes and Van Hootegem,
2011) who added other three dimensions to make the entire list eight. These earlier
polar views of organizational change are attributed to the low success rate of
organizational change implementation as Nasim and Sushil (2011:192-193) assert:
This approach to explaining organizational change continued for decades until
the inadequacy of the theories was demonstrably, reflected in the poor ratio of
change success. While exploring the reasons for the low rate of change success,
researchers looked beyond the existing epistemology, paving the way for a new
perspective of defining change, calling for balancing the opposing views rather
than choosing one over the other. This marked a clear shift from the ‘logic of
exclusion’ of the ‘either/or’ to the ‘logic of inclusion’ of the ‘and/also’, allowing
the emergence of ideas like managing both evolutionary and revolutionary
changes (theory of punctuated equilibrium), balancing Theory E and  theory O,
developing strategic ambidexterity to exploit as well as explore, managing
continuity to leverage change, etc.
This is how the concept of managing the paradox of change and continuity emerged
as a promising lens to look into the epistemology of organizational change as a way
forward. Central to this argument is the possibility of organizational success through
the ambidexterity of managing both change and continuity simultaneously—
balancing change with continuity through applying the “genius of the AND” as
Nasim & Sushil (2011) refer to. Partly, this earlier view of managing paradox also
converges with the idea of using complexity theory.
The traditional knowledge about routines was associated with organizational inertia;
however, Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) explanation about the two faces of
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routines—ostensive and performative—which make them sources of both continuity
and change gave new deliberation to the literature  in the paradoxical lens.
Feldman et al. (2016:505) define routines as “recognizable repetitive patterns of
interdependent action carried out by multiple actors.” They also identify two
attributes of routines—(1) they are temporal and (2) they are processes not things;
and because of these features, they are dynamic. But, if routines are considered as
things (i.e., “standard operating procedures, or machines, or genes, or correlations of
inputs and outputs”) (p. 512), it is not acceptable to consider routines as dynamics.
Pentland and Feldman (2008:249) reiterated the need for a shift from the old
ontological views of routines as things and rather embrace on the new fact that
organizational routines are “generative systems that can produce patterns of action
based on local judgment and improvisation by actors.” However, there is a common
mistake by managers to view routines as things and to confuse artifacts with
routines. Routines have the two attributes; intentionally designed artifact may have
an impact on routines only if it is enacted by actants and to an extent that the
designed artifact interplays with that of actants design or any emergent routine.
“Some amount of improvisation is inherent in the execution of routines. For better or
worse, organizational routines have a life of their own” (p. 249).
The change-continuity paradox gained momentum in line with the built-to-last
notion and captured scholars’ deliberation up to now. However, Lawler III and
Worley’s (2006) call for designing built to change organizations instead of managing
change did not get sufficient representation in the literature compared to the
paradox lens.
The final reflection of Nasim and Sushil (2011:198) is “a serious deficit of empirical
research and actionable framework required for managing the confluence of
continuity and change.” In conclusion, they proclaim a need for “a more actionable
strategic framework for practitioners at large” basing their rationale on the assertion
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of ‘managing change invariably requires balancing paradoxes’ while a “dearth of
validated models and frameworks required for managing the duality”  (p. 202).
Woodman (2014) extends the explanation on the duality of knowledge and practice
(action) by taking change process theory on the one side and change
implementation theory on the other. Change process theory explains the dynamics of
organizational change whereas implementation is “focused on strategies, procedures,
and change techniques—in other words, the specific activities that change agents
engage in to create the desired changes in the organization” (p. 466). The art of
changing organizations, Woodman (2014) reflects, requires theories; to mean
theories should have the utility of guiding actions (i.e. implementation). The
proposed solution is to make theories of organizational change usable as also
claimed by Beer (1992).
The issue of usability instead of usefulness as Beer (1992) posits, appears to
dominate recent literature. Synthesis of the literature indicates that proposals of
implementation models (frameworks) also manifest these orientations. To help
facilitate the discussion on implementation models in the extant literature, these
orientations were also used as factors of categorization.
2.6.2. Strategic organizational Change Implementation Models
Even though there have been evidences in the literature about change
implementation models and frameworks since the 1950s (Elrod II & Tippet, 2002),
change implementation models gained attention in the 1990s as a result of weak
track records of change initiatives. Since then, different authors proposed varieties of
models.
In the literature, the great depression of the 1970s and the emergence of Japanese
corporations on the American and European markets marked the start of a second
phase of development next to what was initiated by Kurt Lewin in late 1940s (Burnes,
2004b; Greener & Hughes, 2006).  Following this, the 1980s were characterized by
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early testing of the changes which emerged in the 1990s as process oriented
campaigns and grabbing of management techniques (e.g., BPR, SS, TQM, lean)
(Hammer & Champy, 1993; Balogun, 2001). The rationale behind this move was the
dynamism of the business environment which made old theories obsolete. Because
of acceptability of explanations about the inability of previous organizational change
models for the new dynamic and complex environment, several organizations
adopted the aforementioned organizational change initiatives (management fads).
Albeit the popularity of these management fads in America and Europe, 50 to 70
percent failure remained the track record of such initiatives (Pasmore, 2011; Schwarz,
2009; Franken et al., 2009; Brenner, 2008; Gilley et al., 2008; Kazmi, 2008; Oakland &
Tanner, 2007; Dufour & Steane, 2006; Mankins & Steele, 2005; Siegal et al., 1996).
Except a call for better curiosity on rate of failure (Burnes, 2011), no one appeared to
report a mechanism which curbs the situation nor does an empirically tested
framework of successful implementation gain sufficient representation in the
literature. Compared to the pervasive nature of high failure rate in the literature,
relatively little is said about successful implementation. Balogun (2001) attributes the
poorness of the track record of strategic change implementation to failure to
understand the fact that implementation is more challenging than formulation. This
implies the need to give greater attention to the issue of successfully implementing
changes.
The third phase of development in the literature is characterized by
acknowledgement of low rate of success in implementation and recommendation for
integrated frameworks of change and paradoxical views (Maes & Hootegerm, 2011;
Stragalas, 2010; Parry, Kirsch, Carey & Shaw, 2014; Al-Haddad & Kontour, 2015). The
most recent of the developments in the third phase relates to action oriented
employee-centric approach and the use of organizational routines (Graetz & Smith,
2010; Bernstein & Barrett, 2011; Magsaysay & Hechanova, 2017; Lin et al., 2017). In
the upcoming sections, together with the few notoriously cited implementation
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models, other attempts of scholars to guide the implementation and/or management
of organizational change are reviewed.
2.6.2.1. Kurt Lewin’s Three-Step Model of Change
Kurt Lewin developed a three-step model of change in 1947. The three steps are: (1)
unfreezing, (2) moving and (3) refreezing. The work was published in 1952 (Elrod II &
Tippet, 2002; Burnes, 2004a, b). Scholars in change literature (e.g. Young, 2009;
Walker et al., 2007; Chrusciel & Field, 2006; Siegal et al., 1996; Vrakking, 1995) also
refer to Lewin’s model as the phase model of change.
In the work of Bernard Burnes (2004a) entitled “Kurt Lewin and the Planned
Approach to Change: A Re-appraisal”, there is an argument about the continued
relevance of Lewin’s approach despite the criticisms emerged since the 1980s. Before
the coming to scene of these criticisms, Burnes (2004a) proclaimed that, Lewin’s
model dominated the theory and practice of change management especially the
planned approach.
In his explanation to show the validity of Lewin’s (1947) three-step model, Burnes
(2004a) notes that most of the critics that emerged since the 1980s were narrowly
analyzing Lewin’s work by focusing on only one of his four interdependent models
namely: field theory, group dynamics, action research and the three-step model. To
understand Lewin’s idea, the four concepts should be treated in their totality not
separately.
The essence of the four concepts is solving social conflicts at an individual, group,
organizational or societal level through changing group behavior. Changing group
behavior requires understanding the present situation (field theory) and the forces
that determine group behavior (group dynamics) on the basis of which appropriate
interventions (actions) are designed (action research) to bring about sustained
change with lesser resistance (three-step model). The need to sustain changes elicits
Lewin’s fourth work—the three-step model of change.
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Though Lewin’s works were not targeting change in organizational contexts,
especially the three-step model to change gained prominence in organizational
change research being propagated by the OD movement. During the 1950s to the
1970s, the OD movement focused on group issues and hence the work of Lewin
gained dominance in the literature. Since the 1980s OD started to focus on socio-
technical systems, organizational culture, organizational learning and radical
transformational change (Burnes, 2004a) and hence, Lewin’s model for planned
change implementation faced several criticisms. Much of these criticisms relate to the
rejection of planned approaches to change for reasons that are connected to the
greater dynamism and complexity of organizations and their environment. These
claims gained momentum with the emergence of the idea of using complexity theory
for organizational change management (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995; Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1997; Marshak, 2002).
In his other work entitled “Kurt Lewin and complexity theories: back to the future?”
Burnes (2004b) compared the works of Kurt Lewin with complexity theories. He, as is
the case in his work in 2004a, argued that Lewin’s approach shares much more
common grounds with complexity theorists than claimed by critics. In his argument,
Burnes (2004b) discusses communalities (compatibility) between complexity theories
and Lewin’s model. For example, Lewin’s democratic principles which promote
participatory decisions results in a type of change which lets self-organized teams to
be innovative so as to keep the organization operate at the edge of chaos.
Moreover, Burnes (2004b) claims that the Lewinian approach, instead of being
outmoded as claimed by many supporters of complexity theories, is more
comprehensive in that it can help even these theorists in implementing appropriate
order generating rules which keep organizations at the edge of chaos. Other step-
based models are discussed in the next sub-section.
50
2.6.2.2. Phase Models of Change
Typical to the phase models are those which are characterized by sequence of
actions (steps) through which organization change is expected to pass. For example,
Dainty and Kakabadse’s (1990) eight-step approach which constituents (1) identifying
the need for change, (2) recognition of the need for action, (3) diagnosing the
problem, (4) determining change goals, (5) selecting a change program, (6)
implementing the change, (7) creating proper climate, and (8) evaluation of change
effectiveness is a step-based approach. In this approach, the sixth step is a
manifestation of how confusing the literature used to be for practitioners.
Implementing is not a single task. Apart from the criticisms the step-based model
faced mainly in a way Kurt Lewin’s model was criticized as described in the previous
section, the absence of integrity and clear pattern made it difficult to capture the
exact intent of the models under this category. Other such models from the extant
literature are presented in the next sections.
2.6.2.2.1. Twelve levers of change
Howes and Quinn’s (1978) twelve lever of change is among the oldest in this
category next to Lewin’s.  Authors claim to have developed it based on review of the
literature since the 1950s in an attempt to bridge the gap between what they refer to
as ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ research. In doing so, they identified the distinction
between scientific body of knowledge which is mostly descriptive and tries to answer
‘what is‘ and managerial problems which are mostly prescriptive in nature and try to
address ‘how to.’ From what they called “the descriptive body of knowledge on
change,” they identified twelve variables or levers that managers can manipulate
when they introduce an innovation. The following table depicts the twelve levers.
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Table 2.2: Twelve levers (framework for guiding the phases of implementation)
A. Phase 1: Set up an Adequate Orientation Environment
1. Set aside enough time for an adequate introduction to the change.
a. Identify what will be changed
b. Plan workshops, meetings, and in-service seminars.
2. Make the relative advantage of the change easily visible.
a. Package it so that it is easily understood, easily reference, and
easily related to performance.
3. Show organization members (users) that their efforts will be supported.
a. Identify, obtain, and confirm availability of support services and
resources.
4. Show members it will be easy to institutionalize the change and that it
will be relatively nonthreatening afterward.
a. Clarify the expectation of each member during and after
implementation.
5. Show that immediate superiors accept and support the change.
6. Clearly identify the roles and relationships of all who will be involved in
the change process.
B. Phase 2: Set up Adequate Support Networks for the Implementation Effort.
1. Produce and make supportive services available.
2. Set up formal training programs to develop members’ roles.
a. Provide in-service training, continuing workshops, seminars, etc.
3. Encourage and reward the use of horizontal and vertical communication
channels.
4. Relax standard operating procedures in affected (Changing) units.
5. Integrate change agents, managers, and members.
a. Provide frequent and individual contact.
6. Make sure members feel adequately involved.
a. Establish problem-solving meetings and shared decision-making
norms.
Source Howes and Quinn (1978:73)
The model is named “twelve levers” after the twelve specific tasks that are
engendered in the framework.  The two phases depicted in the table are about
readiness and guideline of action. As such, the work of Howes and Quinn (1978)
somehow overlaps with the first two steps in Lewin’s model. However, Howes and
Quinn’s (1978) work can also be taken as a concern to handling the people aspect
during planning and implementing organizational change.
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2.6.2.2.2. Kotter’s eight-steps model
In 1995, Kotter came up with an eight step model. This model is developed by taking
into account eight common mistakes managers commit during change
implementation and by designing a solution framework for these mistakes. The
underlying assumptions of Kotter’s (1995) model are: (1) the importance of going
through phases (steps) which takes considerable time; and (2) error in any of the
steps will lead the change initiative to failure; trying to speed up organizational
transformation through skipping a step results in failure.
Figure 2.2: Kotter’s (1995) Eight – Step Model
Source: Kotter (2007:99)
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This work of Kotter (1995) is republished by Harvard Business Review in 2007 as best
of 1995. In the 2007 edition, it has been noted that Kotter’s work remains state-of-
the-art even after a decade. Next to Kurt Lewin’s model, Kotter’s eight-step model is
pervasive in the literature. Several authors try to build on or enhance it. Stragalas
(2010) is among such authors. She worked towards the adaptation of the model.
Stragalas (2010) claims the possibility of improving the track record of failure in
change through the provision of effective guidance in the form of implementation
model and put Kotter’s eight-steps model at the center of her investigation. She
notes:
Typically, organizations have trained managers in change process models rather
than change implementation frameworks. Given the track record for failed
change interventions, there is an opportunity for organizational development
professionals to provide effective guidance through the application of a
comprehensive change implementation model . . . (Stragalas, 2010:37).
With the intention to make Kotter’s (1995) model clear for implementation, as its use
in guiding implementation of change initiatives is limited despite the fact that it has
been validated by researchers, Stragalas (2010) tries to expand and refine the eight
steps. These steps are categorized into three stakeholders: (1) leadership, (2)
employees, and (3) organization as presented in the following figure.
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Leadership
Communicate specifics regarding expected results
Use “building up” and “breaking down” language
for understanding and commitment
Be visible in communications, using formal and
informal channels
Support improvisation
Sell problems, not solutions for encompassing
change
Engage employees through purpose and
challenge
Organization
Shape effective management practices
Train and coach managers to exhibit
identified skills and behaviors
Match reward systems to transformed
vision, processes and leadership
behaviors
Support risk-taking and innovation
Target the identified antecedents for
successful change management
Use employee engagement strategies
to reinforce organization culture
values
Employees
Want specifics: expected results,
impacts, time tables, and measures
Look for signals from senior
management before accepting
accountability, investing and
committing
Require an intact management team
through the transformation
Seek role autonomy, participation, a
relationship with managers and
connection to vision
Figure 2.3: Kotter’s enhanced action steps
Source: Adopted from Stragalas (2010:36)
Seijts and Gandz (2017) reappraised Kotter’s model and integrated the eight steps
with leader characteristics framework. Appelbaum, Habashy, Malo and Shafiq,
Hasham (2012) revisited Kotter’s framework and proved the existence of valid
features in the model that last for a decade and half.
2.6.2.2.3. Change agent phases and change target stages
Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) are better known for their contribution on identifying
the four common components of change (i.e., content, context, process, & outcome).
In addition, they recommend a model which is fundamentally similar to Lewin’s and
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Kotter’s works. This model is a sort of operationalizing the concepts in the
aforementioned (earlier) models from change agent and change recipient (change
target) perspectives. In addition, Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) also reviewed other
process models which emerged in the 1990s to develop their model called “change
agent phases” and “change target stages” (see the figure on the next page).
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Figure 2.4: Change Agent Phases and Change Targets stages
Source: Armenakis and Bedeian (1999:305)
Unfreezing
Readiness
Urgency/ Coalition/
Vision/ Communication
Plan/ Communication/
Acceptance
Need/ Vision/
Diagnosis/
Recommendations
Moving
Adoption
Empowerment/ Wins/
Consolidation
Change/Consolidation
Pilot/Preparation/
Rollout
Freezing
Institutionalization
Institutionalization
Institutionalization
Measurement
Reinforcement/
Refinement
Denial/Resistance
Anticipation/
Confirmation
Exploration
Culmination
Commitment
Aftermath
Stages through which Change Targets Progress
Phases within which Change Agents Act
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2.6.2.2.4. Framework for planned change
Mento, Raymond, and Walter (2002) came up with a framework which they claim to
be grounded in both theory and practice and has connections to three other models
namely Kotter’s strategic eight-step model, Jick’s  tactical ten-step model and
General Electric (GE)’s seven-step model. Their model has twelve steps. These steps
are discussed in the following paragraphs. As it is synthesized from the
aforementioned works of previous scholars, Mento et al.’s (2002) effort is a
contribution towards the development of change implementation models. With an
intention to have comprehensive ideas from previous models too, the twelve steps
of Mento et al. (2002) are described hereunder.
Step 1: The idea and its context. The starting point of a change initiative as proposed
by Mento et al. (2002) is recognizing the change—knowing the need for change, the
idea of the change (content of change), and the context within which the change is
expected to unfold. This stage has the same purpose as Lewin’s unfreezing stage by
the end of which organizational actors understand the need for change and engage
in a seeking behavior towards change.
Step 2: Define the change initiative. This step involves, based on the change needs of
the organization, defining the roles of parties—strategists, implementers and
recipients. It is a requisite step as the actual execution is the result of interplay
among these actors.
Step 3: Evaluate the climate for change. Context is called for at this stage. The actual
content of change to be implemented should fit to the context for the organization
to be successful. This requires an evaluation of the environment within which the
organization is expected to operate. The results of these analyses will help develop
different scenarios under which alternative plans are developed for implementation.
58
Step 4: Develop a change plan. This stage implies the application of the framework
for planned changes. Such types of changes need to be planned in a way the plan
specifies goals and detailed responsibilities for strategists, implementers and
recipients. The plan should solicit the content and process of change. There should
also be a room for flexibility in the plan—the plan should be specific but also flexible.
An optimum fit between specificity and flexibility in the plan is required.
Step 5: Find and cultivate a sponsor. A sponsor according to Mento et al. (2002:52), is
a person(s) who with “sufficient amount of organization power and influence”
expresses models and reinforces a change initiative and generates “strategic
convergence both vertically down and horizontally across the organization.” This
sponsor will be more effective if recruited from the “lowest level in the organization
to whom all the change recipients report.”
Step 6: Prepare your target audience, the recipients of change. “This stage of the
change process is best understood from the perspective of the recipients of the
change” (p. 53).  This is to mean that, the concept of the change should be
understood by employees. The natural resistance to change should be handled
through helping change recipients understand what the change is and get relieved
from their skepticism.
Step 7: Create the cultural fit—making the change last. Designing change initiatives in
a way they become consistent with the existing organizational culture increases the
success of the initiative. When there is a gap between the corporate culture and the
change initiative, culture will impose its impact on the initiative and the success of
the initiative will diminish.
Step 8: Develop and choose a change leader team. For the change recipient to accept
and act in a way the initiative will be implemented successfully, a leader who can
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motivate participants towards the vision and put the initiative instrumental in terms
of rewarding changed behavior and institutionalizing the change through crafting an
appropriate organizational structure is vital. This change leader can play its role
better when organized as a team than as an individual.
Step 9: Create small wins for motivation. If we wait for the successful completion of
the entire initiative to celebrate resultant achievements, we will continue dropping
people being hopeless and naturally turned to be resistors and end up with the big
goal not achieved. Therefore, we have to decompose the “big hairy audacious goal”
into short-term small wins and measure progress in terms of them. Recognizing the
employees involved in those wins will motivate them and become committed.
Moreover, updating the sponsor about the small wins will increase his/her
confidence in the initiative and is important to get the required resources.
Step 10: Constantly and strategically communicate the change. With the purpose to
enhance understanding, reduce confusion and resistance, and increase commitment;
a communication which is carefully designed and tailored to the frame of reference
of the audience is critical for the full execution of a change initiative.
Step 11: Measure progress of the change effort. This means creating and
implementing metrics to measure the progress of the initiative in terms of outcomes
related to milestones in the change initiative [effort]. This requires prior definition of
change outcomes and corresponding measures against which progress of
implementation can be measured.
Step 12: Integrate lessons learned. Here, organizations are advised to document the
norms, political systems, written and unwritten rules of work, and procedures so that
they cannot forget the past but learn from it. Reflection is sought to be an effective
mechanism central to lessons learned. The reflection process will better suit to
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learning if triggering questions are used. The US army’s “After Action Review
Process” (AARP) set of questions are recommended by Mento et al. (2002:56) to be
used for this purpose. The questions are: “(1) What did we set out to do? (2) What
actually happened? (3) Why did it happen? And (4) what are we going to do next
time?”
Asking these questions and making continuous refinements at all times; not just at
the end of the project and hence, taking lessons as they emerge, during
encountering problems and proposing solutions throughout the course of the
change process is the intent of this step. This last step is a new insight Mento et al.,
2002) came up with. It allows revising the plan when there is something that
demands so in any of the twelve steps. This has connections to the notion of
continuous change.
2.6.2.2.5. The 7-step model of change implementation
Balogun (2001) proposed a seven-step model which is also associated with other
cautionary moves (i.e., cultural shift, organizational context assessment, &
consideration of the people side). The issue in connection with context which is
shaped by culture, organizational specifics, and people sets the condition contingent
on which the change to be implemented has to be designed. As such, she developed
a relatively well framed implementation model consisting of seven steps as
demonstrated in the Figure 2.5:
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Figure 2.5: Implementation steps
Source: Adopted from Balogun (2001:3)
To successfully go through these steps within the specific context, which is shaped
by the three aforementioned issues, Balogun (2001) proposes to start first with
carrying out a cultural shift with a support of her “culture web” framework which
helps to understand existing culture and associated barriers to change which in turn
is required as an input to design the future desired state of the organization. The
culture web (indicated in Figure 2.6 below) is designed in a way it defines
organizational paradigm in terms of webs of symbols, power structures,
organizational structure, controls, routines and stories.
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Figure 2.6: Culture web
Source: Adopted from Balogun (2001: 5)
The second one is designing an approach which is sensitive to organizational
context. The specifics of the organizational context are supported by her framework
called “change kaleidoscope.” This framework has three layers of contexts. The outer
layer consists of factors that are in the wider context of organizational change. The
middle one encompasses time, scope, preservation, diversity, capability, capacity,
readiness and power. Whereas design choices, change path, change start point,
change style, change interventions and change role are in the inner layer. The inner
layer is the micro level which shapes the change implementation operation.
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Balogun’s change kaleidoscope (see Figure 2.7) is a unique attempt to integrate
context with change implementation approach.
Figure 2.7: Change kaleidoscope
Source: Balogun (2001: 6)
The third concern is the people aspect. As change cannot be thought about without
changing the way managers and employees of an organization are doing businesses,
changing the employees must be framed as an integral part of the change.
Here, it can be seen that the choice of appropriate design (approach) to change is
dependent on cultural, organizational context and people aspects. This leads to the
validity of the idea of having context-sensitive approach to change as the above
attributes of context are differing across nations and at the core of the present study.
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Balogun’s (2001) is a bridge between those who consider the implementation of
change as a linear sequence of actions and those who consider it as a contingent,
dynamic and non-linear system. Earlier, Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990) also raised
an issue in connection with programmatic changes in a relatively bold manner by
referring to them as “fallacious”.
2.6.2.3. Cyclic Models of Organizational Change
Step-based models are oriented towards following a set of steps or sequences of
activities. They are mostly parallel to the unfreezing-moving-refreezing triple stages
of Lewin. A central assumption behind such propositions is stability of organizations
before and after the change. That is, until the need for change arises, organizations
operate under state of equilibrium. Then, when the status quo in equilibrium is not
fit to changed environmental conditions, organizations plan to change through
sequence of steps which ultimately lead to a new status quo (equilibrium).
Models under this section are built based on an assumption which considers change
to happen in a loop instead of linear-cause-effect relationship or sequence of steps
(Langley, 1999). Gradually, this assumption grew to include an assertion that change
is an iterative non-linear complex phenomenon which makes equilibrium impossible
(Marshak, 2002). Exemplars of models with such underpinning assumptions are
presented in the next sub-sections.
2.6.2.3.1. Oakland and Tanner’s (2007) “Figure of Eight”
Oakland and Tanner’s (2007) framework is a typical cyclic model which is graphically
visualized by a figure which looks like number eight. Using arrow heads, the model
indicates a cyclic process through which a successful change unfolds. Intention of
the authors is reflected through their recognition of low success rate which ranges
between 10% and 30%.
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With this in mind Oakland and Tanner (2007) identified four themes from the change
literature. The first one is leadership of change. Leadership plays an important role in
planning the change through implementing it. The second theme is the need for
change. In relation to this, project management approach, which is also proposed by
Kazmi (2008), is sought to be the most successful approach to change
implementation. Managing the softer side of change (people) which encompasses
dealing with organizational culture and effective communication is the third theme
recognized by these scholars. This notion is a reappraisal of Balogun (2001). The
fourth one is learning. Learning is important in change management. This signals the
explicit start-up of the next cycle in a cyclic model.
Based on these four themes from literature, Oakland and Tanner (2007) developed
research instruments and applied them to both private and public sector
organizations with an attempt to address critical factors for successful change
management. An examination of how organizations implement change revealed that
process, structure, resources, behavior, system and control are important factors to
be considered (Oakland & Tanner, 2007).
Their “new framework” for managing change is the resultant contribution from their
work. As depicted in Figure 2.8, it resembles number eight (8) and hence referred to
as “the figure of 8” (Oakland & Tanner, 2007: 585). It shows the process through
which managing change passes.
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Figure 2.8: The organizational change framework
Source: Oakland and Tanner (2007: 584).
The authors warn not to delve into the second circle in the figure prior to making an
assessment of readiness for change. This approach is similar to the twelve levers
model proposed by Howes and Quinn (1978). Armenakis and Harris (2009) also
reaffirmed the importance of readiness assessment.
Readiness for change begins by identifying the triggers (drivers) of change. These
can be internal or external as summarized by the following table.
Table 2.3: Drives for change
External drivers Internal drivers
Customer requirements Improving operational efficiency
Demand from other stakeholders, such as
the Government
Need to improve the quality of products
and services
Regulatory demand Process improvement
Market competition
Shareholders/city
Source: Oakland and Tanner (2007: 574).
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Identifying triggers of change enhances interest in and energy on change. Not only
does identifying triggers of change serve as a source of energy, it also sets the
context within which appropriate type of leadership and directions can be designed
on the basis of which “expectations—values, aims, measured objectives and targets”
are set (Oakland & Tanner, 2007:584). Clarity in the type of leadership and directions
is prerequisite for a detailed plan of an initiative. The plan should set priorities and
indicate strategic objectives and targets. With this, all the people involved will be
focused towards the desired end.
For a plan to be implemented there must be a clearly articulated process
(prescription) that defines the way people and resources in an organization work.
Process defines the “structure, roles, competencies, and resources deployed”
(Oakland & Tanner, 2007:585). Then, the organization’s system and control come to
the scene.  The whole thing is a defined context within which people in organizations
are expected to behave. This is where managers are systematically trying to influence
the behavior of people. As Oakland and Tanner (2007:585) put it, “most people start
work for an organization with positive attitudes and behaviors and it is frequently
the systems and environment that cause problems and deterioration.” Therefore,
managers are expected to take care of the process, system and control in a way it
positively influences the behavior of people in organizations.
Oakland and Tanner (2007) claim that their organizational change framework is
developed with an intention to help practitioners enhance success in implementing
change. These authors further claim that, such enhancement in implementation
success is manifested by the fact that world class companies are working in
consistency with the specifics in the figure of eight model.
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2.6.2.4. Process Models of Organizational Change
The term process here should be understood in consistence with the process
epistemology discussed earlier. In the work of Van de Ven and Poole (1995), the idea
of using models is viewed from a new perspective—having a pool of multiple
models of change from which to choose and use as a remedy when a change
initiative breaks (fails to deliver). This approach is later described as action and
reflection by Van de Ven and Sun (2011).
Van de Ven and Sun (2011) proposed two kinds of strategies to be taken when
breakdowns to change occur—action which deals with correcting people or
processes in the organization and reflection which focuses on revising the mental
model one stands with. The argument of these scholars is that the effectiveness in
change implementation will be improved if a greater attention is given to reflection
than the practice of taking action strategy. Further, Van de Ven and Sun (2011) argue
that the use of action and reflection strategy should consider three things—having
multiple mental models of change, having framework for diagnosing weaknesses
and breakdowns in the models of change, and being cognizant of the level beyond
which process breakdowns cannot be repaired.
The approach of building a repertoire of multiple mental models of change from
which change agents can choose as a remedy for process breakdowns as asserted by
Van de Ven and Sun (2011:59) “shifts the research agenda on organizational change
toward a contingency theory of implementation.” The authors discuss the idea of a
shift towards contingency theory of implementation in line with Van de Ven and
Poole’s (1995) four process models of change as the ones to be encompassed in the
extended repertoire of alternative models from which to choose depending on the
type of breakdowns and remedies assumed to best fit to a specific change situation.
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A summary of these alternatives and their corresponding fit to expected types of
breakdowns is presented in the following table.
Table 2.4: Breakdowns and remedies in process models of organizational change
Teleology
(Planned
Change)
Life Cycle
(Regulated
Change)
Dialectic
(Conflictive
Change)
Evolution
(Competitive
Change)
Process cycle Dissatisfaction,
search, goal
setting, and
implementation
Prescribed
sequence of steps
or stages of
development
Confrontation,
conflict and
synthesis between
opposing interests
Variation, selection
and retention among
competing units
Situations when
model applies
(generating
mechanism)
Social
construction of
desired end
state; goal
consensus
Prefigred program
regulated by
nature, logic, or
rules
Conflict between
opposing forces
Competition for
scarce resources
Typical
breakdowns
 Lack of
recognition
 Decision biases
 Groupthink
 Lack of
consensus
 Resistance to
change
 Lack of
compliance
 Monitoring and control
 Destructive
conflict
 Power imbalance
 Irresolvable differences
 Requisite variety
 Lack of scarcity
Remedies  Triggering
attention
 Critical thinking
 Consensus
building
 Responding to
complaints
 Local adoption
 Internalizing mandates
 Conflict
management
 Negotiation skills
 Political savvy
 Niche development
 Marketing
 Strategies for
competitive
advantage
Source: Van de Ven and Sun (2011: 61).
Van de Ven and Sun (2011) claim that none of these four process models can
adequately address organizational change processes. Therefore, instead of focusing
more on applying action strategy of problem solving through changing people or
organizational processes, change agents can better succeed in change
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implementation by dealing with breakdowns through revising mental models of
change. They further propose that the implementation of reflective strategy is
recommended after it is proved that the breakdowns in implementing change
models cannot be corrected or repaired through action strategy.
Contingency theory of change implementation leads to the challenges of
complexities of interacting models, agents and changes. That means, understanding
the interaction and interdependencies among different changes, among change
agents who have different mental models, and among models themselves is
required. Van de Ven and Sun (2011) also recommended considering other change
models proposed by other scholars such as Huy (2001), Meyer, Creux and Marin,
2007) and Weick and Quinn (1999). The following figure depicts temporal relations
among the four process models of Van de Ven and Poole (1995).
Figure 2.9: Temporal relations among change models
Source: (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011: 68; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995: 520)
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Another challenge yet to be researched well as proposed by Van de Ven and Sun
(2011) is determining the learning cycle of acting to correct breakdowns in the four
process models and reflecting to change one’s mental model and searching for a fit
to the change process that is unfolding in an organization.
2.6.2.5. The System Models of Change
Models under this category are guided by an assumption which considers
organizational change as a system in itself. Two examples are presented in the next
sections.
2.6.2.5.1. Maes and Van Hootegem’s (2011) change system
Maes and Van Hootegem (2011) are the prominent protagonists of the notion of
conceptualizing organizational change as a system (instead of a process of changing
a system). These authors proposed generic nomenclatures for sets of attributes of
change through consolidation of old dichotomist views in the change literature.
Their consolidation effort extends to researching the literature on organizational
change articles which were published since 1970. As a result, they identified eight
dimensions of change attributes as presented in the following table.
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Table 2.5: Eight dimensions of change
Dimension Attributes
1. Control Emergent Planned
2. Scope Adaptation Transformation
3. Frequency Continuous Discontinuous
4. Stride Incremental Revolutionary
5. Time Long Short
6. Tempo Slow Quick
7. Goal Open Strict
8. Style Participative Coercive
Source: Maes and Van Hootegem (2011:209)
These dimensions are used to describe the process of change as a system. The
dichotomist view still persists in this work. As can be seen in the table above, there
are two types of changes emerging in a continuum even though there is a more
comprehensive characterization. Moreover, Maes and Van Hootegem (2011:192)
describe the change models which were developed based on dichotomist view as
“cluttered jumble” that do not help in understanding the subject matter.
Despite the fact that the systems approach is more suitable than any other single
discipline to understand practical management problems, there was no sufficient
attempt to approach change management as a system instead of considering it as a
process to change a system (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011). This is the reason to
look for a different theoretical perspective beyond these eight attributes of change—
the application of systems approach. This approach considers the management of
change as a system with a specific function in organizations. As such, this system has
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three components: specific inputs, particular system elements and outputs. The
following figure portrays this.
Figure 2.10: The systems model of change management
Source: Maes and Van Hootegem (2011: 216)
The type of change is affected by individual components and interactions between
these components of the change system. These parts are viewed as integrated whole
functioning in cooperation with an intention to change the setting of system.
The other insight to change management that comes in connection with the
application of systems approach is the notion of considering organizations as
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). This view has roots in complexity theory. This gives
several ways to respond to change. Considering change as a complex adaptive
system is a holistic approach that reduces tension between dichotomist positions
through entertaining planned and emergent, discontinuous and continuous,
adaptive and transformative attributes at the same time but to different extents.
74
This modern view of change systems is described by Maes and Van Hootegem
(2011:219) as:
In order to produce creative, innovative, continually changeable behavior,
the change system must operate far from equilibrium into complexity and
paradoxical states of stability and instability, predictability and
unpredictability, freedom, and control... Instead of a dichotomistic view
requiring an ‘‘either or choice’’ ... is convinced that in a complex system
paradoxical states are present.
The presence of the statement about paradox is an important development here.
This is how the paradoxical view (Graetz & Smith, 2010) emerged. With this views
(paradox, complexity and dynamics), the eight attributes are incorporated in the
change system model as presented in figure 2.11.
Figure 2.11: Attributes of the change system
Source: Maes and Van Hootegem (2011:219).
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Maes and Van Hootegem (2011) proclaimed the change system approach to be
given attention by scholars as part of the presently demanding consolidation and
integration of previous dichotomist views. Their proposed model, as they say, can be
used for empirical research. However, they do not mention whether they have tested
it or not. Nor do they discuss how change managers can implement this approach
and the model to actually manage change.
2.6.2.5.2. The 5P’s Model
A group of five Texas A & M University staff reviewed major change management
models, namely: the action research approach, Lewin’s 3-step model, Schein’s
extension of Lewin’s model, Lippitt’s five-phase model (extension of Lewin’s three-
step), Kotter’s (1996) eight-step model, Mento et al.’s (2002) twelve-step model,
Jick’s ten-step model and Shield’s five-step model as summarized in the table below.
Table 2.6: Comparison of selected change models
Action Research
Model/Theory
Collier, 1945
Lewin, 1946
French, 1969
Schein, 1980
Lewin’s Model (1945)
& Schein’s Model
(1980) (Adaptation of
Lewin’s Model) *1985
Lippitt, Expanded
Lewin
Kotter’s Model
(1996)
Jick’s Model
(2003)
Mento/Jones/
Dirmdofer’s Model
(2002)
Shield’s
Model (1999)
Identify
problem(s)
Lewin-Step 1
Unfreezing
Establish a
sense of
urgency
Analyze the
organizational
need for
change
The idea and it’s
concept
Define the
desired result
and change
plans
Consult with
Behavioral
Science (OD)
Expert
Schein-Stage 1
need for change;
People must be
dissatisfied with the
present
Form a
powerful
guiding
coalition
Create a
shared vision
and common
direction
Define the change
initiative
Create
capability
and
capability to
change
Gather Data &
Begin Preliminary
Diagnosis
Lewin-Step 2
Moving/Changing
Create a
vision
Separate from
the past
Evaluate the climate
for change
Design
innovation
solutions
Provide
Feedback to
Client
Schein-Step 2
Cognitive
Communicate
the vision
Create a sense
of urgency
Develop a change
plan
Select and
deploy
OD expert &
client members
Lewin-Step 3
Refreezing change
Empower
others to act
Support a
strong leader
Find and cultivate a
sponsor
Reinforce &
sustain
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diagnose
problems
to make permanent on the vision role business
benefits
OD expert &
client jointly
plan actions
Schein-Step 3
Refreezing involves
self and others
Plan for and
create short
term wins
Line up
political
sponsorship
Prepare target
audience, the
recipient of change
Take action Schein -To be
permanent, change
becomes a part of
self, relations with
others, & system in
which people exist
Consolidate
improvements
producing
more change
Craft an
implementation
plan
Create the cultural
fit-making the
change last
Gather data
after action
*Lippitt, Watson,
Westley expand
Lewin’s Model
Institutionalize
new
approaches
Develop
enabling
structures
Develop and choose
a change leader
team
Measure &
Evaluate results
*After Step 1, add
Establish a change
relationship
Communicate,
involve people
and be honest
Create small wins
for motivation
Feedback
results
*After Refreezing,
add Achieve a
terminal relationship
Reinforce and
institutionalize
the change
Constantly and
strategically
communicate the
change
Re-diagnose *Lippitt, et al Five
Phase Change Model
(1958)
Measure progress of
the change effort
New action if
necessary
Integrate Lessons
learned
Source: Pryor, Taneja, Humphreys, Adnderson, and Singleton (2008:8)
The concepts in these models and theories of change are relevant as claimed by
Pryor et al. (2008). However, as the speed and complexity of required change is
changing in this era, they suggest that change should be a reinvention of the future
rather than a response to the present. For this, a systems model which is strategic as
well as executable at the tactical level is needed. As Pryor et al. (2008) claim, the 5Ps
model is sought to serve this purpose. This model is named based on five Ps in the
model. They are: purpose, principles, process, people and performance results.
Purpose: As the following figure describes, purpose relates to the directions the
changing organization is heading to. There are several variables that need to be
addressed in connection with purpose as depicted in Figure 2.12 below.
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Figure 2.12: Purpose (in the 5Ps model)
Source: Pryor et al. (2008: 14)
Principles and processes: These are established values and procedures interrelated as
they are presented in Figure 2.13. Principles refer to shared values, guidelines,
philosophies, and agreed upon behaviors (Pryor et al., 2008). These are important
forces interlinked with organizational systems and processes and shape people and
their performance.
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Figure 2.13: Principles and processes (in the 5Ps model)
Source: Pryor et al. (2008:14)
People: The people aspect is related to individuals and teams internal or external to
an organization having direct or indirect stake in the performance of organizations.
The inclusion of people in this model (Figure 2.14) can also be considered as a
reappraisal of Balogun’s (2001) recommendation of giving attention to people.
Figure 2.14: People (in the 5Ps model)
Source: Pryor et al. (2008:15)
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Performance: This element refers to the progress the firm which is undergoing
change is making towards achieving intended outcomes (purpose) of the change
initiative. Mento et al. (2002) has also an explicit step of measuring the outcome
change (progress of change). This part is a significant contribution which can lay the
foundation for more curious evaluation of change success (Burnes, 2011).
Figure 2.15: Performance (in the 5Ps Model)
Source: Pryor et al. (2008:15)
In general, Pryor et al. (2008) try to address the challenges facing change
management theory and research for not being comprehensive enough to
accommodate all relevant ideas from previous works and not reinventing the future
instead of merely responding to the present. The five Ps closely relate to the four
fundamental components of organizational change (i.e., outcome, content, process
and context). The only difference is the way some of the components are referred to.
For example “people” is related to context though context is broader. Moreover,
“performance” is connected to outcomes. Content is similar to purpose in the 5Ps
model.
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2.6.2.6. Implementation through Routine Dynamics
The paradoxical view of organizational change (Graetz & Smith, 2010) underpins
behind the approaches of organizational change under this category. Organizational
routines, which are known as sources of both stability (inertia) and change (Feldman
et al., 2016) are the foci of deliberations within the paradoxical lens.
2.6.2.6.1. Routines for implementation of Management
Innovations
Lin, Chen and Su (2017) explain how organizational routines evolve and serve as
mechanism of implementing management innovations. According to Lin et al.
(2017:457), organizational routines are “defined as repetitive, recognizable patterns
of interdependent actions involving multiple actors.” When implementations of
change in general and management innovations in particular are referred to, there is
no possibility of effectiveness other than changing organizational routines. This is
also an explication for the views that consider organizational change as part of
management’s daily routines (Appelbaum et al., 1998; Van de Ven & Sun, 2011;
Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011). So, effectiveness in changing organizational routines
is a mechanism of implementing changes in organizations.
A synthesis from the literature reviewed by Lin et al. (2017) indicates the link
between management innovation and knowledge management, and dynamic
capability and complex adaptive system (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011). As asserted
by Lin et al. (2017:461) the notion of organizational routine “leads researchers to
suggest routines as sources of not only stability of an organization but also
organizational change or innovation.”
Existing organizational-routine-dominance phase, new-routine-creation phase, and
new-routine-solidification phase are identified as the stages through which
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organizational routines evolve to serve as sources of organizational change or
innovation (Lin et al., 2017). This expression of change in routines follows a pattern
which resembles the unfreezing-moving-refreezing phases of planned change
representation by Kurt Lewin. The detail of this emergence is depicted in Figure 2.16
below:
Figure 2.16: The Evolution of organizational routines in management innovation
implementation
Source: Lin et al. (2017:476)
These similarities with Lewin’s three steps (see the bottom row in the above figure) are
acknowledged by Lin et al. (2017:479). However, they also acknowledge a difference
in the following way:
Kurt Lewin model refers to more general changes and highlights the human
behavior aspect of change; while our research focuses on specific change of
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management innovation in the context of organizations and we adopt a
cognitive perspective of organizational routines. Therefore, it furthers research
of the Kurt Lewin change theory and change model.
Besides, Lin et al. (2017) show (see first row of figure 2.16) how the evolution of
routines is linked to implementation of change and innovation activities. However,
Wang and Wang’s (2017:731) argument for a very dynamic environment which
results in disruptive changes is that, there is “no routine way to handle such
disruptive changes.” They even reject the suitability of the dynamic capability as a
source of competitive advantage in dynamic environments.
This criticism is similar to that of protagonists of complexity theories on Kurt Lewin’s
planned approach to change. However, concepts of improvisation and emergence
were made to the development of the concept of routines and their characteristics
(Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Feldman, 2008; Feldman et al., 2016).
2.6.2.6.2. Artifacts as Intervening Mechanism of Organizational
Routines
Glaser (2017) came up with an enriched idea of emergent change building on the
notion of routine dynamics. Organizational routines appear to be sources of both
change and stability. When serving as change implementation method, there needs
to be a framework which helps to intentionally alter routines and implement
strategic organizational change. As Glaser (2017:2128) explains, “organizations often
intentionally change their routines in order to implement strategic initiatives”.
Therefore, it is imperative for scholars and practitioners alike to look for mechanisms
of intentionally altering organizational routines. Effectiveness in changing
organizational routines which can ultimately pursue strategic goals is an approach of
implementing strategic organizational change. Glaser (2017:2144) addresses how
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organizations can intentionally change routines in order to “pursue strategic goals
and adapt to their environment by developing artifacts.” In doing so, Glaser explored
a single case and developed a framework of designing organizational artifacts to
intentionally alter organizational routines while allowing the dynamics of emergent
routines.
As depicted in Figure 2.17, the design of artifacts to change organizational routines
should consider the impact of existing routines and that of external communities on
the implementation of new artifacts. These two determine the intent behind the
need for changing organizational routines. Then, the design of new routines starts.
Pursuing strategic tasks that are enacted by intentionally designed artifacts is
equivalent to implementing strategic organizational change.
Figure 2.17: A theoretical framework explaining how organizations use design
performances to change routines
Intention to
change the
routine
Design Performance(s)
Informs
Informs
Inspire
Inform
External
Communities
Existing
Routine
Theories
Actors
Artifacts Practices
Change in
Routine
Dynamics
Abstracting Grammar of
Action
Exposing Assumptions
Distributing Agency
Appraising Outcomes
Assemblages
Source: Glaser (2017:2134)
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The design performance of artifacts should; therefore, be oriented by abstracting
grammar of action, exposing assumptions behind the design, distributing the ideas,
and appraising outcomes in order to shape the impact of assemblages in a way that
is consistent with an intended outcome from a newly designed artifact. In the
assemblage, there is interplay among theories, practices, artifacts and actors.
Practices are exposed to a confounding impact of existing artifacts and new artifacts.
Newly designed artifacts can come from actors and from designers. That means,
change in routine dynamics can only be attributed to the intentionally designed
artifact to the extent the design performance effectively shapes the assemblage.
2.6.2.7. “Built to Change” Model
Lawler III and Worley’s (2006) “Built to Change” model is a relatively unique
perspective in that it does not accept the traditional concept of change which refers
to variations in an organization’s established structures, strategies, systems and so
on. Traditional perspectives are guided by an embedded assumption of “stability
leads to organizational effectiveness” while that of built to change is “change leads
to effectiveness.” For Lawler III and Worley (2006), environmental dynamism (1) does
not allow such stability to serve as a source of success and (2) such type of
organizations cannot successfully change. As a solution, they proposed the built to
change (b2change) model (see figure 2.18) which assumes change as a source of
organizational effectiveness and sets organizations in changing state by building
(designing) them to change. Therefore, in such organizations, there is no need to
initiate a change project. They are from the very beginning designed in a way they
will keep changing.
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Figure 2.18: The built to change model
Source: Lawler III and Worley (2006:27)
As depicted by the figure, designing, strategizing and creating value are in a
continuous motion shaping organizational identity which makes it possible to
continuously fit to environmental scenarios based on temporary advantages instead
of the old notion of sustainable competitive advantage.
2.7. Conclusion
The literature in organizational change is characterized by evolution of thoughts that
can be put in a continuum which is extended between rigid planned change
approach which promotes organizational inertia (stability) as a source of successful
organizational performance and built to change approach which lets everything to be
a temporary advantage and keeps moving to continuously search for new sets of
temporary advantages. There are several views in between. These views are
influenced by underlying theoretical assumptions.
Earlier times in the history of change literature were related to Kurt Lewin’s three
step model and OD theories. Before the 1990s, with the exception of Kurt Lewin’s
famous three-step model, there was no significant attempt of providing
implementation framework to the empirical world. The notion of change
implementation framework (model) gained greater attention following the work of
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John P. Kotter (1995). Since then, a plethora of proposals of implementation steps or
frameworks appeared in the literature. However, little attempt is made to integrate
with or build on previous scholars’ works. This contributed only to fragmented views
and proposals. Because of this, the search for an appropriate framework that guides
implementation of organizational change remained being imperative in the literature
of strategic organizational change implementation as the high rate of failure is
evident in contemporary research as well.
Since the 1970s, because of the emergence of corporate Japan to the American
Market, a new debate came to the fore. Rapid transformation instead of slow
incremental changes was proclaimed to be appropriate for globalizing dynamic
organizations (Burnes, 2004a). However, most of the initiatives which were sought to
bring about such transformations ended up with only about 30% success rate
(Bunres, 2015; Pasmore, 2011; Schwarz, 2009; Franken, Edwards, & Lambert, 2009;
Brenner, 2008; Gilley, Dixon, & Gilley, 2008; Kazmi, 2008; Dufour & Steane, 2006;
Mankins & Steele, 2005; Sterling, 2003; Siegal et al., 1996).
The notion of implementation model came out of the realization of high rate of
failure. The 1990s are known for such works. Revenaugh (1994), Van de Ven and
Poole (1995), Kotter (1995) and Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) are examples. These
efforts gave rise to a new thought to have a pool of alternative models among which
one that fits the situations best needs to be selected. The low success rate of
renowned organizational change tools that were emerged mostly in the 1990s led to
some scholars’ concern on context.
In the 2000’s, the issue of contextual approach to change gained greater attention
than it did in the 1980s (Pettigrew et al., 2001). Balogun’s (2001) change
Kaleidoscope makes her to be among those who proposed comprehensive and
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context-sensitive approaches to strategic change. In the same year, Pettigrew et al.
(2001) came up with a strong argument in support of international and cross-cultural
approach to organizational change. They called for a research on organizational
change to be conducted in a non-US context.
Instead, subsequent efforts of scholars were geared towards integrating or
consolidating prior theories and models. Mento et al. (2002) is an earlier attempt in
this regard. Later, Pryor et al. (2008) made a more comprehensive summary of prior
efforts of scholars including Mento et al.’s (2002). Pryor et al. (2008) also transformed
the thought into a systems perspective.
As exceptions to the first generation step-based models, cyclic models also emerged
in the literature. Appelbaum (1998), Victor and Frankeis (2002), Oakland and Tanner
(2007) are examples for this category. These approaches laid the foundation to a
systems approach to organizational change. The systems approach to organizational
change was made more elaborated later by Maes and Van Hootegem (2011). These
authors made a significant contribution with respect to consolidating the
dichotomist views which were pervasive in the literature since the 1990s. As also
clearly indicated in Figure 2.19, these notions together with complexity theory are
metaphorical.
Apart from consolidation efforts (e.g., Mento et al.’s, 2002; Pryor et al.’s, 2008; and
Maes & Van Hootegem’s, 2010) there was little attempt to build on previous
knowledge. The literature is characterized by fragmented attempts of explaining the
same thing (i.e., strategic organizational change) differently. However, consolidation
efforts could not exerted simply especially because of varying theoretical
assumptions.
The latest views appear to evolve to the level of questioning even the notion of
dynamic capability as the environment is too dynamic (Wang & Wang, 2017).  As a
result, ad hoc problem solving and dynamic routines came to the fore in line with
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the new paradoxical lens in organizational change literature (Lin, et al., 2017;
Feldman et al., 2016; Nasim & Sushil, 2011; Guiette & Vandenbempt, 2017; Feldman
& Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Feldman, 2008).
The literature in organizational change still manifests contradicting theoretical
arguments. Sarkar and Osiyevskyy (2017) focus on the evolving inclusion of change
and continuity paradox. This oxymoron in organizational change appears to be the
latest view in organizational change theory. As Nasim and Sushil (2017:198) reflect,
“a serious deficit of empirical research and actionable framework required for
managing the confluence of continuity and change.” In conclusion, they proclaim a
need for “a more actionable strategic framework for practitioners at large” basing
their rationale on the assertion of ‘managing change invariably requires balancing
paradoxes’ while a ‘dearth of validated models and frameworks’ required for
managing the duality” (p. 202).
All these conceptual disparities are nevertheless converged in noting the high rate of
failure in implementing change initiatives. Ironically, yet, implementation is
underrepresented in the literature. Only few of the scholars gave attention to
framing implementation guidance. Strictly speaking, only Kurt Lewin’s (1947) and
Kotter’s (1995) models of implementation remained original contributions that are
explicitly recognized as implementation models. The rest are adaptation of these or
generic frameworks that in some cases consider implementation only on the fly. A
summarized portray of these is given by figure 2. 19.
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Figure 2.19: A conceptual framework summarizing major change theories
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As the framework in Figure 2.19 above indicates, while the relatively action oriented
and phase oriented models are framed with the help of Lewin’s three step model,
the relatively latent (conceptual) models that are underpinned by systems and
complexity theories are not explicit in the framework. For example Maes and Van
Hootegem’s (2011) and Van de Vena and Sun’s (2011) models are not explicitly
observable in the graphic representation. However, especially in the upper part (the
parts that are adopted from Lin et al., 2017 and Glaser, 2017) have sophisticated
processes that result in the stages that become apparent in the figure.
Apart from these, to the best of the researcher’s search effort in databases including
EBSCO, Emerald insight, ProQuest, Jstore, and Google scholar, getting an explicit
account of differences in national contexts consistent to Pettigrew’s et al.’s (2001)
call was hardly possible. Neither was it possible to get an explicitly reported and
recognized implementation model for strategic organizational change.
2.8. Chapter Summary
This chapter attempted to highlight the literature on strategic organizational change
and implementation models. In line with this, various theoretical views of
organizational change and their evolution were also reviewed in an attempt to
explicate the framework within which the theoretical contribution of the present
research can be situated. The next chapter presents the research method employed
in the present study.
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CHAPTER THREE:RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. Introduction
This chapter explains how the research was conducted. In doing so, the research
problem, as it implies the logic behind the research methodology applied in the
present research, is encapsulated followed by the paradigmatic orientation
underpinned in the overall study. The specific design of the research and associated
strategies are also described together with the data type and sources as well as
methods of data collection and analyses. Methodological rigor and ethical
considerations are also discussed.
3.2. The Research Problem and its Methodological Implication
As stated in the first chapter, the present research intends to develop an
implementation model for strategic organizational change in the context of
commercial banking sector in Ethiopia. The inquiry was triggered by leanness of
salient discussions in the extant literature about an implementation model and the
quest for one with a clear contextual domain instead of taking the western
(especially American) context as an assumed context (Hempel & Martinsons, 2009;
Pettigrew et al., 2001). As a contribution towards accounting contextual influences
(Woodside, 2010) into implementation of organizational changes in line with
Pettigrew et al.’s (2001), this study takes Ethiopian context as an emerging economy
case. George Corbishley, Khayesi, Haas and Tihanyi, (2016) called for future research
on the area to focus on Africa in the Academy of Management Journal’s from the
editor’s series. Their specific call for scholars has been to “examine how phenomena
of relevance to management in Africa extend, or modify our existing management
theories [or to] explore how such phenomena enable us to generate theory and
frameworks that can shed new light on pressing problems” (George et al., 2016:386).
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Within Ethiopia, the context of the financial sector is taken as a typical case (Yin,
2003) since it is a fully regulated sector wherein foreign operators are not allowed to
enter as per article 9 of the new Ethiopian Banking Business Proclamation number
592/2008. This makes the selected sector a purely domestic environment resulting
from the regulation’s control of confounding influences of foreign companies
operating in the domestic market. This adds to the extent of variation which
increases the chance to encounter anomalies which will help to improve existing
theories (Carlile & Christensen, 2004; Christensen & Carlile, 2009).
In other words, in the explanation of what guides organizational changes, the
approach of the present research should overcome (1) the dearth of literature on the
issue of implementation model which could guide initiatives for strategic
organizational change in general and (2) the bias towards the western (especially the
American) context by disregarding the context of developing economies such as
Africa in particular. Hence, for the investigation of this type of situation, an inductive
logic which is underpinned by a “bottom-up” or data-driven approach is preferred to
the theory-driven hypothetico-deductive approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin &
Strauss, 1990; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009).
This approach helps to address the need to conduct an in-depth examination of
cases (Creswell, 2003; Nelson, 2003) which allows the investigation of contextual
realities that can be thickly described and richly explained by addressing “how” and
“why” questions of instances in the selected context that unfolds during an initiated
organizational change in a selected case (Yin, 2009, 2003; Woodside, 2010). Hence,
in order to develop an implementation model for strategic organizational change, an
investigation of how and why a strategic organizational change unfolds within the
selected context is central to the present research. Such a research requires the use
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of qualitative Case Study Research (CSR) as several scholars agree (e.g. Woodside,
2010; Yin, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989).
3.3. Paradigmatic Inclination
Paradigmatic orientations convey the framework within which a research is designed
and executed; the results are computed and interpreted. Therefore, the assumptions
and inclinations that have possible connections to the present research are
highlighted in this section. The attempt is not, however, to claim a strict adherence
to a specific paradigm.
As explained by Van de Ven and Poole (2005), research in organizational change is
dominated by the variance method which has roots in an ontological assumption of
considering organization as a “thing” which can epistemologically be addressed
based on a deterministic model which relates a set of independent variables to
dependent variable(s). Referring to the variance method as paradigmatically
functionalist, Gioia and Pitre (1990) argue that the variance method alone is not
sufficient to fully unleash how and why organizational change unfolds. Gioia and
Pitre (1990:587) also explain that all organizational phenomena are not suited to the
dominant functionalist paradigm and hence force-fitted “functionalist theory-
building techniques” should be reconsidered.
Excessive reliance on variance method, as Van de Ven and Poole (2005) explain, has
limitations especially when the problem does not need to be addressed that way.
They asserted;
...researchers tend to conceptualize process problems in variance terms. One can
see the "law of the hammer" in operation here: Give a child a hammer, and
everything seems made to be hit;  give a social scientist variables and the general
linear model and everything seems made to be factored, regressed, and fit (p. 13).
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On the other hand, the process ontology considers organization as a “process” which
can epistemologically be addressed by employing the process approach. The
process approach, as posited by Van de Ven and Poole (2005) applies to a research
which tries to study “how” and “why” change unfolds.
As organizational change is by default an indication of dynamism, deterministic
approaches fall short of capturing the complex flux in modern organizational
systems. It is less logical, thus; to force the naturally fluid phenomena to a
deterministic variance model. Therefore, the study of organizational change can be
better captured by a more dynamic, flexible and relatively more ambiguity tolerant
method—implying an inclination towards process study. However, in the present
study, there is no strict adherence to a specific paradigm. As it is fleshed out in the
upcoming paragraphs, the connection is pragmatically limited to paradigms which
have features that allow the development of theory from empirical data.
Moreover, as (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005) assert, the term “process” has ontological
and epistemological meanings as explained in chapter two (Rescher, 1996). As such,
variance and process are epistemic typologies within the process ontology (Van de
Ven & Poole, 2005; Langley et al., 2013; Langley, 1999; Chiles, 2003). This is the other
reason not to dare rejecting variance for ontological rather than epistemological
reasons.
“Most often, process studies derive theory…” (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005: 14). Theory
building in the context of organizational studies is defined by Gioia and Pitere
(1990:587) as “any coherent description or explanation of observed or experienced
phenomena.” However, these authors contend the thesis of applying “appropriate”
paradigm which may fit to organizational phenomenon that is consistent with the
underpinning assumptions of the paradigm (p.587).
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The foci of the present study are inductively developing an implementation model
for strategic organizational change and the discovery of contextual components
from the realities in the commercial banking sector of Ethiopia. The issue of context,
when the study involves meaning extraction from data on the basis of which to
induce theoretical propositions, requires a departure from reliance on a-priori
theoretical framework. The other perspective from which the methodological stance
of the present research can be justified is; therefore, addressing the etic-emic
dilemma.
As Guba and Lincoln (1994:106) argue, in an inductive theory building approach, the
etic-emic dilemma can be addressed by developing “valid theories that are
qualitatively grounded” to have real meanings in the emic view. The shortcomings in
the extant literature to explicitly address the issue of national context (Pettigriew et
al., 2001; Hempel & Martinsons, 2009) and the “unwitting tendency to treat context
as undiscussed background” (Pettigrew et al., 2001: 703) presuming the American
(western) context as a universal reality; therefore, have led to a search for context-
based theory which tries to come up with a model that captures emic (Woodside &
Wilson, 2003; Patton, 2002) views of a defined context (Woodside, 2010). The
exploration of contextual influences as constructed based on participants’ views (i.e.,
emic views) within the selected context are therefore what the data gathering
procedures employed by the present research strived for. Such explorations,
especially during the initial stages of data gathering and analysis, are predominantly
constructivist (Saldana, 2009).
Lincoln and Guba (2013) also explain the impact of context in changing the reality
being in constructivist view. This fits to the assertion that because of the excessively
western views in the extant literature, the hypothetico-deductive approach (etic)
might fall short of making sense across different national (emic) contexts (Hempel &
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Martinsons, 2009; Pettigrew et al., 2001; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). This is how the
choice of an inductive theory-building approach (from cases) has been made as part
of the paradigmatic orientations in this study. Therefore, at this point, it is logical to
assert that the present research has much to do within the interpretive paradigm as
its main purpose is to build theory from cases.
For the sake of addressing the research problem better, Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach
of building theory from case study research is applied in the present research. This
approach has roots in grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990), in the works of
Miles and Huberman (1994), and in Yin’s (2009, 2003) case study research approach.
The background of the approach is perceived by others (e.g. Tracy, 2013) as
positivist/post positivist. Corbin and Strauss (1990) refer to it as symbolic
interactionist (pertaining to grounded theory). This orientation is apparent in
Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach. In her co-authored article (Eisenhardt & Graebner,
2007:25) too, post positivist orientation is reflected in the assertion about the results
of Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach which are “objective” because “close adherence to
the data keeps researchers honest—the data provide the discipline that mathematics
in formal analytical modeling [does]”. However, as Gioia and Pitre (1990:47)
categorize it, Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach of theory building is interpretive.
Therefore, as discussed by Tracy (2013), a blurring paradigm approach which uses
“concepts and tools from various paradigmatic approaches” is the epistemic
category of the present research.
Notwithstanding the fact that the present research significantly resides in the
interpretive paradigm, it has to be noted that pragmatic inclination is also
manifested by the use of positivist/post positivist tactics (Tracy, 2013) for reducing
(or if possible avoiding) researcher bias through employing triangulation and
constant comparison techniques (Eisenhardt, 1989) that are backed by Computer
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Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) and the use of qualitative data
analysis techniques (detailed in the data analysis methods section) proposed by
Miles and Huberman (1994).
The researcher’s effort to gather data was guided by a “passionate participant’s” role
of a facilitator (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). However, extraction of meanings from the
data corpus involved an interpretive procedure (Saldana, 2009). As this epistemic
approach is researcher dependent (Lincoln & Guba, 2013), Eisenhardt’s (1989)
approach of theory building from case study research is used to benefit from the
features that reduce possible researcher influence and let the data contribute the
most in the meaning construction. This is further explicated by Carlile and
Christenesen (2004).
The pragmatist stance of the present research has various manifestations as
described above. Therefore, in its strictest sense, the present research does not stick
to and advocate a specific paradigm. Instead, relevant features from different
paradigms were pragmatically intermingled.
3.4. Research Design
“A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected (and the
conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of the study” (Yin, 2003:19). This
logic serves as a blueprint for conducting the research. The design of the present
study emanated from an inductive logic to build an implementation model for
strategic organizational change in the context of commercial banks in Ethiopia. The
rationale for holding this logic is the researcher’s intention to search for a context-
rich model which should have grounds on empirical data from the target context for
the reasons detailed in the first Chapter and in the previous section of this Chapter.
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When the phenomenon of study is believed to be context sensitive (i.e., either when
contexts are deliberately included in the study or it is very difficult to demarcate the
boundary between the context and the phenomenon), case study is an appropriate
design of research (Yin, 2009, 2003; Woodside, 2010). Moreover, as Nutt (1986)
describes, the study of implementation approaches can better be conducted through
retrospective constructions taking cases of implementation practices.
Case study methods do encompass the logic of design, data collection, and analysis
methods and therefore are comprehensive research design types (Yin, 2009). On the
basis of this premise, Yin (2003) claims that a case study, in addition to the reason for
using it (the phenomenon of investigation needs to be studied within a real-life
context), allows the collection of data from multiple sources about more variables
than those in the data point or being guided by theoretical propositions. In line with
the purpose of this research, case study research is useful for modeling (i.e., for
theory-building) real world phenomena (Dooley, 2002). With the supportive
explanations given so far, this research employed multiple-case study design in line
with Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach of building theory from case study research (see
next section).
As Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) recommend, the use of multiple-case design is
appropriate for theory-building research. Multiple-case design is possible by having
at least two cases (Yin, 2009). The use of multiple cases has benefits of replication
(Yin, 2011, 2009; 2003). The uses of multiple cases to organizational change studies is
confluently claimed by different scholars (e.g. Hempel & Martinsons, 2009; Van de
Ven & Poole, 2005) to be appropriate. Hempel and Martinsons (2009) also
recommended the use of multiple cases for theory (model) development. The use of
multiple cases can allow triangulation across-cases and among respondents and
handle inconsistencies. Especially when the purpose is theory-building, “multiple-
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case studies are typically quite rich... and they often have compact and explicit
theoretical focus” (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005:14).
As per explanations in the above paragraphs, multiple-case design is appropriate for
the present research. The issue of multiple cases can be observed at different levels
in the present research (i.e. organizational, team and individual). As fleshed out
under the ‘selection of cases’ section, while the use of two banks makes the present
study a multiple-case design, there are also nested layers of cases embedded in each
case (Yin, 2011, 2009; Hak & Dul, 2009; Patton, 2002). A graphic representation of
the design of the present research is outlined by figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1. Design of the research
Source: Own compilation
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3.4.1. Building Theory from Case Studies
The approach of Eisenhardt (1989) is cited here as the foundation guideline for
devising the strategy of the present research. Other scholars also acknowledge
building theory from case study research (e.g. Woodside, 2010; Sinkovics & Alfoldi,
2012; Van de Ven & Poole, 2005; Hak & Dul; 2009; Woodside & Wilson, 2003; Yin,
2011).
Wacker (1998) classifies theory building research into two as (1) conceptual-
analytical and (2) empirical. The later one builds theory based on induction from real
world data. Eisenhardt’s (1989) work is seminal with respect to clarifying the
procedures of inductively building theories from case studies (empirical). This
approach is explicitly meant for building theory from cases. As explained by
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007:25), “building theory from case studies is a research
strategy that involves using one or more cases to create theoretical constructs,
propositions and/or midrange theory from case-based, empirical evidences.”
Eisenhardt, Graebner, and Senenshein (2016:1114) assert that building theory from
case study is an inductive method which adds to “robustness of emergent theory”
and leads to “better theory” by applying comparison techniques. This approach, as
Eisenhardt et al. (2016:1115) explain, is better at handling implementation processes
and addressing research problems that are “related to the ‘how’ research questions.”
It provides conceptual insights based on in-depth empirical data from one or a small
number of cases (Eisenhardt, et al., 2016). The theory developed using this method is
the result of relationships emerged from case data.
Empirically speaking, Nutt (1986) used multiple-case study approach to conduct a
research that intended to identify implementation tactics. Brown and Eisenhardt
(1997) also used Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach of building theories from case studies
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in organizational change research. Moreover, Miles and Huberman (1994)
acknowledge that Eisenhardt’s (1989) work has provided the best explanation for
building theory from qualitative data.
Building theory from cases is a method which “bridges rich qualitative evidence to
mainstream deductive research” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 25). As also explained
by Carlile and Christenson (2004) and Christenson and Carlile (2009), the inductive
part of theory building is half-way in the theory building cycle.  The first half of the
cycle (i.e. the deductive part) is what Carlile and Christenson (2004) refer to as
descriptive. The second cycle builds normative theories, which they also refer to as
prescriptive (Christenson & Carlile, 2009) theories, result from the second cycle by
building on descriptive theories from the first cycle.
The present theory-building research is confined to the first-half. However, it is
designed in a way it benefits from the theory-improvement methods which Carlile
and Christensen (2004) refer to as anomaly-seeking. To be specific, the nested
research design which “entails how individuals act and interact within group; and
how the interaction amongst groups and the companies within which they are
embedded” is an anomaly-seeking feature (Carlile & Christensen, 2004) of the
present study as detailed in the section which explains case selection.
3.5. Data Sources, Collection and Analyses Methods
3.5.1. Types and Sources of Data
The present research is based on empirical data gathered from two commercial
banks in Ethiopia. Within each bank, teams that were established being in charge of
designing and implementing initiated strategic organizational changes, individuals
who were playing key role during the initiated changes, “gatekeepers” (Lincoln &
102
Guba, 2013: 66) who informed the researcher about the targeted initiative in their
respective bank, and documents (archives) were primary data sources. The details of
how cases and individual participants were selected are presented in the next
section.
3.5.2. Assumptions and Justifications for Case Selection
The perspectives in line with which case selection tactics that were applied in the
present research were decided are explicated in this section in order to complement
to readers who are more familiar and adherent to quantitative sampling orientations
and practices. According to Patton (2002:46),
perhaps nowhere is the difference between quantitative and qualitative
methods better captured than in the different strategies, logics, and purposes
that distinguish statistical probability sampling from qualitative purposeful
sampling. Qualitative inquiry typically focuses on relatively small samples, even
single cases… selected purposefully to permit inquiry into and understanding of
a phenomenon in depth.
As can be inferred from the above explanation, the analogy of a case with “sample
and universe [in a survey research] is incorrect when dealing with case studies” (Yin,
2009: 86). In case study research, Yin (2009) explains, cases are rather identified
purposively based on their importance to make analytic generalizations about some
“broader theory” (p. 86). The reason is “cases are selected because they are
particularly suitable for illuminating and extending relationships and logic among
constructs” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007:27).
The case selection procedure implemented in the present research followed the
logics that are proposed by scholars as appropriate for theory building from
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qualitative case study research. Therefore, selection of cases was not random; and
the number of cases selected did not intend to convey representativeness.
To explain how cases in research such as the present one can be selected, Suri (2011)
synthesized approaches of purposive sampling which Patton (2002) proposes for
qualitative research. Even though these scholars use the term “sampling”, the
rationale of sampling for qualitative studies is quite different from that in
quantitative sampling. As many scholars (e.g., Yin, 2011, 2009, 2003; Patton, 2002;
Suri, 2011; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss, 1990)
argue, cases in qualitative research are not meant for representing a population
about which to make generalizations based on sample evidences.
Cases are selected when they are fit to the purpose of the research (i.e., when they
are information rich) and the number of such cases can be one (i.e., n = 1 as Yin,
2003 explains) or may be several; even it may not be determined in advance
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). Data or theoretical saturation which
implies sufficiency of data to build theory and practically speaking time and money
determines the number of cases in such kinds of research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton,
2002). Cases can be individuals, programs, organizations, processes and related
phenomena which are put under a study and some could have sub-cases embedded
(nested in layers) within (Yin, 2013; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002;
Eisenhardt, 1989).
Case selection in the present research passed through several stages. In due course,
a combination of purposeful sampling techniques was applied. The first level of
selection was the selection of an industry in a specific country’s context. The
rationale for selecting a specific country’s context is discussed in the first chapter in
line with Pettigriew et al.’s (2001) and Hempel and Martinson’s (2009) view. The
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financial sector in Ethiopia, as it is also discussed in the first Chapter, is particularly
important to the study because it represents a purely domestic business
environment in the banking sector in the world. This makes the sector a controlled
case to explore exclusive context which is expected to intensively illuminate the
importance of context in strategic change implementation (Patton, 2002; Suri, 2011).
This helps to “discover and comprehend indigenous phenomena” through focusing
on a single national context (Sinkovics, Penz & Ghauri, 2008:691).
Secondly, the two banks were selected anticipating literal replication (Yin, 2009)
initially. However, actually, bank selection entertained the maximum variation
(Patton, 2002) in the banking sector of the country by incorporating a government-
owned and a private bank. The inclusion of possible instances, managers of
commercial banks in Ethiopia could find themselves in, is an anomaly-seeking design
feature (Carlile & Christensen, 2004).
Within each bank, teams established to design and implement strategic
organizational change in a specific business process were targeted. As Hak and Dul
(2009) explain, these sub-components embedded in each case bank also serve a
replication purpose. The selection of core-process and support-process teams within
each bank (see details under the selection of teams section) is also in line with the
strategy of different cases (Hak & Dul, 2009) which is alternatively referred to as
maximum variation by Patton (2002). This strategy of nested design increases the
quality of findings (Carlile & Christensen, 2004; Patton, 2002).
Moreover, the inclusion of individual participants was as much as possible guided by
the same logic (by including operational workers and managers) which was also an
applied logic (by banks) for team establishment. It is with these assumptions the
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selection of cases and their embedded (nested) components should be judged (Yin,
2011).
3.5.3. Selection of Banks
Among the commercial banks in Ethiopia, two government-owned banks and one
private bank were found to be appropriate for the study as they were the only
Ethiopian banks which experienced strategic organizational change initiatives based
on the researcher’s preliminary investigation. To capture the variations (maximum
possible for the context), two banks; one from each category were included in the
research (Patton, 2002; Suri, 2011). This makes them (the banks) information rich
cases with sufficient intensity to conduct a qualitative case study research on the
basis of which it is possible to build an implementation model for strategic
organizational change in Ethiopian Commercial Banks (Yin, 2003; Patton, 2002; Suri,
2011).
In addition to the technique, the size (number of cases) is also contended by
quantitative oriented evaluators. In case study research, however, a single case is
methodologically sufficient because the generalizations made from case study
findings are generalizations to “theoretical propositions and not to populations or
universes” (Yin, 2009: 42). The case in such studies is not a sample; and what
generalization refers to in this case is analytic not statistical. However, a “two-case
design is stronger than single-case designs” (Yin, 2009: 59). Therefore, the present
study is designed as a multiple case research as described by Eisenhardt (1989). As
such, the two banks were predetermined (Eisenhardt, 1989).
As multiple case study design was planned a-priori, an advance selection of at least
two cases was a requirement. That is why the two cases of commercial banks were
selected in advance. This does not mean, however, that the addition of cases is
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closed. In such type of research, the addition of cases depends on sufficiency of data
which is manifested by saturation (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989). In the
present study too, the number of cases has been proved to be sufficient based on
cross-case analyses results which indicated no need for further inclusion of samples.
Achievement of data sufficiency has been enhanced by the application of embedded
cases within each bank.
As Hak and Dul (2009) confirm, a multiple-case design for replication purpose in
theory building research is guided by the logic of saturation to determine the
number of cases. Whereas several embedded cases were considered within each
bank for the purpose of replication until the level of saturation within each bank; Hak
and Dul’s (2009) strategy of different cases has been applied by including a public
and a private bank in the set.  The inclusion of variations is not only applied by
having private and government-owned banks; within each bank, the sub-cases that
are described below are also selected based on this logic (Suri, 2011; Patton, 2002).
3.5.3.1. Selection of Teams
The study was focused on nested layers of cases that are embedded (Patton, 2002)
within each case bank.  In both cases, the initiatives were organized by establishing
teams that were responsible to design and implement changes in an identified
business process. The business processes were broadly categorized as core and
support. Within each category there were teams established to design and
implement new business processes. The core-support divide which is salient in both
banks, served as a variation across teams and hence representations of both (core
and support) were engendered in the selected teams. In each case (process study
team), multiple respondents were interviewed to minimize the impacts of memory
distortion and memory failure (Eisenhardt, 1989; Nutt, 1986) on the quality of data.
This was achieved through the application of triangulation logic.
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From bank A, members from all the three core process sub-teams and from four
support process sub-teams participated in the in-depth interviews. Besides, those
who participated in the selection committee, in the structure team and those who
were participating as coordinators at different capacities were also participants in the
research.
From bank B, members of those who participated in designing three core processes
and those who participated in designing three support processes took part in the in-
depth interview. Besides, members of the change management team which was
serving as a technical team and members of a committee which was established to
evaluate performance of change implementation were participants of the study.
This identification of sub-units (embedded cases) helped to conduct structured
investigation and gave means of triangulation. In both banks (A and B) the major
division of business processes was between core and support category.
Representatives from each were included in the study. Once a process team was
selected, multiple participants from the selected team were contacted to find out the
truth about how and why changes unfolded with respect to the selected business
process. Addition of teams was determined based on saturation of data about how
the change was implemented in the case bank. The benefits that are sought to be
gained from multiple cases are believed to have been enhanced through the
application of embedded cases within each bank.
At this level, the concept of theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss,
1990; Charmaz, 2006) is more explicitly manifested. This was supported by
comparative analysis between core and support teams. Salient constructs across all
the teams constituted the findings from each case.
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3.5.3.2.Selection of Key Participants
The participants interviewed for this study were “key participants”, who were selected
purposively because of their experience (as member of teams that were established
to design and implement changes, and as coordinators of different teams) during
targeted change initiatives in the two banks as conceptualized by Tracy (2013: 141).
As Lincoln and Guba (2013) explain, participants (also called “hermeneutic circles”)
can be identified by the help of “gatekeepers” (p. 66). These logics were applied in
the present research to select individuals.
Heads of relevant offices of each bank were contacted first to get information about
target initiatives. In preliminary interviews with such individuals (i.e., gatekeepers),
data pertaining to the structure of teams and their coordinators, the members of
each or at least some teams and their addresses were searched for. Based on the
data from gatekeepers and analysis of some archival documents, as part of the
preparation for the in-depth interviews, contact lists were prepared. The names in
the list were planned as first contacts; when succeeded, served as bases for
subsequent selections through snowballing (Patton, 2002; Suri, 2011) which means
that once a team member is contacted, the next participant could identified from
other members of the same team. Subsequent selections continued through
snowballing until the data about the targeted team saturated. “Snowball or chain
sampling is … a legitimate strategy as long as the strategy is purposeful” (Morrow,
2005:255). The addition of an individual participant to gather additional data about a
team through the application of snowballing continues up to the level of data
saturation. This entails theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss,
1990).
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3.5.3.3. Selection of Quotations
Selection of quotations from data corpus gathered from participants is also a
decision made by the researcher during the preparation of the report. Quotations
are assumed to be powerful in representing participants’ voices (Patton, 2002).
Moreover, they are empirical evidences on the basis of which the constructions of
concepts or categories and their relationships are backed. Therefore, for the
development of this report, quotations that were viewed as exemplars of salient and
significant ideas of participants with respect to an issue under discussion were
selected and presented. The use of the ATLAS.ti software made the selection of
quotations more dependable as all the quotations that are linked to a selected
category can be easily retrieved in a way comparison can be made amongst all of
them. This reduces researcher bias and memory lapse (Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition,
to this, the coding procedure implemented in the present research is also an integral
part of the logic behind selection of quotation (see the data analysis section).
3.5.4. Data Gathering Procedures
The data sources used in this study were multiple. The first group of sources includes
(1) documents (archives) that have information about the change initiatives which
helped to gain insights into the change, the participants, the structure and
management of teams, and the leaders of the entire initiative; (b) tape-recorded
discussions (preliminary interviews) with relevant personnel (gate keepers) that
helped the researcher gain insights about changes initiated in each bank, how they
were managed, and about the participants; (c) researcher’s intuitive observations and
researcher’s interpretations of observed phenomena which were recorded as field
notes and memos; and (d) in-depth interviews that followed the preliminary analyses
of data from the aforementioned sources. The final stage of field work was mainly
the execution of in-depth interviews as explained in the next paragraphs.
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Whenever appropriate, the researcher was flexible to gather data from documents
and to take field notes on observations and communications with organization
members who were briefly contacted by the researcher during field works. These
were persistent throughout the field work. But the volume of data gathered through
and the importance of the data to the research problem made in-depth interview the
main method of data gathering.
The initial analysis of data which were gathered during the preliminary stages served
as an input for the next stage (in-depth interview phase) of each bank. Preparation
includes checking the appropriateness of the interview guide to the situation,
checking the researcher’s level of understanding about the change initiative in order
to be able to conduct the in-depth interview in a passionate and empathetically
neutral way (Patton, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Transiting through these
preparations, the researcher delved deeper into each case. This helped the
researcher to integrate the two phases of data gathering and whenever appropriate
to iterate between the two.
Within each team, anomalies among views of different participants provoked
probing questions and additional participants in search of clarity and truth through
triangulation and further discussions (Carlile & Christenson, 2004). This was a cyclic
process which terminates when the researcher recognizes that new ideas are not
emerging from new participants (i.e., data saturation).
As reported so far and is usually the case in qualitative research, the analysis process
overlapped with the data gathering. The process at this stage was alternating data
gathering-analysis iteration. The data gathering in the present study was generally
guided by the logic of triangulation from multiple respondents about same process.
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The interviewing process applied in the present research is fleshed out in the next
section.
3.5.4.1. The Interviewing Procedure
As explained above, before the commencement of the in-depth interview,
preliminary interviews with gate keepers and documentary analyses were conducted
to gain insights into the overall situation within which the changes were initiated in
each bank. This preliminary investigation helped the researcher to get information
about who the participants (major actors) were and to know their contact
information or physical address so as to be able to prepare a starting list of a few
potential participants. Moreover; documentary reviews and discussions with relevant
personnel from each bank helped the researcher gain better understanding that put
him in a better position to facilitate subsequent in-depth interviews with different
participants. In line with the techniques in Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach, the in-depth
interviews were carried out with a support of an interview guide (Yin, 2009). The
interview guide was initially prepared (see annex 2) having questions that were
developed based on the research question.
The in-depth interviews were tape-recorded. The sequence of conducting in-depth
interviews was decided to be bottom-up in which the interview was conducted first
with operational workers and then continued to managers upwards in the hierarchy
of their respective bank. The tactic of maintaining the hierarchical sequence was
applied within a team (see Chapter Four for details on team composition). This
helped the researcher to gain an insight first, and be equipped with more probing
strategies as the in-depth interview proceeds to participants who were at higher
positions during the pursuit of the initiative and/or during interviewing. Interviews
with those in the upper tiers were often more critical as their foci were more
conceptual. This is why the researcher had to be more informed about different
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voices with the help of previous data and running analyses first and then conduct in-
depth interviews with participants at higher levels. This helped to benefit from
gaining greater insights into conceptual (macroscopic) view (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).
Besides, the inclusion of various views is an anomaly seeking strategy which normally
improves quality of findings (Carlile & Christensen, 2004).
Each interview started with oral introduction about the study and its purpose and
subsequently giving a copy of a participant information sheet (see annex 1) in
response to which contacted individuals had to express willingness to participate.
Prior information about the purpose of the study and promise to take utmost care
for the privacy of participants encouraged participants to be willing to freely share
their experiences and views. This first contact also served as an opportunity to set an
appointment to conduct the interview and if possible to develop the list of team
members with additional names which were missing from that which was developed
based on information from gate keepers.
Interviews were characterized by free-floating (open) discussions to let any idea
emerge with reduced researcher influence. This helped the researcher to be in a
better stance to conduct the interview and understand the responses from the emic
perspective (Woodside, 2010; Patton, 2002). However, an interview guide was used
to maintain focus on the topics that are relevant for addressing the research
question. General background conditions about the initiatives targeted by the study,
procedures undertaken to initiate and implement the change, success and failure
related factors as perceived by participants, and suggestions by participants about
important components of a guideline which lead successful implementation had
been chosen to be in the interview guide initially (see annex 2).
Each in-depth interview took between 2:00 hours and 3:00 hours per individual
participant. The interview session with an individual could be continuous or divided
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into two or three appointments. As much as possible, interviews were conducted out
of office to gain full attention of the participant and to create a friendly environment.
However, some participants preferred to use their offices for interview. In most cases
interviews were conducted after office hours. During interview sessions, the
researcher was a passionate facilitator and used to continue as empathetically
neutral as possible (Patton, 2002).
Subsequent interview sessions with participants of the same team were conducted
with an intention to triangulate the data from previous interviews. The fact that
subsequent interviews were conducted after the researcher gained insights
(understanding of emic views) from previous interviews with other member(s) of the
same or a similar team, helped the researcher to easily detect anomalies (deviations)
and seek for deeper explanations of the deviations through probing questions. Peer
debriefings and session summaries were also used to ensure credible data gathering
from each team (Lincoln & Guba, 2013; Morrow, 2005). With careful sequencing in
order not to destruct an environment of mutual trust, member reflection questions
(Tracy, 2013) were used to check the acceptability of data gathered from previous
interviews and interpretations thereof. In so doing, the researcher intentionally
maintained neutral stance not to judge a respondent for repressing or denying prior
ideas gathered from prior sources rather tried to be as open as possible and capture
the meanings and ultimately understand what each participant conveyed. This was
achieved though conducting constant comparisons across interviews.
The interviewing strategy gradually evolved based on analysis of earlier interviews
and researcher’s intuition about saturated data and interest to focus the discussion
on the most important things. In doing so, the researcher watches if interview
questions that were included to gather basic facts (which are descriptive in nature)
were gradually losing importance as data about these issues naturally saturates first.
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This resulted in the modification of the interview guide by making it focused on
concepts that emerged to be salient and by dropping some owing to data
saturation.
Later on, the interview guide had to be adjusted for subsequent interviews (see
annex 3) based on lessons learnt from previous sessions. The main adjustment was
dropping the question about background of initiative as the first few interviews gave
sufficient data. The time allocated to gather background related facts declined as the
number of interviewees increased. On the other hand, the attention given to the
main discussion (i.e., pertaining to how strategic change implementation unfolded
and how it should be handled in future change initiatives) increased progressively.
This was accelerated by the interviewing sequence (bottom-up) which was explained
above. This helped the materialization of more informed discussions with those
individuals who had leadership responsibilities during the initiatives. These latter
interviews were made to focus on the whole picture; not on a team.
3.5.5. Data Analyses
As the present study is based on qualitative data, the methods of data analyses
employed were also qualitative. As explained in section 3.4.4 above, the data analysis
process overlapped the field works (data gathering).
The general framework of analysis which was applied in the present research is
consistent with Eisenhardt’s (1989) recommendation for building theory from case
study. Embedded in the approach of Eisenhardt (1989:540) are pattern identification
methods from case data. These methods, according to her have two broad
categories of analysis—(1) within-case and (2) cross-case analyses. The sequence of
implementing them is becoming “intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone
entity” first and then searching for cross-case patterns.
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However, the very method of identifying patterns (or concepts) is not explicitly
described by Eisenhardt (1989). Because of this, the thinness of details of within-case
analysis was overcome by augmented insights from selected features of data
analyses methods which are proposed by Miles and Hubernam’s (1994) and Corbin
and Strauss’s (1990). The same is inferred from Eisenhardt’s (1989) and Brown and
Eisenhardt’s (1997) citation of Miles and Huberman as a method of data analysis.
Grounded theory method is also acknowledged to have an influence on the
inductive theory-building method proposed by Eisenhardt (1989). But the researcher
does not claim the use of grounded theory method in its strictest sense. As
described in Eisenhardt’s (1989) proposed approach, the contribution of Robert K.
Yin on case study method is also an underpinning framework of analysis.
Though Eisenhardt’s (1989) article explains an entire theory-building project’s
procedure, the part on within-case analyses of data requires thicker description. For
this reason, Yin’s (2011) five steps proposal and Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six steps
proposal were synthesized to develop within-case analyses procedures that were
applied in the present research. These procedures are presented in the next section
(under phases of data analysis).
Data that were gathered from the sources that are mentioned in the previous
sections were analyzed with a support of the ATLAS.ti software. The use of CAQDAS
(in this case ATLAS.ti) is an accepted practice in qualitative research (Lewins & Silver,
2007; Yin, 2011; Saldana, 2009; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In addition to the analysis
of data, the software supports organization of data (i.e. it organizes primary
documents (PDs) in a manner retrieval is easy). As Lewins and Silver (2007:83)
explain, “CAQDAS packages provide a range of tools which can be used to facilitate
various analytical processes”. For future reference too, the data and analyses thereof
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are saved on the researcher’s computer as a copy bundle—ATLAS.ti’s feature to
create backup of each project (hermeneutic unit).
In their discussion on qualitative data analysis, Miles and Huberman (1994) explain
that when the research involves the use of an evolving coding scheme instead of a
firm (a-priori) coding scheme, the use of a computer program is advisable.
Moreover, Miles and Huberman (1994) categorize ATLAS.ti as a “code-and-retrieve”,
and as “theory builder”, and “conceptual network builder”. As the present study is
meant for theory building, ATLAS.ti as a theory builder is an appropriate CAQDAS.
Moreover, its conceptual network building features play important role in the
theming and theory proposition procedure (Saldana, 2009).
3.5.5.1. Phases of Data Analysis
Under this section, details on how, within the aforementioned general framework,
data analysis was done through two phases: (1) within-case analyses and (2) cross-
case analyses (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the first phase (within-case analyses), five
iterative procedures that were augmented by detailed procedures extracted from Yin
(2011), Braun and Clarke (2006), Saldana, 2009, and Corbin and Strauss (1990) were
applied. The second phase (i.e., cross-case analysis) which was mainly confined to
Eisenhardt’s (1989) description of tactics is also described. Moreover, Eisenhardt’s
(1989) techniques that are referred to as shaping hypothesis, enfolding literature and
reaching closure were applied in this research to refine the findings that emerged
after cross-case analyses.
3.5.5.1.1. Within-case analysis
Although Yin’s (2011) and Braun and Clarke’s (2006) works were reported with
different orientations, procedurally they have things in common. Synthesizing from
them and incorporating specific coding procedures (Saldana, 2009; Tracy, 2013;
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Miles & Huberman, 1994; Corbin & Strauss, 1990), five iterative procedures of data
analyses were applied. They were: (1) data familiarization which was implemented
through conducting preliminary interviews, documentary (archive) analysis,
transcribing interview data (converting the tape-recorded audio files into text),
reading and rereading of transcriptions and field notes to gain deep insights into the
targeted change initiative in each selected bank; (2) compiling data into formal
database which encompasses documents (archives), and transcribed data, and
uploading them as primary documents (PD) into the ATLAS.ti software; (3)
conducting first cycle coding which include initial coding (open coding) and
descriptive coding (Saldana, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 1990); (4) generating second
cycle codes which include focused coding/selective coding (theoretical coding)
(Saldana, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 1990), and (5) describing and interpreting coded
concepts (results of coding) and their relationships as grounded within the case data.
In line with Miles and Huberman’s (1994) explanation, these steps were “arranged
roughly from the descriptive to the explanatory and from the concrete to the more
conceptual and abstract” (p. 245). Earlier methods were focused on meaning
extractions, and then followed by pattern findings on the bases of which conceptual
findings emerged. Details of methods applied in each step are presented in the next
paragraphs.
3.5.5.1.1.1. Data familiarization:
Familiarization of data, as it is briefly described above was the first step in the
analysis of data gathered from each case (Bank). Familiarization contributed to the
researcher’s effort to be empathetically neutral (Patton, 2002) through immersion in
the studied banks’ contexts. Analyses of preliminary discussions with gatekeepers
(Lincoln & Guba, 2013) supported by some archival analyses about targeted change
initiatives marked the start of this step. Following the analyses of preliminary
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discussions (interviews) and archives, the researcher headed towards analyzing the
data which were gathered from key participants (individuals who participated as
change agents during the initiation and implementation of targeted changes either
being team members or coordinators of the entire initiative).
Transcribing the audio file (tape-recorded interview data), which was mostly done
right after each interview session and before conducting next interviews, was the
other method of familiarization. As transcriptions were done by the researcher,
subsequent interview sessions were more critical by benefiting from increased
insights into the contexts represented by each case (bank).
3.5.5.1.1.2. Compiling data into formal database:
Transcribed data, field notes, and archives constitute the formal database for
analysis. Archives and preliminary interview notes were meant mainly to
understanding the context, structure and people who participated during the
targeted changes in each bank. The structure of data arrangement from the in-depth
interviews was different—it was organized around the process teams and change
leaders in each bank’s context (see Chapter Four for details). This is what Carlile and
Christensen (2004) refer to as nested design. The data gathered, transcribed and
compiled were saved as separate word documents in different folders. Each
document then was uploaded into the ATLAS.ti software as primary document (PD).
Each PD is the basic data source for analysis using ATLAS.ti. Data encoding is
equivalent to uploading the transcriptions to the software as the software has a
feature which does so. When a PD is added to ATLAS.ti, the software assigns index
numbers that identify each text using paragraph numbers and primary document
code number within the text (which is equivalent to a data segment or chunk). These
index numbers served as references to cite direct quotations from PDs.
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This compilation of data with the software support facilitated the data analysis and
made retrieval of quotations (chunks) simple during the constant comparisons while
coding the data (Saldana, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Selecting and copying of exemplar quotations during report preparation was
facilitated by the software as it has features which show the data segment
(quotation) within the entire data document. This helps to maintain the contextual
meanings (emic views) as originally conveyed by respondents which also adds
credibility to the data (Lincoln & Guba, 2013).
3.5.5.1.1.3. Coding:
Codes, in this research, refer to labels of concepts or categories about which
conceptual frameworks and theoretical propositions are developed (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). A group of such concepts around a higher and broader level of
abstraction is defined as category in the present research (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The
process of generating such codes is termed as coding (Saldana, 2009).
As Lewins and Silver (2007:81) define, “[q]ualitative coding is the process by which
segments of data are identified as relating to, or being an example of, a more
general idea, instance, theme or category.” As also asserted by scholars (e.g.,
Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Tracey, 2013) the coding procedure is
iterative which results in more abstract and higher level concepts through
comparison of emergent concepts with various data sources (triangulation).
Thus, coding requires extracting meanings from the data corpus and labeling that
meaning. The techniques applied for the extraction of meanings are inseparably
embedded in the coding process. Noting patterns or themes, counting, making
contrasts/comparisons, noting relationships, building logical chain of evidences and
building conceptual/theoretical coherence as explained by Miles and Huberman
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(1994) were techniques of meaning extraction applied in the present research. These
techniques were applied as appropriate throughout the data analysis phase of the
research.
As the present research is designed with an inductive logic for reasons explained in
the previous sections, the coding scheme applied does not have a-priori lists of
codes or categories; rather the “grounded” approach or “a-posteriori” method of
coding was applied (Miles & Huberman, 1994:58; Sinkovics et al., 2008:704). This
type of coding is consistent with the seminal works of Eisenhardt (1989). This
approach is also consistent with the coding conventions of Corbin and Strauss
(1990). The justification for selecting inductive (grounded) coding approach is
because it helps to prove that “the researcher is open to what the site has to say,
rather than determined to force-fit the data into preexisting codes” (Miles &
Huberman, 1994: 62). This approach, in addition to increasing trustworthiness, fits to
the purpose of the study which has much to do with context.
As the present research is inductive, the coding process progressed from generating
descriptive codes at the initial stages to more latent or interpretive ones (Miles &
Huberman, 1994) in later stages. In line with this, coding in this research went
through two phases—initial (first cycle) and focused (second cycle) (Saldana, 2009;
Charmaz, 2006).
3.5.5.1.1.3.1. Generating first cycle codes:
This (i.e., initial) stage of coding dealt with the identification, labeling and description
of codes and categories. This stage was categorized by being open to let any
meaning emerge from the data corps. Its orientation as explained above is
descriptive. In so doing, the coding method that is known in the literature as initial or
line-by-line or open coding (Saldana, 2009; Charmaz, 2006; Miles & Huberman,
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1994) and in vivo coding (Saldana, 2009) were applied with the support of the
ATLAS.ti software. Strictly speaking, these two methods are overlapping. Especially in
the descriptions of Charmaz (2006) and Corbin and Strauss (1990), in vivo coding is
not a separate type of coding; it is rather a technique of selecting participant’s word
as a code. The broader category of coding is open coding. It is an appropriate
method for interview transcripts and inductive methods (Saldana, 2009).
Initial codes were generated through closely reading each primary document and
trying to make sense from it; and in due course giving name to (i.e., labeling) each
word, line, or segment of data (Charmaz, 2006). This resulted in the list of emergent
codes (see annexes 6 and 7). These codes emerged based on close interactions and
researcher attempts to deeply understand data. Throughout this process of initial
coding, the researcher remained open to take any meaning out of the data. This
tactic avoids the risk of overloading researcher’s voice (i.e., excessive researcher
influence on the analytic process which leads to lack of codes that are fit to the
empirical world under study ) (Charmaz, 2006).
The code manager of ATLAS.ti keeps records of created codes in an integrated
manner and continues adding new ones as the researcher moves across primary
documents. With the support of the software in this way, the researcher created the
codes by typing words or phrases that are assumed to have as much as possible
semantically similar meaning to what they are intended to represent (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). Besides, in vivo coding method was applied in the code creation
process to maintain the contextual meanings and ensure the emergence of
participant’s meanings (voice) in the theory building. This also adds credibility.
Coding with a support of ATLAS.ti results in a running list of codes in real time in a
way subsequent typing of new codes does not allow duplications through
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suggestions of previous codes and preventing the researcher from typing same code
for more than once. This replaces the preparation of code book (Saldana, 2009). This
feature of the software indirectly indicates the point of saturation as per the
conceptualization of scholars (e.g., Charmaz, 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin &
Strauss, 1990).
The creation of line-by-line coding was followed by constant comparisons across
interview data from different participants of the same team, across different teams,
and between core-process teams and support-process teams. This attempt of
looking similarities and differences across similar and different teams (Eisenhardt,
1989) helped to iteratively refine codes. The second phase of constant comparison
was characterized by comparing between codes and codes and between codes and
data. This helped refining the final list of codes to be retained for further analysis.
The whole lot of activities from interviewing through transcription and generating
initial codes marked prolonged engagement with data. This adds credibility to the
meanings (i.e., emergent concepts and categories) that were labeled using codes.
3.5.5.1.1.3.2. Generating second cycle codes:
Coding at this stage was based on the codes that were generated in the first cycle
coding. The intention was to further refine the already created codes and categories
and identify patterns through searching for the most frequent (salient) or significant
initial codes and deciding to retain initial codes which “make the most analytic
sense” (Saldana, 2009). Salient codes are those that are frequently linked to
participants’ ideas in the data corpus. That means salient codes are well grounded in
the data. ATLAS.ti measures this with an index number called groundedness. In
addition to being salient, codes should also be significant in their contribution to the
whole pattern of relationships that are extracted from the data. This is supported by
ATLAS.ti’s network view manager (see annex 12 & annex 13) which works with the
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logic that is accepted by scholars (e.g. Miles & Huberman, 1994; Saldana, 2009;
Charmaz, 2006). The number of times a code or category is related to other code or
category is measured by the ATLAS.ti to indicate significance as density.
Codes and categories that were already created in the first cycle and extracted
because of their salience and significance (not in a statistical sense) as measured by
ATLAS.ti’s groundedness and density were refined at this stage. This is a
manifestation of the iterative process of coding. By its focus on relationships
between categories and its attempt to extract more abstract themes and concepts,
the second cycle is different from what was described in the previous stage. The
focus of the second cycle evolves to be latent (i.e., conceptual) as compared to
descriptive in the previous cycle.
Theoretical coding (Saldana, 2009) was the type of second cycle coding which was
applied in the present study. Saldana’s (2009) descriptions of coding methods are
parallel to axial coding and selective coding as explicated by (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin
& Strauss, 1990). Axial coding starts at about the end of the first cycle. ATLAS.ti’s
code family manager was used to create code families for already created codes in
the first cycle coding.
Refinements to the code families (i.e., categories in the second cycle) served as the
beginning of the second cycle before it turns its focus on higher level (i.e., latent)
abstractions. Theoretical coding or as referred to by grounded theorists (e.g.
Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 1990) selective coding was applied in the last
coding cycle of the present research. “Focused codes are sort of meta-code” (Miles
and Huberman, 1994:69); however, it focuses on the categories “without destructed
attention at this time to their properties and dimensions” which is already dealt with
in the first cycle (Saldana; 2009: 155).
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This last stage in coding is also referred to as focused coding to mean “using the
most significant (not in a statistical sense) and/or frequent amongst earlier codes to
sift through large amounts of data” Charmaz (2006: 57). This tactic has a positive
impact on increasing the voices of participants. That is the rationale behind
supporting the method of second-cycle coding in the present study with ATLAS.ti’
software.
As a counterintuitive mechanism (Miles & Huberman, 1994), an analysis of codes’
salience (measured by groundedness) and importance (measured by density), as
referred to by the ATLAS.ti software, were applied to go through the second cycle.
Miles and Huberman’s (1994) salience and importance is parallel to Charmaz’s (2006)
significant and frequent as described in the above paragraph. The combination of
these measures (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.3) is applied at this stage in the attempt to
search for codes which make the most analytic sense (Saldana, 2009).
Through the support of density measures (see Annex 5 & Annex 9), codes that
emerge conceptually appealing; and through the support of groundedness measures
(see Annex 4 & and Annex 8), codes that are most grounded on the empirical data
were selected. These counting features of the software are clearly explicated by Miles
and Huberman’s (1994:253) assertion to identify a concept that (a) “happens a
number of times and (b) consistently happens in specific way.”
In general, the two coding cycles applied in the present study balance two things: (1)
openness to capture line-by-line all possible meanings from a chunk and to give a
chance to each of such extracts and (2) reduce the data so created into fewer more
significant or recurrent or important ones without the influence of the analyst’s bias
in the process.
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3.5.5.1.1.4. Describing and interpreting coded concepts and their relationships:
Building logical chain of evidences and making conceptual/theoretical coherence (as
described by Miles and Huberman (1994)) describe the techniques used at this stage.
As asserted by Miles and Huberman (1994: 260), subsuming particulars into the
general and factoring result in identifying “discrete bits of information” were among
the methods applied at this stage. However, how these bits make “a more
economical whole that, analytically speaking is more than the sum of its parts” (Miles
& Huberman, 1994:260) requires building a logical chain of evidence. Graphic
representations were used to depict the logic manually or with a CAQDAS Support
(Saldana, 2009). The final stage greatly benefited from Saldana’s (2009) post-coding
and pre-writing strategies of extracting top categories and themes or concepts.
Besides, Saldana’s (2009) touch test was applied to progress to higher level of
abstraction.
In line with descriptions, chains of evidences were compared and contrasted. Direct
quotations which were selected from participants’ responses were interwoven with
the description to increase credibility (Miles & Huberman, 1994). On due course,
countervailing evidences were also accounted for and ruled out. This tactic gives
sense to the relationships identified. This is done through a series of if-then tactics
and anomaly-seeking exercises (Carlile & Christensen, 2004). Raising questions such
as “Does this really happen, and what would we logically predict as a consequence—
and does that consequence appear in the data?” (Miles & Huberman, 1994:260)
leads to what Eisenhardt (1989) refers to as shaping hypothesis whereby provisional
propositions had been made about the relationships among the final set of concepts
(themes) and refined through iteratively checking if they give good sense of the
data. This was done through “dialogue/argumentative method of dialectics” (Lincoln
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& Guba, 2013). Refined hypotheses and related explanations backing them were
then juxtaposed with extant literature (Eisenhardt, 1998).
This same procedure of within case analysis had been used to every case before the
start of cross-case analysis. At the stage of cross-case analysis, the focus of analysis
was on the findings of each case. Basically, findings had been compared in search of
the final extraction of concepts and relationships.
3.5.5.1.2. Cross-case analysis
The second phase which is the search for cross-case patterns as posited by
Eisenhardt (1989) started after the above iterative procedures were completed and
results from each case emerged. The remaining procedures were the same as
Eisenhardt’s (1989) prescription. The specific tactics used to do cross-case analyses at
this stage were searching for similarities and differences across paired cases
(Eisenhardt, 1989) which were at same time supported by counts (Miles &
Huberman, 1994) that were generated by the ATLAS.ti software (see Table 7.1). These
tactics of comparisons are meant to reduce researcher bias (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The benefit of multiple case designs is the possibility of replication and comparison
of findings across-cases through the application of qualitative analysis techniques
(Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). As Eisenhardt (1989) explains, analysis of cross-case
patterns can help in avoiding information processing bias that has roots in vividness
influences, more elite respondents, and inadvertently dropping disconfirming
evidences. Eisenhardt’s (1989:540) two tactics of cross-case analysis were applied in
the present research. The first tactic, which is selecting “categories or dimensions”
and looking for “within-group similarities and intergroup differences”, was applied
for core process teams and support process teams within each bank. The second
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tactic, which is selecting “pairs of cases” and listing “similarities and differences”, is
more explicit in this report. The second tactic takes the two banks as pair.
Theory is then developed inductively on the basis of emergent “relationships among
constructs within and across-cases and their underlying logical arguments”
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007:25). As a result of the iterative process described so
far, tentative themes (concepts) and relationships or patterns continued emerging in
a more and more vivid manner. These emergent themes (constructs), relationships
and patterns had to be systematically compared with evidences from each case with
an intention to test how they fit to case data. This led to sharpening of definitions of
emergent concepts and clarifying their manifestations.
After exhaustively describing the final finding (cross-case analysis result), the
research entered another stage – triangulation with theory in the extant literature. In
this stage Bacharach’s (1989) and Wacker’s (1998) criteria for good theoretical
contribution had been applied. Using these criteria, the research’s proposition about
a strategic organizational change implementation model had been made. Finally,
Eisenhardt’s (1989) techniques that are referred to as shaping hypothesis, enfolding
literature and reaching closure were applied to refine the findings that emerged after
cross-case analyses.
3.6. Methodological Rigor
The quality of findings from qualitative research is judged based on methodological
rigor. The judgment of rigor in the present study should be viewed within the
perspective of the specific research design employed by the study. Eisenhardt’s
(1989) approach of building theory from case study research is the research strategy
applied. Eisenhardt (1991:627) further explicated its “rigorous methodology and
comparative, multiple-case logic.” The use of multiple data sources and triangulation
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tactics applied in the present research can primarily be considered as indicators of
quality (Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991). As procedures prescribed by Eisenhardt (1989) are
evident (in the study as can be observed in the previous sections of this report),
indicators or research quality and methodological rigor explained thereof also apply
for the present study.
This research approach is strong in building empirically grounded theories through
rigorous tactics of constant comparisons between emergent theory and data across
various sources and cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). This reduces researcher bias to its
minimum and results in relatively objective constructs. Meeting methodological rigor
“requires being watchful about multiple sources of analytic bias” (Miles & Huberman,
1994:263). The other feature Eisenhardt (1989:547) pinpoints as the strength of her
approach is the fact that the output will be a theory which “can be readily measured
and hypotheses that can be proven.... [This is because] they have already undergone
repeated verification during the theory-building process.”
The present research supported by the ATLAS.ti software applied frequency counts
of appearance of concepts in the data (i.e., groundedness) and measures of the
density (salience) of relationships a concept has with the rest of the concepts or
categories (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Charmaz, 2006). The software sorted the
emergent categories or concepts in terms of their order of importance so that the
top most important ones could not be overlooked. This added to the objectivity of
the results. The use of computer programs such as ATLAS.ti helps to reduce biases as
it helps to conduct bias minimizing tactics such as if-then tests, and triangulating
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Moreover, as the use of the software documents the
interactions of the researcher with the data, it provides an “auditable foot-print”
allowing progressive focusing and refinement (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012:827).
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In addition to the above measures in connection with empirical research, Eisenhardt
(1989) also posits that as a measure of goodness, the theory built must be
parsimonious, testable, and logically coherent. CAQDAS can also “facilitate robust
theory development through the ongoing renegotiation and updating of theoretical
concepts and a constant comparison of theoretical building blocks and empirical
evidence (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012:819).
Eisenhardt et al. (2016) refer to the approach of building theory from cases as an
inductive method. According to these scholars, the use of theoretical sampling which
creates “opportunities for comparisons… [adds on the] robustness of emergent
theory” (p. 1114). They call for better rigor and quality inductive research contending
what they referred to as “rigor mortis” that challenge inductive researchers and
ultimately lead to false rigor (Eisenhardt et al., 2016: 1121). As a solution, they
propose three criteria for testing rigor: (1) whether the emergent theory is internally
coherent and parsimonious, (2) whether constructs or themes are convincingly
grounded in compelling data and (3) if the research provides rich and un-expected
insights.
Sticking to the distinct nature of the approach proposed by Eisenhardt (1989), the
present research can be evaluated in terms of the above three criteria while
reviewing all the parts of the report. All the three criteria do not require procedures
(steps) in order to test for methodological rigor; rather the features are embedded in
all the research tasks that were executed to build theory from cases.
Miles and Huberman (1994) generically explain quality in terms of reduced bias and
researcher effect. With respect to reducing these researcher biases and influences on
the findings, they proposed several tactics. Effects refer to the influences of outsiders
to a group and that of insiders’ influence on outsiders. This leads to an interest of
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preventing “biased observations’ (as a result of the influences) are “confounding” the
natural characteristics of the setting with the artificial effects of researcher-native
relationship” (Miles & Huberman, 1994:265). This implies two sources of effects on
research—(1) researcher and (2) effects of the site.
In terms of reducing investigator effects, the present study has qualities that are
consistent with the proposal of Miles and Huberman (1994). These include: staying
long on-site which is also referred to as prolonged engagement, unequivocally
informing participants about researcher intentions, and conducting some interviews
off-site. The preliminary discussions with gatekeepers and archival reviews on the
targeted change initiatives in each bank as strategies to gain emic insights which
helped the researcher to be empathetic and at the same time to be neutral during
in-depth interviews are what can be mentioned as instances here. In addition, the
use of participant information sheet with details about the implications and impacts
of participating in the research indicates quality as acknowledged by Mile and
Huberman (1994). There were also interviews conducted outside the office of
participants based on their willingness in order to reduce the impact of the site and
give participants more freedom and create a friendliness condition.
As Miles and Huberman (1994) explain, getting feedback from informants is a logical
source of corroboration. In the present study, the researcher used earlier
conceptualizations of ideas emerged from previous data in exploring more
information or refining previous ideas based on data gathered from subsequently
contacted participants from the same case and sub-case (embedded case). These
peer debriefing methods were used to corroborate through subsequent interviews
until the data saturates. These later participants are referred to, in Miles and
Huberman (1994:275), as “confidants”. These approaches as affirmed by these
authors are other mechanisms of getting feedback from participants.
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3.6.1. Methodological Norms
In addition to the approaches discussed so far, to explain the methodological rigor
of the present research, criteria that are used to measure goodness of qualitative
research are discussed here in order to give complementary information by using
the language (i.e., norms) of deductive-orientated readers in viewing methodological
rigor of qualitative research (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012).
Quality of a qualitative research can be tested by (1) the “trustworthiness criteria of
credibility (paralleling internal validity), transferability (paralleling external validity),
dependability (paralleling reliability) and confirmability (paralleling objectivity)” (2)
the authenticity criteria of fairness, ontological authenticity, and educative
authenticity (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:114). The synthesis of proposals by different
scholars (e.g. Patton, 2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Lincoln and Guba, 2013; Toma,
2006), thus; results in a set of the two common standards against which quality of
qualitative research can be judged—trustworthiness and authenticity.
The tactics applied in the present research are also consistent with some features of
trustworthiness and authenticity. However, it has to be noted that not all the criteria
for rigor are required to be fulfilled by a single research project; only combinations
of those that are relevant to the specific research project need to be applied (Toma,
2006).
3.6.1.1. Trustworthiness
As described above, trustworthiness is among the commonly applied criteria for
judging the quality of qualitative research. A research that demonstrates its findings
are (1) credible, (2) dependable (3) transferable and (4) confirmable is said to be
trustworthy (Patton, 2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Lincoln and Guba, 2013; Toma,
2006). In addition, Sinkovics and Alfoldi (2012:819) explain about the use of CAQDAS
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in enhancing “systematization, trustworthiness, reflexivity and operational
effectiveness in qualitative research.” Hence, the trustworthiness criteria is fulfilled in
the present study by the use of the ATLAS.ti software and also in the ways described
below.
3.6.1.2. Credibility
Credibility indicates the quality of data in terms of accurately representing the
targeted empirical reality. It also refers to the accuracy of researcher’s interpretation
in terms of representing meanings of study targets and the researcher’s credibility
(Toma, 2006). In effect, credibility indicates the degree to which the findings sound
true for those with emic views (natives) and for those in the field.
Mechanisms that show whether participants agree in the constructions and
interpretations of the researcher can be used to ensure credibility (Toma, 2006). In an
attempt to richly describe cases, the present research used several data sources and
multiple participants. This enhances credibility (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Eisenhardt
et al., 2016). Greater confidence can be built about the credibility of the data and
emergent constructions because of the triangulation strategies applied in the
research. “Triangulation, in whatever form, increases credibility and quality by
countering the concern (or accusation) that a study’s findings are simply an artifact
of a single method, a single source, or a single investigator’s blinders” (Miles &
Huberman, 1994:563). The application of theoretical sampling also enhances
credibility.
Richness of description (thick description) of the case and its boundaries also serves
as a base against which readers (evaluators) can judge the credibility of the
interpretations and constructions by the researcher (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The
cases selected for the present research are described in a separate section to clearly
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communicate the reality so that the interpretation process can be judged by the
reader for its congruence with the data.
Peer debriefings were also applied as mechanisms of ensuring accuracy of data and
researcher understandings (interpretations). As mechanism of ensuring quality, the
researcher used to summarize issues for the participant seeking confirmation.
Whenever the researcher perceives an emergent need to do so, checking and
rechecking the stances of participants was an integral tactic of interviewing. Besides,
subsequent interviews were augmented by peer debriefings to ensure the accuracy
of previously gathered data or to decide on further data collection towards those
which require more effort for saturation.
In line with Miles and Huberman’s (1994) recommendations, in the present research,
the researcher took time before delving deep into each case and gathered
preliminary information and general insights from gatekeepers. With key participants
too, giving sufficient information with the help of participant information sheet,
getting used to each other, and maintaining rapport were used as strategies to
increase credibility (Patton, 2002). Further details about the researcher are provided
under the statement of subjectivity section of this report. Audit trial and chain of
evidence were also mechanisms that were applied by the researcher as quality
(credibility) enhancement tactics (Yin, 2003; Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). These tactics
(i.e., debriefings and audit-trial) are also considered as mechanisms of enhancing
dependability.
3.6.1.3. Transferability
In the present research, as it is guided by Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach, such
analyses techniques as constant comparison methods, triangulation, and frequency
counts have been used for the purpose of reducing bias and increasing the
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transferability of meanings across various boundaries that are rectified through
cross-case analysis. To make it more explicit, the fact that the present research
employs multiple cases and the attempt to enclose maximum variation (both private
and government-owned banks) and the nested cases embedded within each bank
which is also consistent with Carlile and Christensen’s (2004) anomaly-seeking add
value towards transferability of the findings of the present research. In addition, the
tactics mentioned in connection with credibility also increase transferability. Thick
description of the cases included in the present research also enhances
transferability.
3.6.1.4. Authenticity
The researcher actually visited the cases (banks), discussed with concerned
personnel, gathered documentary evidences and conducted in-depth interviews. This
enabled the researcher to authentically analyze the data and develop the theory
based on emic views within the cases through immersion into and prolonged
engagement on case data as explicated in the previous sections of this report.
Instead of bringing researcher’s prior insights into the research, the research is
designed in a way the researcher sticks to the data and refrains from influencing the
meaning construction process by etic views.
Fair representation of the voices of different participants such as operational
workers, middle level managers, and top managers are features of the present
research that are consistent with authenticity criteria. This, through triangulation
effort, balances voices from multiple participants and fulfils fairness criteria. The fairly
adequate use of quotations from these participants is an indicator for an authentic
finding and reporting. Above all, the trigger for conducting the present research has
much to do with context. The entire research was geared towards understanding
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how strategic organizational change unfolds in the selected context. This forced the
research process to focus on emic perspectives and the results to be authentic.
3.6.2. Ethical Considerations
Ethics is about “how we decide that an action is right, correct, or appropriate” (Miles
& Huberman, 1994: 289). As Tracy (2010) explicates, research should meet
procedural, situational, relational, exiting, and culturally specific ethical standards.
She also adds self-reflexivity and multivocality as parts of ethics.
The present research was conducted in accordance with ethical standards of the
University. Data collection was conducted after getting ethical clearance from the
university (see annex 11). The standards applied to ensure ethical principles are
consistent with the recommendations by Tracy (2010). The following subsections are
explanations of ethical considerations considered in conducting the research.
3.6.2.1. Procedural Ethics
Procedural ethics include the standard procedures of causing no harm, avoiding
deception, and protecting privacy and getting informed consent. As explained in the
previous sections, the present research has features that enhance credibility; and the
use of multiple data sources and the report preparation entails authentic multi-vocal
tactic.  With respect to meeting procedural ethics in the present research; informed
consent and confidentiality principles were maintained.
Informed Consent: Participant organizations (banks) and individuals were fully and
accurately informed; on the basis of which they gave their consent to participate in
the research. Before starting data gathering from a selected bank, a written request
of permission was issued to each bank as this was a requirement by the ethics review
procedure of the university too. The two participant banks then gave permission
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letter to allow data gathering. These letters were reviewed by the university but not
annexed to this report for confidentiality purpose.
In each bank, relevant personnel (gatekeepers) were contacted in search of gaining
insights into the nature of the targeted change initiative. Besides, these first contacts
helped the researcher in getting information about who participated in initiating and
implementing the change. This resulted in lists of individuals (participants). These
lists are securely kept by the researcher in order to keep personal identities
confidential. With the help of the lists, individuals were contacted and given
sufficient information about what it meant to participate in this study. To maintain
consistency in doing so and for audit purpose, a participant information sheet which
was also reviewed by the university was prepared (see annex 1) and printed copies
were given to each individual participant before getting her/his willingness to
participate. No individual was made to give data without her/his willingness.
During interviews with participants, the researcher asked the consent of each
participant to take notes and to use tape recorder by explaining the purpose of
doing so and how the data will be kept secured from access that compromises
privacy and confidentiality.
Confidentiality: Confidentiality issues were given utmost care. The privacy of
participant individuals and organizations are protected. As the finding is not
targeted to a specific bank, there is no need to disclose the identity of the
participant bank. Instead, it is empathetic to protect participant bank’s interest by
not disclosing its strategy related facts as doing so may have a potential harm to
market competition of the participant bank. With this in mind, the research report is
written using anonymous representations of participants. The privacy of the
participants is so protected that they are secured from any possible harm.
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Interviewees were not required to sign or provide informed consent form as their
private information was not needed. The researcher faced no dilemma with respect
to confidentially protecting identities of participants as interviewees’ private
information (identity) is not needed for the research. Report of the present study
consciously avoided deductive disclosure of participants to prevent unwitting
disclosure of private information to those who know the setting.
As part of ensuring confidentiality, paper-based records are kept and will be kept in
a secure location and will only be accessible to the researcher. These files will be kept
for five years after publication of this report and finally disposed through shredding.
Computer-based records are kept in password-protected computer and files to be
accessed by only the researcher. Data exchanges with the supervisor did not include
private information of participants. Crashing of external storage devices and
formatting (erasing the files from) the personal computer will be used to de-identify
personal information when the file will no longer be important.
3.6.2.2. Situational Ethics
As Tracy (2010:847) explains, “situational ethics refer to ethical practices that emerge
from a reasoned consideration of a context’s specific circumstances.” Conducting the
present research in the context of Ethiopian commercial banks is expected to benefit
the banks in terms of recommending an implementation model for strategic
organizational change that fits the specific context of banks. This benefit is expected
to be anticipated without compromising the interests of participant banks. This can
be inferred from the procedural ethics considerations specified in the above section.
Besides, this research is initiated to explore context-based constructs and their
relationships. On the bases of these relationships, an implementation model for
strategic organizational change is built. This very nature of the research poses ethical
dilemmas to the researcher.
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One is the claim to be made about the specific context and the second is the voice in
the making of the claim. Context in the present research refers to the setting within
which (it also implies the domain) the emergent model is expected to be valid. The
dilemma is whether the breadth encompasses Ethiopia, an emerging economy, the
banking sector or the two selected banks. Being in this dilemma, the researcher
decided to focus the claim to be analytical (theoretical) as Yin (2011) describes in a
sense that constructions from purely national (domestic) context can result in
deviant explanations of strategic organizational change implementation by
presenting findings juxtaposed with similar concepts from the extant literature. This
decision is made compromising the researcher’s view that the findings can also be
transferred to contexts other than the banking sector. This view of the researcher is
influenced by his previous research on the implementation and impact of similar
change initiatives in other six public sector organizations.
In claiming to make genuine contribution for the banking sector in Ethiopia with
respect to overcoming acontextual theories, “the question of whose voice is heard in
any given construction” is the fundamental ethical issue as asserted by Lincoln and
Guba (2013:54). In this study, the voices of participants resulted in the most
important influence in the construction process. The researcher’s voice is kept as
minimal as possible through the researcher’s utmost care. This is evident in the
intensive use of direct quotations in the finding sections of this report. These
quotations are selected because they are exemplars of salient concepts or
constructions that are grounded in the data. However, care has also been taken in
order not to misrepresent the facts being influenced by deliberate or unconscious
malconstructions by either the researcher or participants. The use of multiple
participants and the support by the ATLAS.ti software in organizing data and
facilitating retrieval without memory loss or risk of being overwhelmed by most vivid
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data or influences of elite participants and to be instead based on groundedness and
density measures (counts) were main strategies of fairly representing voices and
reducing bias.
However, notwithstanding the probable novelty of some constructs that emerged
especially from the private sector bank, the researcher decided to drop them for the
sake of protecting the bank against possible interrogations by regulatory bodies. The
private sector in Ethiopia struggles for access to finance as government policy is too
tight. The private banking sector has devised informal mechanisms of overcoming
this. The researcher refrained from reporting them because of the likely speculation
about the identity of the participant bank.
3.6.3. Statement of Subjectivity
As an academician and a practitioner, I was exposed to the lessons on different
change models and to the practices of organizational change initiatives both in the
University I work for and in other organizations in which I conducted research. I
perceived common patterns across the initiatives. They have advocates with mantras
that are directly copied from a book authored by the contributor of the change
model. However, other than the media campaigns propagating the success stories, I
felt that witnessing real and sustained changes is difficult. As the media stops the
campaigns on a specific type of change model, the reported changes also vanish and
gradually organizations regress back to the status quo – a punctuating deep silence.
This state then interrupts with a different name of change. The same organizational
shock accompanied by media campaigns runs for a while to precede another period
of resilience.
My attendance of the PhD proposal development program was an opportunity to
explore towards a way through which I was convinced that I could systematically
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address the issue of why these initiatives are not delivering what they promised.
From the literature, I learned that implementation of an organizational change is the
most challenging stage and hence, the track record of success is low. I further
investigated to learn about the possible reasons behind this. The acontextual
practices of change and the skewness of extant literature towards western context fit
to my personal quest for why can’t the initiatives to the best of my understanding
deliver as they are expected.
Especially Pettigrew et al.’s (2001) call and the dearth of literature in response to the
call triggered me to build a contextual model that can guide change initiatives
towards success. From this time onwards, I remained open to explore anything that
gives sense with respect to the idea of successful implementation of change.
Attempting to observe the issue within national context, I chose the banking sector
because it is legally reserved for domestic players only.
Apart from being enthusiastic to develop an implementation model which primarily
serves as a guideline for upcoming strategic change initiatives and at the same time
to build on the notion of context-based change models, I have no conflicts of
interest which challenge me to be biased towards. To overcome the inherent
problem of subjectivity in qualitative research, I followed the strategy of immersion
into the subject of study (Patton, 2002) and tried to control the etic view’s influence
on the emic view of participant cases. This effort was backed by the very interest of
exploring contextual perspectives which motivated me to study on this subject.
Having a stance of exploring the truth as experienced by study participants and
inductively developing a model which captures the theory of how a strategic
organizational change can be successfully implemented in the specific context
represented by the selected cases, I followed specific strategies of reducing
investigator influence.
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I started the field work by a familiarization strategy through gathering data from
documents, and gatekeepers about the targeted change initiatives in each bank.
Then I designed procedures which would help me to be immersed in each case and
be able to understand emic views. Following these procedures (bottom-up
interviewing schedule) I gathered data from nested layers of cases up to the level I
felt I reached data saturation. Prior reading of and decision to use Eisenhardt’s (1989)
recommended approach to remain unbiased and let the data speak contributed a lot
in terms of reducing researcher subjectivity.
The coding scheme (the inductive or grounded approach) helped me in giving fair
chance to consider all emergent concepts to be represented. Further reductions
were supported by computer software (ATLAS.ti). This allowed me view all created
codes through an open coding procedure and when need be retrieve all segments of
data that are linked to the codes within their origin (text) in the entire data set.
The final selections were done in line with what is proposed by Miles and Huberman
(1994) as counting being supported by the software that makes the counting
accurate. The counting reflects two dimensions – groundedness (which indicates the
number of quotations linked to a code) and density (which indicates the number of
times the concept is interconnected to the rest). The combined use of density and
groundedness as criteria for selecting concepts for further analysis reduces the
researcher’s bias to a level that does not practically affect the findings of the study.
Even though the researcher tried to apply several methods to reduce subjectivity, as
the researcher in qualitative research is normally a human instrument, it is impossible
to avoid the influence of the researcher in the construction process. Hence, during
the sense making process, the researcher’s background knowledge of some theories
in the extant literature could possibly influence the construction.
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3.7. Chapter Summary
In this chapter, the methods that were employed to conduct the present study are
discussed in line with ontological and epistemological underpinnings. In the chapter,
the research problem and how it is linked to the applied research methods was
introduced fist. Then the type of research design that was employed in the present
research and relevant justifications are discussed. The next chapter describes the
cases which were involved in the present research.
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CHAPTER FOUR: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF CASES
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the cases (i.e., commercial banks) that were included in the present
study are described. The description intends to provide insights into the types of the
banks and the nature of the changes initiated in each bank. The cases described in
this chapter were selected based on the logic explained in Chapter Three.
In Ethiopia, the banking sector constitutes both government-owned and private
banks. All the government owned banks have commonly experienced some strategic
organizational changes in the past decade alone. However, there was no such widely
known practice across all private banks. Notwithstanding this fact, as the purpose of
this study was to develop an implementation model for strategic organizational
change in commercial banks in the country, the sample had to engender
representation from private banks too. Only one of the private banks went through
an organization-wide change. Therefore, the only private bank which undertook
strategic organizational change and one of the two government-owned commercial
banks were incorporated as cases of the present study.
The two case banks introduced strategic organizational change which entails
business process redesign. The redesigning was executed by teams that were
organized based on core and support business process conceptualization. This
structure helped the researcher to organize field works based on these nested sub-
cases embedded in each bank as depicted by figure 3.1.
The banks’ identity is anonymously reported in this study as the name is not required
for the purpose of the study. Besides, this approach protects the privacy of case
banks. Further details about cases are presented in the subsequent sections.
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4.2. General Background of Cases
Banking sector of Ethiopia comprises of the central bank (i.e., National Bank of
Ethiopia (NBE)), two government-owned banks and sixteen private banks. Among
the tww government-owned banks, one is fully dedicated to finance investments in
government’s priority areas. Total number of commercial banks is seventeen. For
Africa’s second most populous nation with 102 million people (World Bank, 2016),
the number of banks is very few.
As a result, indigenous informal financial institutions primarily ‘Iqquib’ are providing
services and filling the demand gap. These informal financial institutions have been
serving the financial needs of societies and businesses (Misganaw, 2012; Dejenie,
1993) and are continuing doing so. Moreover, transaction cost of getting access to
finance from the informal sector is lower (Misganaw, 2012) compared to that of the
fully collateral-based commercial banking sector. The World Bank (2017)
recommends identifying ways of sustaining financial infrastructure and supporting
private investment through credit market as major challenges of the country.
NBE has the authority to give license to and supervise operations of banks and other
financial institutions based on the power bestowed to it by the “National Bank of
Ethiopia Establishment (as Amended) Proclamation Number 591/2008”. This
proclamation made amendments to and replaced proclamation number 83/1994
which allowed establishing private banks. Article 3 of the new proclamation
reaffirmed the establishment of the central bank declaring: “the National Bank of
Ethiopia established by Order No.  30/1963 shall continue to exist as an autonomous
institution.”
However, Article 9 of the new Ethiopian Banking Business Proclamation number
592/2008 still remains being protectorate. It says, “foreign nationals or
organizations [that are] fully or partially owned by foreign nationals may not be
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allowed to open banks or branch offices or subsidiaries of foreign banks in Ethiopia
or acquire the shares of Ethiopian banks.” This added to the National Bank’s directive
which increased the minimum paid-up capital to establish new banking business
which slowed down the rate of new bank entry to the market forced the number of
banks to remain very few.
The industry in which Ethiopian commercial banks are operating is characterized by
the existence of very few players and entry barriers as a result of government’s
protection of the market from foreign investors and high paid-up capital
requirement. This indicates weak intensity of competition among extant firms. In
such situations, inefficient operations might not necessarily lead businesses to poor
profitability. This indicates greater opportunity of improving operational efficiency by
initiating strategic organizational change in such banks. Experiences of two
commercial banks in Ethiopia with respect to initiating and implementing strategic
organizational change are taken as cases in the present research.
In Ethiopia, several banks have been initiating different types of organizational
changes. The differences in nature, source, and scope of initiatives have been more
apparent between private and government-owned banks. Generally, government-
owned banks have been subjected to organisation-wide changes as the same was
demanded by the government. In contrast, practices of organisation-wide initiatives
are rare in private banks. With an exception to one private bank which undertook
organization-wide change, the rest experience only relatively smaller changes the
biggest of which being the adoption of the core banking system. As organization-
wide (strategic) change is the target of this study, the changes in government-owned
banks and in the only private bank were found being appropriate for the study.
As described in the previous chapter, engendering cases from both government-
owned and private banks helped the study to include maximum variations in terms
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of form of ownership and capture the differences so as to identify patterns that are
salient across the entire commercial banking sector of the country. With this
intention, one government-owned commercial bank and one private bank which
attempted to undertake strategic organizational change were selected for this
inductive multiple case study research.
Generally speaking, initiatives in government-owned banks are externally-driven
while private sector banks initiate changes internally. Government-owned banks are
often skewed towards fulfilling the financing needs of government projects or
government priority areas in the private sector while private sector banks may
choose to serve the motives of major shareholders who have interests other than
making a profit out of the banking business. In both cases, nature of ownership plays
an important role in business orientation and hence assumed to have impacts on
strategic change implementation.
As participants explained based on their experience, private sector banks may attract
the attention of investors whose primary interest is getting rid of difficulties of the
financial market and get better access to finance. In private banks, investors have
interests other than making money out of the banking business as mentioned
before. For example, shareholders may opt to influence bank management to work
towards fulfilling their financing needs for their other businesses more often than
demanding running a successful banking business. This speculation sounds valid as
the banking sector generally falls short of meeting financing demands of the market.
It is no wonder banks can still be profitable while primarily serving such interests of
their major shareholders. For a bank operating in this kind of environment, getting
customer for the credit business is not an issue; fulfilling the demands of applicants
is far from sufficient as banks are in short supply.
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Getting access to finance through government-owned commercial banks is widely
considered as a privilege. A bank can exploit its capacity without a significant effort
to get customer. Government’s mega projects alone can consume the entire lending
capacity of government-owned banks in Ethiopia. Because of this reality, the central
bank even forces banks to spend considerable portion of their loan in purchasing
government bills.
Because of these, banks are focusing towards deposit mobilization, to minimize
liquidity risks and increase their capacity to supply for businesses. These facts were
widely expressed by participants from the two case banks. As was commonly
mentioned by participant individuals from selected banks, banking business in
Ethiopia is a no risk of loss area of investment.
With such prevailing conditions and the level of competition in the government
protected banking industry wherein only few players enjoy entry barrier, the success
of change is demanded more by the workforce than the management or leaders.
The issue of increasing success in implementing strategic organizational change
should, therefore, take this reality into account. This is indeed unique.
In the subsequent sections, the change initiatives in banks that are included in this
multiple case study are described. The purpose is to provide background information
about the kind of changes which were subjects of this study. Therefore, these
sections are more descriptive than analytical.
4.3. Case Description: Bank A
Bank A is among the cases included in this study. It is a government owned bank. In
this bank, initiatives for strategic change had been instituted five years earlier than
data collection time. The purpose of these initiatives was to reorganize the bank
using business process re-engineering (BPR).
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Changing this bank using BPR passed through two phases as participants refer to.
The first phase started following government’s announcement about the use of BPR
as a tool for organizational reforms. In accordance with the government’s directions,
bank A had in turn ordered all of its work units to do their own BPR. Then, each
department of bank A self-declared BPR which was described by the participants as
a functional-based BPR. As participants unequivocally claimed, the functional-based
BPR failed to deliver as it was expected except bringing about some quick fixes. As a
result, a second phase which was claimed by participants to be a process-based BPR
was started. These were the two phases embedded in the entire move towards
changing the bank through the application of BPR.
Although important insights were gained from the first phase (functional BPR), the
process-based BPR (the second phase), was selected to be the focus of this study as
the previous phase had not been well organised and access to data was assumed to
be difficult when considered retrospectively. A major drawback, as commonly
claimed by the participants of the first phase, was mentioned during in-depth
interviews. Recognition of this drawback has served as a springboard to the next
phase.
In the process-based BPR in bank A, the first thing that gained the attention of the
change leaders was the issue of understanding the change model—BPR and its
principles. As an output of this effort, unlike the case in the first phase where each
department had to conduct its own BPR study and implement changes, phase two
started by first establishing teams to design the anticipated change for the entiere
bank in accordance with BPR principles.
Team establishment was not a one-time event. Initially, there was only one such
team to handle the task of organizational redesigning. This team started its task by
identifying the required processes to undertake the bank’s business. It identified two
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categories in terms of which the bank’s processes were classified—core processes
and support processes.
Core processes are those processes that are directly related to the bank’s
commercial banking services to the customer while support processes represent
back office operations that facilitate the operational processes of the bank. The team
started the task of redesigning the bank first by focusing on the core processes. As a
result, the first team identified and named three core processes—Customer accounts
and transaction service, trade services and credit services.
At about the end of the redesigning task of the core processes, following the pilot
testing results, managers realized the importance of changing the bank’s processes
entirely and hence initiated similar changes in support processes too. For this
purpose, a new process team which was responsible to design support processes
was established comprising of members from the prior team. The support process
team then identified nine sub-processes. After this team had identified and named
the sub-processes, it split into nine sub-teams and continued the operation of
redesigning the support processes.
4.3.1. Core Process Teams
The process of changing bank A started by first identifying three core processes
namely, customer accounts and transaction services (CATS), credit services, and trade
services (TS). Each core process was established as a sub-process by assigning
individuals who did the process identification works as members of the core process
team. To accomplish the remainder of the tasks of assessing the “as-is” situation,
which refers to the old system and designing the “to-be” (the new process),
additional members joined each core process sub-team. Then each sub-team started
to assess the old system that they referred to as “as-is” through collecting data from
the work units that undertook the function(s).
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Participants claimed to have followed the BPR principles and supporting tools such
as process flow charts throughout the course of assessing the old system. They also
had to report their findings regarding the pitfalls of the old systems to a higher body
in the bank that was organised for the purpose of undertaking the change. This
higher body was known as a steering committee.
There was also a resource person who served as a coordinator of the entire core
process team. This person usually served as the representative of the three core sub-
processes in presenting deliverables to the steering committee. During the
presentations to the steering committee the process teams used to get feedback for
further improvements or were told to proceed to the next steps.
Once the study of the “as-is” was approved by the steering committee and the
weaknesses and areas of improvements had already been identified in connection
with this study, the teams had started generating ideas about perusing the process
in a better way. In connection with generating ideas, participants usually mentioned
some techniques applied during the brainstorming sessions. Thinking outside the
box, wacko idea generation and assumption breaking were mentioned in this regard.
Teams were also moved to a different place from where they resided so team
members could work for the project with more concentration being away from their
office assignments. This helped members to get to know each other better and
maintain improved communication within and even across sub-teams.
Moreover, core-process team members got an opportunity to visit benchmark banks
in other countries. Several participants regarded this as a remarkable event during
their project work.  However, others who were assigned to the support sub-process
teams did not get such a chance. How they perceived this will be described in the
section that deals with support process teams.
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Based on their assessment of the “as-is” and outcomes of benchmarking visits, core
process teams designed the “to-be” of bank A. This was a task of designing new core
business processes of the bank. Designing the “to-be” passess through same
studying and reporting procedure to the steering committee as they did during
assessing the “as-is.” Through this iterative interaction, the steering committee
finally approved the three core business processes. This stage marked the start of
implementing the new business processes through pilot-testing on selected
branches.
The same core process teams that designed the business processes conducted the
pilot-testing of the newly designed banking system in selected branches. They did
this test with the selected branches’ full participation. The pilot-testing was
successful. Participants from the core process sub-teams regarded the pilot-testing
important as it proved the feasibility of the new system.
Success of the new system in the branches where it was tested resulted in support
from those branches’ personnel and greater confidence and attention from bank A’s
management. Then the bank’s management started to think about the importance
of changing the bank completely using BPR as a tool. Consequently, the bank
decided to initiate similar change in its support processes.
While the support process teams were established and started struggling to redesign
the back office services, the core processes prepared policies and procedures along
with the required design documents. These documents were inputs for the
implementation procedures. Implementation was then started using those
documents.
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4.3.2. Support Process Teams
As explained above, the idea of redesigning the support processes emerged
following positive results of pilot-testing the core processes. A team dedicated to the
redesigning of the support business processes was established bearing this
responsibility. Similar to what was done with the core processes; this team also
started its task by trying to understand BPR and its principles. However, the time
allocated to this team to accomplish its task was quite shorter compared to what was
given to the core process teams. The bank’s leaders were under time pressure while
starting this initiative because of the long time consumed by the core processes and
the first phase.
Next, the support process team identified and named nine sub-processes. Then the
team was divided into these sub-processes. Finally, each sub-process was
strengthened with additional new members and the task of redesigning the support
sub-processes was started first by giving trainings and distributing reading materials
to team members. However, members of these teams perceive, little attention and
shorter time was given to the support process team members compared to that of
core processes. Being equipped with the ideas about the change model, each sub-
team went through the processes of studying the “as-is” and subsequently designed
the “to-be” in similar ways as core process teams had done.
Interviewees who had been involved in the design of support processes were rather
emotional when talking about their experiences. They perceived the entire matter in
their own way. This signals a considerable difference in the way change happened
during the two processes at bank A. Therefore, the two processes enabled the
researcher to make a comparative analysis of them by treating them as embedded
cases at times for the sake of enhancig the quality of within-case analyes results.
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4.3.3. Coordinator
The coordinator for both core and support processes was common. He was a
resource person responsible for all facilitation services regarding the process
designing teams. This person used to serve as a link between the process designing
teams and the steering committee. Deliverables had to be evaluated first by the
coordinator before being submitted to the steering committee and other parties.
4.3.4. Organizational Structure Designing Team
A team called “organizational structure designing team” was established being
composed of selected members from core and support processes study teams. This
team prepared an organizational structure based on the newly designed core and
support business processes. The team as participants informed the researcher took
BPR principles in addition to the proposed changes by each processes study team.
However, members of this team were not representative of each process sub-team;
only some from core processes and some from support processes were given the
chance to join this team. Formally, no document was given to the team as input to
design the new structure. Only the participants’ knowledge (based on experience in
participating in their respective teams) helped to serve this purpose. The final
proposal used to be submitted for approval by the board of directors. The board of
directors also played its part in modifying the proposed structure before final
approval. Interviewees perceive this procedure to have suffered from information
gap to accurately represent the intents of each newly designed business process in
the new organizational structure of the bank.
4.3.5. Steering Committee
Core and support process teams described so far used to submit their proposals
(interim and final deliverables) to a committee called the “steering committee”
through their coordinator. The steering committee was the highest authority in the
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structure of actors during the change initiative in bank A. It was composed of the
bank’s president and other higher officers.
The steering committee’s role was to recommend total rework, major modifications
or minor modifications if not accepted and approved a process teams’ deliverable.
After approval by this committee, proposals were assumed to be final from the
bank’s side pending the formal by the board of directors.
4.3.6. Selection Committee
Selection committee was a group established to assign personnel to newly designed
business processes. By the time this committee was established, process designing
teams were about to finish their task. As the task of redesinging support business
processes sequencially emerged after pilot-testing core business processes, the
timing of starting assigning personnel to newly created job positions in newly
designed business processes was perceived unfaire by members of support business
process redisigning sub-teams.
Their argument is that selection should have started after the new processes were
fully designed and should have been based on jobs designed for the new processes.
They assert, it is illogical to start assigning personnel before finalizing the task of
process redesigning as newly designed job were integral to the newly designed
processes. This even destructed support processes teams and forced some of them
to stop working towards finalizing the design. This implies, assignment of personnel
was done with incomplete designs of jobs as the same is a result of fully designed
business process. In the absence of a job design, there is no logic to make selection
of personnel objective.
On the other hand, a participant from the then selection committee rejected this
claim. According to this participant, the selection processes started first on the core
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processes as this was the order of completion (and of startup as well). However, the
support process team members were also targets of the selection. If a member of a
support process team that did not finish his/her task was assigned to a core process
team, it might have marked the dissolution of the sub-team. This was attributed to
the incompleteness of support business process designs.
4.4. Case Description: Bank B
Bank B is a private bank. This bank was selected because of its experience in an
organizational wide change. Among other private commercial banks, bank B was
found to have been engaged in strategic organizational change called “business
process redesigning” that was initiated to intentionally precede its acquisition of the
“Core Banking System.” The purpose of initiating business process redesign in bank
B was laying a good foundation for the technology support (i.e., Core Banking
System).
The bank initiated the task of implementing Core Banking System as the same was
demanded by NBE. While top management introduced the bank’s plan to apply core
banking system, experts raised an issue to change the entire organization in a way it
fits to the application of the new system. These experts reportedly claimed the
inappropriateness of implementing the new system with an old organizational
setting. With this idea the experts convinced top management of the bank to deploy
an initiative to change the entire bank’s ways of doing business. This did not happen
without fierce resistance from the top management though.  This made the entire
process of changing the bank a very challenging journey.
After convincing top management, initiators headed to declaring the idea of
redesigning the entire bank’s business processes. This was not a simple task,
however. In the absence of heartfelt support from top management, introducing the
idea by using the buzz word BPR was not found appropriate. Instead, they called it a
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“process redesigning” initiative. Their intention was to reduce resistance which they
were afraid of as the name BPR already earned badmouthing following its
application in government banks and other government organizations. Their worries
were connected to possibilities of speculations about BPR as it was publicly
perceived as a political agenda and as a tool for downsizing. This was partly
influenced by government’s excessive advocacy on public media and gradual
regressions of government organizations back to the status quo after being a
onetime subject of applause on the media for their achievements.
The bank, after a full year of implementing the newly designed business process, had
established teams to evaluate the actual performance of the change vis-à-vis the
newly designed business processes. As bank B’s documented evaluation revealed,
newly designed business processes of the bank were not fully implemented because
of several challenges.
The bank’s failure to install the Core Banking System in the entire bank and lack of
commitment were among the reasons that were mentioned for implementation
failure. Though the new business processes were designed taking the application of
the software into consideration; it was found that the use of technology was limited
only to the core business processes. Because of this, participants believe, the
performance of implementation is better in retail banking operations department as
the Core Banking System is installed there than in back office operations. Besides,
lack of awareness and failure to align the change to performance evaluation and
employee compensation were mentioned as reasons that prevented full
implementation.
The report of the change evaluation team on the bank’s retail banking operations
also confirmed the full installation of core banking system in the process. The report
further explains, the overall change initiated in bank B was composed of workflow
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redesign, branch structure, staff requirement, branch grading, and re-crafting policy
and procedure in connection with laying fertile ground for the implementation of the
newly acquired technology. The report describes the bank’s move towards changing
the whole procedure, policies, workflows, rules, regulations, staff placements,
structures and related practices as strategic change. This is taken as a rationale for
including this bank as a case in this research.
The recommendations forwarded by this team revolve around fully implementing
the proposed change. This implies, despite the fact that the purpose of the team is
evaluating implementation, as explained by participants; implementation of the
change is yet to be commenced. The team proposed (1) selecting pilot branches for
full implementation of the new systems and scaling up the practices at selected
branches to the entire bank’s branches, (2) controlling and following up
implementation progress, (3) inter-departmental integration and (4) finally
organizational restructuring as remedies for a complete implementation. All these
recommendations indicate huge task of implementation is still left over.
However, the bank’s management established a team to evaluate the performance
of implementing the new system. This implies that the initiated change has already
lost momentum even before the intended change was fully implemented. Time will
tell whether the bank could reinitiate to exhaustively implement all features of the
designed change.
The coordinator of the entire initiative also confessed the incompleteness of
implementation. Based on his inadequate evaluation, the coordinator designates fifty
percent implementation rate out of what was sought during designing. Both
designing team members and the coordinator attributed this problem to lack of top
management commitment because of the fact that the idea of the change was first
raised by experts.
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Thus, this case is perceived by organizational members as unsuccessful in
implementing the anticipated change. The evaluation of participants ranges from
acknowledging the need for some improvements to considering the initiative as a
total disaster. But none considered the initiative to have been successfully and fully
implemented. In connection with this fact, this case is assumed to have helped the
researcher gain exposure to a polar case in the industry; not in its strictest sense
though.
The structure of teams and committees that had roles during the initiative in bank B
is a reflection of the sincerity of the bank’s top management and maybe owners
through the board of directors in carrying out the initiative. The following
paragraphs are brief descriptions of each actor.
The approach of redesigning business processes in bank B was done in a way each
existing unit of the bank had to redesign its processes. This was pretty much similar
to what bank A participants refer to as “functional-based” approach. In this process,
not all employees in each unit participate in whatsoever way; only selected ones did.
Employees who had no chance to participate in the process redesigning task of their
respective department had no exposure to know about the change. Finally, the
documents containing redesigned processes of each department were delivered to
be implemented. As participants unequivocally agreed up on, no one is interested to
refer back to these documents let alone implementing them.
4.4.1. Process Redesigning Teams
As described above, teams which were responsible to do the process redesign for
each department were organized parallel to the old structure whereby all
departments in the bank were ordered to redesign their own process. As a result,
teams of individuals had been established from each old department. After
establishment, each team started operation without trainings to help them
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understand their tasks. There were no external consultants. As there was no prior
experience of such type of initiative in other private banks, team members took
experiences of government banks as benchmarks. Bank A was among the
benchmarks. Besides, there was no time allocated for team assignments. Members
had to carry out their regular tasks and side by side work towards team assignment.
4.4.2. Change Management Committee
There was a central committee called “change management committee” which was
established to oversee what had been done by each department. The coordinator of
this committee was the expert who played the leading role in influencing top
management to sponsor the initiative. In this committee, there were members from
different departments of the bank such as, organization and management,
engineering, branch operations, and corporate planning departments.
This committee played technical roles during the designing stage by evaluating
proposals of each department before submission to the steering committee for
approval. Based on the comments given by this committee, each department had to
make adjustments. However, the change management committee did not have
power to forward the final saying on the proposal.
4.4.3. Structure Committee
This committee was responsible to design an organizational structure on the basis of
the approved newly designed system proposal document. Logically, the input to the
structure redesigning group was the department’s proposal; top management’s
intervention had a role in the nature of structure though. This committee’s and the
steering committee’s recommendations would mean a deviation of whatsoever from
the original proposal. This is a second point where possible deviations from
proposed designs could emerge. This way, the last version of the change in the
business process had been set into implementation.
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4.4.4. Steering committee
There was also a steering committee which used to approve proposed designs by
each department and the proposed organizational structure. This committee was
composed of the top management members of the bank. Therefore, this is indirectly
the bank’s top management group.
As complained by participants from the change management team and process
redesign teams, this committee used to modify proposed designs without
convincing or even informing designers. This was one of the sources of resentment
on the side of implementers. Besides, possibility for perceptual difference is normal
as the change was initiated bottom-up.
4.5. Chapter Summary
This chapter describes the two cases which were involved in the present study. In the
description, the sub-components (nested layers) within each case are identified and
described. The chapter provides background information about cases and hence, the
mentions of cases both in the previous and in the next chapters can better be
understood by grasping what is describe in this chapter. The next three chapters are
based on data gathered from the cases which are described in this chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MAJOR CATEGORIES EMERGED FROM
WITHIN CASE ANALYSES OF DATA
5.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the major categories that emerged from the empirical data
analyses within each case. Explanations about codes that are retained for further
analysis are presented for each case bank sequentially. This chapter lays the
foundation for the transition towards reporting on higher level of abstractions on the
bases of which final propositions about each case are made (in Chapter Six).
5.2. Results of First Cycle Coding
As discussed in Chapter Three (see section 3.5.5.1), analysis of data went through
two phases (i.e., within-case and cross-case). In this chapter, results of within-case
analysis are presented while cross-case analyses are discussed in Chapter Seven. To
execute within-case analysis (see section 3.5.5.1.1), five iterative steps were
employed. Here, the results of the third step (i.e., coding) are discussed. There were
two cycles of coding. In the first cycle, initial or line-by-line or open coding (Saldana,
2009; Charmaz, 2006; Miles & Huberman, 1994) and in vivo coding (Saldana, 2009)
were applied with the support of the ATLAS.ti software. To help this report convey its
messages more vividly, outputs of first cycle coding are annexed (see Annex 6 and
Annex 7).
To get the results in annex 6 and annex 7, all primary documents that were added to
the ATLAS.ti were coded on a line by line basis. The software has features that
support labeling (i.e., coding) each concept that is extracted from the data chunk.
Once coding all the primary documents is done, the software results in a list of all
written codes as annexed. The lists of codes that were extracted from each bank’s
data were then sorted by the support of ATLAS.ti mainly using to indexes – density
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and groundedness. The list of most grounded and densest codes helped to facilitate
the reduction of data for further analysis.
Second cycle coding was then executed by applying data reduction techniques
through searching for the most frequent (i.e., salient) or significant (i.e., dense) initial
codes and deciding to retain initial codes which “make the most analytic sense”
(Saldana, 2009). Based on codes that are retained for further analyses, second cycle
coding which evolved to be latent (conceptual) compared to descriptive in the
previous cycle was executed for each bank as presented in the upcoming sections.
5.3. Major Categories that Emerged from Bank A’s Data
To extract major categories for further analyses with the support of ATLAS.ti,
groundedness and density measures were used. Then, extraction through a
combined use of the top most grounded (see annex 4) and the densest (see annex 5)
codes resulted in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Top most grounded and densest codes extracted from bank A’s data
No Grounded Density
1 Understanding the change model Personnel selection
2 Separation of designers and
implementers
Conflict of self-interest
3 Idea generation capacity Attitude
4 Perception management Communication
5 National development level Contextualization
6 Skepticism Perception management
7 Conflict of self-interest Implementation success
8 Office politics Workforce capacity
9 Deviant implementation Deviant implementation
10 Transparency Team relations
11 Positioning personnel selection Emotional engagement
12 Personnel selection Timing
13 Balance of attention Implementation specifications
14 Implementation specifications Skepticism
15 Team composition Sustainability
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16 Success story Reducing resistance
17 Cause of failure Employee morale
18 Change model-context match Understanding the change model
19 Leadership Workforce satisfaction
20 Implementation support system Separation of designers’ and
implementers
21 Team establishment priority Implementation of the  support
system
22 Communication Office politics
23 Time budgeting Persuasion
24 Owners of initiatives Premature implementation
25 Dedicated unit for change Cross team collaboration
26 Handling knowledge gap Transparency
27 Team organization Change model-context match
28 Awareness creation Aftermath
29 Human element Unnecessary secrets
30 Team relations Rumors
Source: Own compilation
As can be seen in Table 5.1, there are thirteen common codes in the two groups (see
shaded cells). These codes satisfy both groundedness and density criteria. To ensure
if an important code which represents vivid ideas as per researcher’s judgment is not
missing, the lists of most grounded and densest codes were reviewed and as a result,
“timing” which is the twelfth code under the densest codes list is included. The rest
which are not included in the extracted codes but are related to these codes are also
accounted for and shaped the context within which codes in the final set were
analyzed. The meanings of these fourteen codes are described in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: List and description of codes extracted from bank A’s data using density and
groundedness
No. Code Description
1 Understanding change
model
Change model refers to Business Process
Reengineering (BPR) and efforts to understand
what it entails technically are labeled by this code.
Specifically, it represents bank A’s effort to
familiarize technical team members with BPR as a
tool before taking action for the second phase
taking lesson from its failure to do so in the first
phase.
2 Personnel selection It represents the selection of employees to be
assigned to new job positions that are created
with newly designed business processes in bank
A.
3 Separation of designers
and implementers
Bank A’s approach to using newly assigned
personnel other than those who participated in
the technical teams for the implementation of
newly designed organizational systems.
4 Conflict of self-interest Behaviors of actors during the change initiatives
that are covertly geared towards serving the
actor’s own interest. These behaviors were
manifested as pseudo-organizational but purely
personal.
5 Perception management Represents change leaders’ intervention to shape
behaviors that were influenced by actors’
perceptions and not necessarily based on facts.
6 Communication Information exchange between actors during
change initiatives.
7 Skepticism Behaviours that are connected to lack of trust and
insufficiency of information and knowledge about
the initiative as a whole or some aspects of it.
8 Office politics Represent behaviors that were triggered by needs
to possess control of some attributes of the
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change or the organization to protect one’s or a
group’s interest. These behaviors exhibit how
individuals took advantage of formal
responsibilities to serve their personal interests.
9 Deviant implementation The act of implementing something (attribute of
the change) apart from what it was designed to
be.
10 Transparency Relates to the act of or the need to making
change related things sufficiently visible to the
relevant personnel. There were cases of
unnecessarily keeping things secret from
organizational members; with the needed
transparency not being exhibited.
11 Team relations Interactions within or between teams that were
established to study and design new
organizational systems at bank A.
12 Implementation
specifications
Specific parameters that were part of the newly
designed systems. Job designs, performance
indicators, procedures and policies that are
needed to implement the newly designed
business processes.
13 Change model-context
match
Relates to how the change tool (in this case BPR)
fits into or deviates from the context. Context
spans from nationwide realities to organisation-
specific facts.
14 Implementation support
system
Systems that must be in place to realise the
designed attributes of new business processes.
Required technologies, infrastructure, information
systems, control systems and related matters that
ensure the accurate implementation of newly
designed organizational systems.
15 Timing Relates to the amount of time allotted to carryout
the change project in bank A and resultant
scheduling of major events therof.
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5.3.1. Understanding the Change Model
The organizational change investigated in bank A was planned to be carried out
using BPR. This happened in two phases. The first one was a failure as everyone in
the bank explained. The bank attributed the failure to lack of understanding of the
basic principles of BPR. Therefore, taking lessons from this first trial, the second
phase was started first by giving training to technical teams as a participant
explained it below:
…we did it with newly organized teams. The previous one [phase] was more or
less functional. We did it again having received training and using newly
organized teams. Therefore, the main reason [for initiating the second phase]
was the ineffectiveness of the previous initiative because it was not done as per
the BPR principles (13:04).
This idea of shifting from what has been claimed as a functional and failed approach
necessitated the issue of starting from understanding the model (i.e., BPR). The
remedy taken to make the change effective was starting afresh with an
understanding of the change model. A participant explained it in more elaborated
way by including the time it took the bank to go through the two phases:
I was in the BPR team for about six years; two of which were during the time we
were not clear on the concept. But we did something in the name of BPR. But
the result was not satisfactory. We initiated another BPR by reviewing the entire
concept and rethinking the basic issues. We had been working in this BPR
[team] four years now, two of which were for studying and the other two were
for implementation (14:2).
Based on what the participants described using a comparative analysis of two
initiatives (i.e., phase one and phase two), misunderstanding or not understanding
the change model was one reason that led the first phase to failure.
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5.3.2. Skepticism
The fact that the first phase was declared as a failed trial did not convey good
message to the old management of the bank. The subsequent initiation of the
second phase by the Board of Directors of the bank heightened their speculations.
This situation made them skeptical as they were not clear about why the second
phase of the initiative was necessitated by the government. A participant described
how the act of the government (through the Board of Directors) was perceived:
If you ask is the BPR initiated from within the bank? [The answer is] Not at all!
It was an inducement from the government. This initiative started in the civil
service and spread to the rest of government organizations. This resulted in
resistance. There was frustration. There were rumors. Even people at the top
management were frustrated as a result of transparency problem (8:81).
Similarly, employees of the bank perceived the assignment of individual positions as
an attempt to promote politically affiliated organizational members while
disadvantaging those who were not in this position. The announcements to give
trainings on the government’s strategies and policies and to use employees’
understanding of these policies and strategies as criteria to assign them on the
newly designed jobs caused this perception. This increased the emplyees’ skepticism
about the sincerity of the purpose for initiating the change in the bank. However,
they did not apply the test result for the assignment as it has been reported by
another participant:
While the BPR design was going on, there was a training called policy training.
There was a test at the end. The purpose was to use the results as input for the
selection committee. But they didn’t apply it (4:84).
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This feeling was pervasive among study participants, especially those who did not
assume higher positions following the initiated change as they remained skeptic to
what the bank did. One participant expressed her resentment in the following way:
What this tells me about my assignment is that they didn’t do it based on
objective criteria… This fact definitely forced me to question the assignment
process. This can be taken as proof of the accuracy of rumors. As the bank is
owned by the government, they also used the initiative to serve their political
interest. These things influenced the assignment of personnel significantly
(4:92).
This participant got involved in the technical teams and supposed to have insider
information about how employee assignment took place in the bank. However, she
has the feeling lasting for years. Non-members of the technical teams also did not
trust their colleagues who were involved in the teams. They had negative attitudes
towards what these teams did. One of the participants recounted his experience in
the following way:
…during the time we were studying BPR, even our friends used to suspect us of
doing something bad unto them. They used to say ‘what are you conspiring on
now?’ ‘Whose turn is it now?’ This is related to attitude. There were and still are
people who believe that the BPR is not a change initiative; it is something that
is designed to benefit someone while hurting another (8:79).
Skepticism emerged as a factor that influences both managers and employees. The
cause for the managers is related to the involvement of the government (i.e., source
of initiative) whereas that of employees is related to the task of employee selection.
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5.3.3. Team Relations
Team in this context refers to groups established in bank A to study and design new
business processes in the second phase as explained so far. These teams were
collectively known as the BPR team within which there were sub-categories—core-
process teams and support-process teams. Core process teams were established
earlier than the support process teams. These teams had to interact within
themselves (team members), with each other (across teams) and with other parties.
These interactions are what are referred to as team relations.
Managing team relations requires taking care of the nature of within team and
cross-team interactions among team members, team leaders, coordinators, steering
committees and the bank’s top management including the president.
The nature of within team environment which is mainly defined by team composition
shapes the nature of team relations within each team. A participant described the
composition of team members as:
There were members with three varying background. …it was difficult to have
similar level of understanding…. To tell the truth, it was to have different
perspectives these people were intentionally diversified; however, whether we
like it or not in all processes those who were exposed to the process showed
greatest contribution. They used to bring icebreaking ideas for each discussion
sessions. …eventually, the team used to be influenced by their idea. The
possibility that their ideas got accepted with no or little modifications was so
high. Anyway, because members had varying backgrounds we were challenged
to reach into consensus easily. Sometimes we went through long debates, other
times we nearly quarreled. We usually came up with diversified ideas; later on,
as I said the idea of those who were working in the ‘as-is’ used to emerge as a
final point (5:31).
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As described above, in each team, there was an individual who does not have long
time experience in the bank, there is another who has experience in other
departments than the process under study and the third type is one who has
previous experience of the old operations to be redesigned by the team in line with
the BPR principle. Although the intention of team diversity was to gain an outsider’s
insight from the new entrant, a counterpart’s view from the different department and
to combine all with that of the insider’s and to come up with better ideas,
dominance by the insider negatively affected the achievement of the intended
outcome from each team.
Cross-team relations were also other related issues that came out of the data from
bank A. The purpose of cross-team interactions was to design organizational
working systems that are integrated with each other. They were used to identify
integration points between the business processes and work together to create
workable interfaces as described by a participant below:
You know, it was related to integration points. Processes which were assumed
to have integration points used to get together and deal on that specific
integration point. I remember the chairman of the steering committee
announcing integration points between teams to discuss on those identified
points while we were at Debre Zeyit (4:62).
Later on, as the designing stage approached the implementation stage, actions
taken by different actors started to become meaningful to everyone and developed
to a level that affected team relations. The following paragraph indicates how things
gradually became negative especially in the eyes of those who had been negatively
affected or at least perceived to have been negatively affected by the
implementation. One participant explained it as:
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Initially it was good. It was participatory. We were working fulltime. Members
were from different professions, having diversified experiences and there were
various ideas entertained during discussions. There was no facility problem.
There was no resource problem. We had experience sharing visits both locally
and abroad. Even academicians with strong performance used to be invited to
share their views. People from Ethiopian Management Institute gave trainings.
We used to read related things. There was no difficulty as such (10:33).
Such participants retained their feeling until the time of the interviews. They were
not happy especially about what happened following the establishment of the
selection committee (the turning point).
Besides, especially those who had been working with the support processes had
other disappointing experiences in connection with the unbalanced amount of
attention given to the core and support process teams.  They claimed that the
attention support process teams received from the bank’s management was less
than what the core process teams enjoyed. This feeling had a significant impact on
team relations and ultimately on team performance.
5.3.4. Personnel Selection
Personnel selection was among the sensitive stages in the implementation of the
change initiative in bank A. It was suspected of not being based on objective criteria.
Even after several years, several participants were emotional when describing the
issue. Such participants expressed their negative feelings about the selection
committee and the process of selection.
What the selection committee did was perceived as an action that benefitted some
while hurting others. One participant expressed her feelings about the selection
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process in the following way: “I do not forget it. It was the worst time because it was
by that time things went wrong in my opinion” (8:70).
A more transparent process of selection and assignment could have resulted in
better employee morale as can be understood from what participants explained.
Timing was also another factor that worsened the perception of employees. Some
factors such as its timing, the lack of transparency, and employees’ perception have
been mentioned in connection with selection. The fact that employee selection
started before the completion of the entire design task, especially with regard to the
support processes, increased suspicions. The fact that it was done parallel to the
pursuit of process design by process teams was expressed by a participant in the
following way:
Parallel to this, the selection committee started its operation. There were
disappointments following the selection. It was a surprise. We tried to formulate
the requirements for each job position as well as possible; it could be refined
gradually, though. However, they used exam results of the strategy and policy
training, they used attitude, corruption related history etc… as selection criteria.
Even it was not known how the members of the selection committee had been
selected. They [members of the selection committee] just came to operation.
They were working in a room. No one was allowed to walk around that room.
…If you are forgotten, then you will lose your position. One had to have
someone who knew him/her to be considered for an assignment (10:57).
Discussing about this issue was a turning point during the interview sessions with
participants. Personnel selection was also associated with designer-implementer
issues.
Several participants in bank A showed disappointment with the way the assignment
of personnel was done. Especially those who were assigned to relatively lower
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organisational positions strongly criticised the actions of the committee (team) with
regard to doing personnel selection. Those who supported the efforts of the
selection committee were affected positively by the selection process, while negative
reactions were experienced by those who suspected the committee of misusing its
powers to favour relatives (of whatsoever type) while harming others.
This process of selection has two directions of implications for the success of
implementation. The first one is its direct impact on determining the quality of the
assigned personnel whereas the second is the indirect impact it has on the morale of
employees who do not accept the procedures. In the latter case, employee morale
might not necessarily be affected by whether the selection process is actually
manipulated or not. Therefore, it is highly dependent on how employees perceive
the selection process.
5.3.5. Perception Management
This concept represents efforts to shape the way organizational members perceive
an initiated change. In bank A, as one of the participants explained, the impression
people had about BPR impacted their commitment towards implementing it. The
following is an excerpt taken from the explanation of a participant about how it was
imposed without an internally driven need for change:
…when the concept of BPR came, people didn’t consider it as a change tool;
they instead, perceived that it was imposed by the government (party) to be
forcibly implemented in the bank (14:59).
Several participants from bank A expressed certain kinds of emotions when entering
into discussions about the major implementation of related events. For example,
personnel selection was among the major events in bank A. As personnel selection
affects everyone in an organization and hence, captures everyone’s attention, it is
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imperative to understand how it has to be perceived by the critical mass. In bank A,
this event was found to be the most disputed one.
It is clear that the new way of doing which results from strategic change will finally
be implemented by those who are selected to assume the newly created positions.
There is no other way of implementing a change than through such employees.
Therefore, for the implementation to be successful, change leaders have to have a
good understanding of the process of employee (change recipient) perceptions and
apply properly designed intervention mechanisms.
Several of the participants expressed their doubts about the objectivity of the
selection criteria; consequently, they expressed their views at this stage in an
emotional way. The researcher realized that this issue was a turning point during the
entire process of changing bank A.
5.3.6. Conflict of Self-Interest
Conflict of self-interest relates to feelings, emotions, decisions and actions that are
driven by participant's (actor's) self-interest at the expense of organisational
objectives and success of implementing the initiated strategic organizational change
in bank A. This concept is grounded in facts that are evidenced by participants in
connection with the actors' dilemma regarding whether to give priority to
organizational purposes or to try to ensure that they would benefit from the actions
taken. This dilemma challenged everyone who played a role in designing and
implementing the change in bank A.
As a result of actual and perceived partiality and manipulations of the process of
changing the bank, there were rumors in bank A. Pertaining to the process team,
there were suspicions about intentional inclusion of job specifications to help team
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members assigned to job positions as a result. A participant explained this issue and
how it was challenging to the teams as:
…different people might have different interests; but these interests might not
necessarily represent the interests of the bank. Yet, they can influence (divert)
the change towards their interests. We assumed this to have challenged the
team (5:26).
Another participant who was a member of a process team in bank A admitted that
there were instances when the team was challenged through some actual attempts
of different people to influence the team so that it would consider their assignments
to job positions. As this participant explained:
People used to come with self-interest even during some discussion sessions.
There were others who used to come to the discussions without being invited
and argued why were these changes being made to their units?(8:39).
More than what the process designing teams did, the selection committee attracted
the center of gravity for the rumors and suspicious of unethical practices. Even those
in the designing teams (process teams) suspect the selection committee of doing
favoritism and serving self-interest.
As a participant from a process team explained, if somebody in the selection
committee perceived that the job designs produced by the designing team were not
free of conflicting interests, then that person might try to curb the abuse or get his/
her share of the manipulated stake. Moreover, clashes among members were taken
as manifestations of infiltrations and tendencies of serving self-interests within the
selection committee as a participant describe below:
…but I know there were rumors regarding misunderstandings between the two
groups. This was especially the case regarding the assignment of people at
managerial positions. There were people within the group who had reservations
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about those who were nominated for managerial positions. This eventually
grew to the level of clashes of ideas within the group (the committee). This is
what I heard in rumors (5:44).
The organizational structure designing team is also one of the suspected parties of
serving its self-interest at the expense of organizational interests. The following
paragraphs are excerpts from a participant’s bold statements about the self-serving
actions he perceived about this team:
You know what happened later, especially during the designing of the
structure? Several things were kept secret. It was done by some individuals.
There was a big problem like in the case of selection. They did like cooking
things to serve their personal interest (10:63).
One thing I remember... The structure that prevailed by the time was intended
to fit for the interest of those who were engaged. There was a coordinator and
team leaders in the team structure for that purpose (10:33).
Conflict of self-interest from the side of managers also challenged the change
initiative under investigation. This gradually grew to a level of resisting the change.
When we think of resistance against organizational change, it implies that employees
are the ones who resist; in bank A it was learnt that, managers including those at the
top level were the most resistant ones though it was not in a form of direct
confrontation. A participant explained it in the following way:
But the management… [deep breath] initially, they were resistant for the sake of
protecting the previous BPR [functional based] as they were involved and got
promotions as a result. It took a huge struggle to convince them and bring
about transformation. The argument was [between] ‘we need only incremental
change;’ [and] ‘no, the previous change was not satisfactory therefore we need
radical transformation.’ Because they wanted to convey a message that the
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previous BPR had only minor weaknesses and therefore we have to make
incremental changes (10:36).
In this ways, the entire implementation process could have been affected. This
implies that better change performance could have been realized by identifying such
interests and intervening against them. Apart from the above examples, self interest
was also a challenge to employees at the operational level. This makes the entire
task of implementing a change very difficult.
5.3.7. Office Politics
In a condition that there were perceived or actual tendencies or actions of serving
self-interests, office politics can be a means which sponsors these behaviors through
misuse of power. In bank A, there were evidences of actual or perceived use of
power for serving different interests.
The first source of such power with potential misuse and direct impact on the
success of the initiated change could be old management group of bank A. As these
groups were skeptic towards the entire initiation of the second phase, obviously, the
transition time (during which they remain in power) is the remaining opportunity
they have to exploit and ensure that they will continue being influential is office
politics.
The second and more source of power which sponsored office politics in bank A
originates from the selection committee. It was this committee which selected
personnel to be assigned on new positions including top managerial positions. The
committee could misuse its responsibility. Besides, even if this misuse did not
actually happen, organization members may perceive.
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Poor communication between designers and selection committee led members of
the technical committee to have a suspicion that the committee could have made
arbitrary selections without using objective criteria. Out of the belief that the change
process has not been free of office politics, a participant made the following
assertion:
The other which I think is still critical is ‘do not politicize the change’. When you
design a change, you present it professionally as to what you are planning to
achieve as a result of the change and about how you will be organizing the
institution. If you politicize it instead, it would fail because it will not be
accepted by all the people in your organization as they obviously would be
politically different. This will lead to some supporters and other opponents. To
have the support of all, it must be presented purely professionally (5:94).
What was explicit from participants about committee members was the negative
perception they had on the assignment of personnel. Moreover, they continued to
have that resentment after several years since then.
5.3.8. Timing
This idea relates to the time allocated to design and implement the change in bank
A and the specific point of time when major events were decided to be executed.
Unacceptable deadlines and less curiosity in time allocation was reported by the
participants from bank A. Time allocation and timing for the execution of the change
initiative in bank A had been influenced by several factors.
As the change was externally initiated (by the government), there were also
intentions (from the government) to control the progress of the change. As a result,
they used to set deadlines authoritatively. The authoritative nature of setting
deadlines was a problem which was explained in a level that equates to syndrome.
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The deadline refers to government’s demand from banks to submit reports within a
deadline. So unreasonable were the deadlines that they forced managers of bank A
to be unreasonable to allocate time to pursue project tasks and prematurely declare
major events even before the completion of predecessor activities. Meeting such
deadlines and showing compliance to the order of the government as described
took supremacy above making the change effective as a participant explained it
below:
Other possible reasons for deviation from the plan may relate to ownership of
the very concept of change. In our bank’s context, initiatives oftentimes do not
come from within the bank. They should not be imposed. Besides they come
with a deadline which creates frustration and results in rushes to reporting to
avoid stigmatization (3:36).
This indicates how difficult it will be to achieve intended outcomes of an initiative to
organizational change in such circumstances. Major milestones that are assumed to
be indicators of progression of the initiative may be simply declared irrespective of
actual level of performance for the sake of meeting deadlines.
One of the participants also described this situation together with the lack of
balanced attention. He explained the premature nature of actions taken before
specifications had been fully developed:
Even they were not ready to give the same time which means sufficient time as
they did to the core [process] to study the support processes. This may be
because of time limitation; may be the board ordered them to do it faster. They
just ordered us to finish it in a short time. Even we didn’t have sufficient time to
read all the materials we had; we just read Hammer’s book. That’s why
implementation started before the completion of the design by the support
teams (8:47).
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As clearly explained above, the time given to perform tasks at later stages of the
initiative was shorter compared to the time given to perform similar tasks at earlier
stages. This happened because of the intention of the management to declare full
implementation may be within the deadline. As emerged from bank A's data,
premature implementation and initial waste of time characterize bank A’s experience
pertaining to time and timing.
5.3.8.1. Premature Implementation
This concept refers to the timing of executing major milestones before they are
actually deemed to be executed at that specific time. Unreasonable deadlines
coupled by waste of time at the initial stage of the initiative lead to the decision to
execute implementation tasks before the right time (prematurely).
As analyses of data indicated, (1) selection of employees preceding the completion
of job design, (2) implementing the new system prior to the completion of preparing
policies and procedures and delivery of the entire document are examples of
premature implementation. One of the participants in bank A described this together
with other factors that led to implementation failure in the following way:
Generally speaking, rushing to execute a certain change before knowing what it
is and accepting the importance leads to failure. Besides, if there is failure to
make relevant concepts clear to all concerned again leads to failure. In
addition, failure to translate the change plan into the context leads to
implementation failure (3:46).
Uniformed deadlines that are set irrespective of the time posts in the project plan
had impacts on the success of the initiated change in bank A. Besides, when those
who were actively engaged in the project (e.g. members of the designing teams) are
not informed about why and when the bank takes implementation actions, it affects
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their commitment to complete unfinished tasks. This in turn results in incomplete
design which makes implementation difficult.
5.3.8.2. Initial Waste of Time
The initial stages in initiating the change in bank A were characterized by waste of
time and slow buy-in mostly because of lack of understanding and the passive
resistance of old management as participants explained. Because of this, the
initiative took long time without bringing tangible changes. This led to the suspicion
of the sincerity of the purpose [of the change]. One of the participants, working in
one of the highest positions of bank A, described this situation in a way that
reflected the reason why there was such a waste of time initially:
...we could have shortened the time; it took us a long time. One of the reasons
for the delay was the fact that management commitment came later; initially,
the commitment of management was minimal as the initiative was perceived to
be just [an] amendment [to the functional BPR]. It took us a long time to
convince the [old] management the need for a complete transformation (13:26).
As can be understood from the above data, management members were not clear
about the intention and scope of the initiative; they chose to systematically resist as
a self-defense mechanism. This stage took time until the team members backed by
the board chairman's intervention changed the situation.
Implicitly, the reason for the failure of the management of the bank to provide
sufficient time was pressure from the board (the initiator). The source of the idea to
change the bank was not within the bank. It came from the government. The
management of Bank A might have perceived the initiative as not more than
fulfilling an order especially at the initial stage. In general, initial waste of time and
premature implementation affects timing of the deployment of major initiative
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related activities (milestones) which in turn affects the success of implementing
organizational change.
5.3.9. Transparency
‘Transparency’ is a concept related to the issue of clearly communicating change
matters to the organizational members. The degree of clarity an individual has on
events that happen during strategic change implementation affects the way that
person perceives them. In bank A, as a result of the lack of transparency,
organization members became confused about the general climate of the bank
during and after the change. It seems that the need for transparency was not given
sufficient attention despite its importance in reducing uncertainty and hence,
resistance:
You know what happened later especially during designing the structure?
Several things kept secret. It was done by some few individuals (10:63).
…now I understand the importance of communication. By then, we used to keep
several things secret. These things gave rise to rumours. However, creating
awareness to everyone is important. There should be no unit or individual that
is categorized as not concerned. As much as possible everyone should know
what is going on regarding a change initiative and understand the expected
contributions for the success of the institutive (9:155).
The above segment of data reflects a participant’s present feelings on the state of
affairs. When keeping things secret is considered the right thing, it means rumors
and informal channels can enjoy surveillance without sufficient contestant options.
Apart from the desire for keeping unnecessary secrets, making things as transparent
as possible is not a simple task especially during radical strategic changes.  Proper
behavioral intelligence and the appropriate designing of messages to address every
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affected aspect (every organizational matter as the change is radical transformation)
are required:
Considering the hugeness [of the bank], the time wouldn’t allow. It was difficult;
I mean it was not transparent in terms of the parameters used for the selection
for example. It was not known whether there were those parameters or not.  If I
was selected, why I was selected; and why I was not selected, was clearly known
[to committee-members]. In terms of manageability it was very difficult to
handle things case-by-case with regard to all the people (12:45).
Transparency is the result of effective communication. As presented next,
communication also emerged as an important concept in relation to implementing
strategic organizational change in bank A.
5.3.10. Communication
As can be inferred from the above sections, communication is an interlocked theme
with others. It is inseparable from most of the themes discussed above. It is
impossible to be transparent, to reduce skepticism, to manage perceptions, to have
a shared understanding of the change model and to deal with office politics without
communication:
You have to communicate to the worker why the change is needed, what will
follow the change if there are some expected problems, etc… in advance. If you
fail to do so, and if the workforce realizes that the change is not of interest to
the worker, it will create a problem (5:92).
You cannot bring change forcefully. You may organize several sessions to
communicate and give training in order to create awareness across the staff.
You need to make them active participants so that they could internalize the
concept, and they would also possess a sense of ownership (7:17).
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Participants at bank A, especially those who were in support of the level of
communication during the initiative argue the infeasibility of addressing everyone in
the organization. They mention time pressures, a large number of employees and to
some extent, the need for keeping secrets as reasons for less communication. Others
such as the person whose idea is presented in the next quotation propose solutions
that make communication easier:
I say, arranging for a communication forum as much as possible. It could be
via email, might not necessarily be face-to-face. You could use several other
media including magazines to tell about what kind of change is going on. What
are the bases, what are we heading for, etc… should be made clear. This can
even help you protect the change against those who intentionally try to attack.
If people know the reality, the one who intentionally misrepresents facts will be
ruled out by the majority (7:59).
However, communication is not a simple exchange of ideas. It has to be carefully
designed as it is the primary intervention mechanism at the disposal of change
leaders to influence the behavior of organization members in a way that enhances
change implementation. Participants expressed their resentment about the way
information about major change events was communicated to them:
One thing which I do not consider as right was the way results had been
communicated. It was done by posting notices at the head office like a grade
[academic score] in school. You might even hear about your assignment; or
people may tell where you are assigned. The communication channel was not
accessible and pure. It could have been better either to email to everyone or the
copies to be posted be clear. I myself heard about my assignment after a certain
time. We used to hear about the assignment of individuals [in the form of
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rumors]. I think this was one of the things we were lacking. Like I said, there
were massive assignments handled haphazardly (12:45).
Communication needs to be designed carefully in terms of its messages and the
media and approach of communication. This ensures effectiveness of
communication.
5.3.11. The Role of Designers on Implementation
This is one aspect of communication. The parties that were engaged in the design of
the new organization (i.e., process teams) had frequent interaction with the steering
committee. As a result of these interactions, the outputs from design teams had to
be refined before approved to be delivered as final. The final deliverables from these
teams of designers were documents containing process designs with details
including job design, policies and procedures. These documents had to serve as a
roadmap for implementation; and hence the delivery of the documents marks the
end of the designers' tasks.
On the other side, those who were supposed to implement the new process (system)
on the basis of this document were selected by a committee. In a way, that was not
explicit enough for the mass, the selection ended up with processes having some or
no members who had participated in the designing process. This means, there was
no clear direction to assign process designers to the implementing team. If there is
some, it was only arbitrary as described below.
There may be a possibility for a person who participated in the design or study
of a new process to be assigned to that same process and work towards
implementation. But this was not necessarily the case in all the processes. The
designing team produced the ‘to-be’ document; then the board approved the
document and a different team did the assignment [implementation] (8:34).
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There was a possibility of having someone who participated in the design also being
assigned to work on the implementation of the new system. This helps with a
comparative analysis of implementation success with or without the involvement of
designers and hence the importance of this issue for implementation success.
The following paragraph is about what would happen if a different person (than the
designers) tried to implement a process. It was reported even by the designing team
members of corporate communication business process in bank A that the processes
had not been changed successfully as described hereunder:
It could have been difficult because in the first place most of the support
processes had been implemented before the completion [of the design]. When
we come here [corporate communication process], this process is operating in a
completely different way from what was designed. [Because] the leader of the
study team had resigned. Even you could not get the paper [BPR document].
You do not even hear the term BPR here (12:69).
This is why the issue of designer-implementer emerged during in-depth interviews
with participants from bank A. There were arguments both in support and against
the idea of separation of designers and implementers. Making conclusion on
whether separation is better is risky as the arguments on both sides were strong.
Pro designer-implementer ideas argue for the use of designers as implementers as
well. The possibility of a communication break and lack of understanding and even
conflicting interests might hamper successful implementation, according to these
proponents. The issue was instead to strive to teach others who were not clear about
the newly designed organizational system, using those who owned the idea. A
participant who got a chance to work for the process to which he participated as a
member of the designing team explains:
187
It is advisable if those who designed the process also implement it because you
cannot write everything down. Especially, the redesigning concept could not be
recorded fully. Therefore, my presence benefitted the team a lot. I served as a
reference during the implementation process. I used to give training to the HR
staff. You would also face the challenges of resistance (12:65).
The engagement of designers on the implementation of changes helps to avoid the
possibility of an implementation break as a result of misconceiving the designed
change. If the designers also implement the change, the designed change will be
implemented as intended initially. If there is a deviation, it will be attributed to
reasons that are beyond the interest (intentions) of the implementers.
In some cases where there was no one who participated in the designing, the
implemented business processes deviated totally from what was proposed by the
designing team though it needs further investigation to attribute this difference only
to the separation of designers from the implementers. There are other factors which
might have contributed to this. For example; the capacity of the designing team was
regarded by the participants.
One participant commented about the capacity of her own team with respect to
proposing a new system that is significantly different from the previous one. There
was also another team that was downplayed by its own members for having
members who were neither interested nor competent to design the business process
they were assigned for. In such instances, it was very difficult to implement the
proposed design per se as it may lead to inappropriate operations. Such types of
deviations might not be considered as an implementation failure; and yet, neither
can it be considered as a success. Therefore, the idea of assigning designers as
implementers to enhance implementation success could be spurious if generalized
for all conditions.
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Therefore, we can only be cautious about the role this concept plays in the
implementation of the changes and other factors that affect the impact of the
designer-implementer combination on implementation success. Team capacity,
participants’ behavioral traits, and other unexplained factors should be taken care of
first.
5.3.12. Implementation specification
In the context of the change initiated in bank A (i.e., in the case of planned strategic
organizational change), implementation of change requires detailes that specify what
needs to be changed how (in what way). As such, the extent to which the anticipated
(designed) change is specified is presumed to have an impact on the success of
implementation. As emerged from bank A’s data, this concept represents designer’s
effort to provide the neccessary details to those who will implement the change and
extends to change managers’ use of performance indicators (measures) to follow up
progress of implementation and hence implementers’ application of the specific
guidelines and procedures accompanying the designed change.
Implementation procedures, job design, performance measures and indicators,
interim deliverables and the entire document containing the design are parts of the
specifications. Without such specifications, implementation will be disordered (i.e.,
will become out of order and control). In some other instances, especially in the case
of back offices (i.e., support business processes) such specifications were not
complete in bank A. The following data segment which is quoted from a support
process team member’s explanation states:
As far as I remember, none of the teams especially the support process teams
do such things [as implementation manual or procedure]. Practically in our
team, there was nothing that we did for the sake of implementation. I do not
remember anything that tries to specify things that should be done during
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implementation. Even in the core [business processes], I didn’t see such things in
the document. The documents are the ‘to-be’ study document, job description
and job specification document, and then policy and procedure documents.
There is nothing other than these which are dedicated for implementation
details. I went through all the documents but didn’t see anything in connection
with this (5:70).
It is obvious that the degree of completeness of designs and communicating
specifications of the anticipated change relates positively to implementation success.
Therefore, it is imperative to have an account of factors related to specifications if
one has to take proactive measures and make use of specifications as a mechanism
of enhancing the success of implementation.
This means documents produced by technical teams (designers) were the major
sources of implementation specifications. Apart from this, there was nothing done
with an intention to specify the procedures to implementation. These documents
also contain the entire change concept as another participant put it in the following
way:
Actually, the team that designed the ‘to-be’ was in a better position to specify
the implementation procedure than an outsider doing it. However, I do not even
think that the other external [to the team] body did such things. What they did
was they simply read the documents, and tried to reorganize the offices based
on what is proposed in the documents. For example, the branches changed to
give one window service. For example, the customer account and transaction
service is designed to give one window service. The people were simply being
dictated about the new process; no document was in place to be used as a
guideline to implement the change (5:72).
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Based on the above facts, one can expect that implementation activities could
logically start following the delivery of these documents produced by designing
teams. However, by the time implementation activities especially personnel selection
and organizational structure designing started, the degree of completeness of the
documents was different for the core and support processes as explained in the
previous sections. All teams were not done with preparing and submitting their final
document.
The difference helped to understand the benefit of having complete specifications
for the new process before starting the implementation task. For example, the
following segment of data was taken from an interview with a core process team
member. He explained the start of employee selection after the specifications had
already been formulated. The explanation clarifies what would happen if the
condition was otherwise:
As I told you, the fact that several things were complete before the emergence
of the diverting thing [related to selection] helped us a lot. It was in a written
form. It was recorded and authorized [before that incident]. It was a big thing
that contributed a lot to the reification of the change we are witnessing now.
Before that time, the interest and vigor of the staff in the team were good;
everyone was determined to bring about change. This caused the realization of
a better change compared to other organizations (10:84).
However, this was not the case for all the support processes. Selections started
before the specifications were fully prepared and delivered. Because of this, some
process teams even terminated their tasks. Corporate communication process
designing team of bank A is a typical example for this; and hence, no significant
change (as perceived by most participants) was resulted in the back offices.
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5.3.13. Implementation Support System
In as much as specifications of the designed change are complete and understood
by those who implement the change, implementation can normally be successful.
However, from the point of view of management, there needs to be a system which
supports the evaluation of progress in implementing the change. Moreover,
performance in the newly implemented organizational reality should be measured
being supported by a system to reinforce new organizational behaviors. The system
issue of implementation is associated with the nature of the processes involved, jobs
designed, policies, procedures, infrastructure, communication technology and
automation technology.
…it [implementation] needs a system. For example, to measure an employee’s
performance in terms of cycle time, you need to have a system that captures
the data while the service provision is going on. In terms of cost, you need to
have a system that records the cost in the new process and compare it with the
previous one (5:74).
Implementation of a new change initiative should be supported by a system that is
compatible with the desired new organizational operation. If the change targets a
reduction in cost, there must be an indicator that measures the costs and there must
be a system that records and consolidates performance data. If time is another
indicator, measuring time should not be an additional task to the performer; there
must be a system that automatically registers time and generates consolidated data
when needed. If such a system is not in place, measuring implementation success
will suffer to a large extent. In the context of Ethiopia, recording and analyzing
performance related data are left to be undertaken manually and ultimately suffer a
loss of attention after the campaign period is over. It is understandable how
cumbersome it will be to spend a considerable amount of time on such routine
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matters. This may gradually lead to regression and performance loss.
Implementation support system is needed to prevent this. Automation as presented
in the data below is among the mechanisms that support implementation.
The first is automation. We didn’t automate our business until recently. We
started to automate in 2014 (G.C.). We bought the core banking system
recently. Previously we had been working manually. Now we are operating
differently (13:52).
The above quotation indicates the importance of a supporting system for successful
implementation. This insight is gained from the fact that the delay in applying a
system that was proposed along with the changed business processes of the bank
created challenges. This was manifested in the reduced performance of the bank
immediately after the reforms. However, after the application of the proposed
system, the bank started to be supported by an increased number of customers as
reported by most of the participants. A participant from core business process
desinging team and working in a higher positions, summarised the importance of an
IT supported system in accelerating the implementation and reducing resistance to
change as:
People had been saying that we will see if it brings any change because of their
experience with the previous BPR. The previous BPR had challenged us a lot.
…However, when they saw it practically they understood that we had
fundamentally changed the approach during the second phase; and they
started to support it. Then people who were working in the operation started to
apply for the prompt implementation of the BPR. Especially its IT support
accelerated its acceptance. Employees got trained quickly and implemented it
swiftly as it made the operation easier for them. The previous operation had
been very tedious; you had to look into [paper based] files to process every
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transaction be it opening a new account, making payments etc… everything
had been manually operated (15:19).
As participants from bank A explained it, supporting implementation with IT
enhances implementation success. They explained it by comparing the level of
success they experience before and after the implementation of core banking
system.
5.3.14. Change Model-Context Match
Change model is the label given to BPR in the case of bank A. Several organizations
globally embark on using such models. However, all organizations cannot be similar
to adopt a model without examining the model’s fitness to the specific context at
hand. Hence, change model-context match, in this study, is a name given to such
examinations.
In the case of bank A, process designing teams found out features of business
processes that do not fit to the basic principles of the change model. For example, in
credit business process they decided not to apply some of the features of the
change model as described in the excertp below:
The business wing tends to support the customer as this wing is closer to the
customer and understands the customer and its business. This means, this same
person should not process the customer’s request [for loan]. This unit instead
submits analysis report to the risk wing. This is for a check and balance. On the
basis of this report, the risk wing analyses and decides. This is the bank’s policy.
This is one of the points where the BPR principles had been compromised (15:4).
In other core business process of bank A, they also applied a principle called ‘four
eyes’ to have a ‘maker-checker’ remedy that intends to manage the risk integral to
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the very nature of the banking business. This, however, creates duplication of efforts
which is not acceptable by the change model.
The other feature of the change model that is assumed to have been mismatched to
the context is the idea of flat organizational structure. The model recommends a
flatter organizational structure by reducing hierarchies. However, this
recommendation was ruled out in bank A for the resultant wider span should be
backed by a proper automated system. Since bank A’s intention to implement the
change was not accompanied by automated systems, the recommendation of
model’s recommendation for flatter organization was not found feasible as it was
asserted by on participant as:
At that time [referring to the designing stage] we decided on a flatter structure
with an assumption that it was possible. When it came to the actual practice,
there were problems; that was why we also proposed a different structure.
[Because], if it creates an overload for the executive director it will result in
inefficiency (6:27).
Context also refers to the national and sector related situations. The industry is a
closed market restricted only to domestic players. The infrastructure, the lifestyle of
the society (actual or potential customer), society’s access to telecommunication
networks and capacity and interest in using technology are also important factors
that have to be considered when redesigning the future bank.
5.3.15. Deviant Implementation
This refers to intentional deviations of the implemented changes from what was
designed. It happens in a form of remedies to ensure smooth operations instead of
sticking to designed change contents when the designed one proved to be less
effective or difficult to realise or contextually unfit; or it may also happen as a means
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of resistance. In the case of deviance as a remedy, for example, some newly designed
organisational processes when found to be unrealistic compared to the context,
deviating from the design may be put in place. Some could only be realised when
supported by required facilities, systems, and skilled manpower that hardly exist in
the bank. In this case, implementers choose to do things differently from what has
been proposed by the designing teams. Deviance as a form of resistance obviously
has no benefit to the success of implementation.
Therefore, deviant implementation has either a positive or a negative impact on the
success of change. One has to know why implementation deviates from the
anticipated change before concluding whether the change is positive or negative. If
there is no system that is put in place to prevent regression and if there is no
mechanism to measure whether all the proposed changes are actually implemented,
there will be a natural deviation which is often covered up with some sort of
improvements on the status quo. The following quotation is an exemple for how
participants used to cover inability to explain results as per designed performance
indicators such as cost, time and quality.
If you ask me whether the change is as proposed by the BPR document, again it
is difficult for me to respond. However, my personal belief is that the change is
not as it was proposed by the document. For example if we measure using
delivery time, cost, and quality; I doubt if it is really as it was proposed there. I
do not think so. However, still there is a change (5:62).
This shows the possibility that change outputs that deviate from what has been
intended have actually happened, but were left undetected. This kind of deviation
cannot even be given attention; instead, covered up with improvements of
whatsoever level and type. When it comes to specifically measuring the implemented
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change, there is no even a system that makes measurement possible. In such
situations, however, change may still be reported as successful.
Deviant implementation can have an extended meaning to include the issue of
improvisation while taking care of changes thought of a priori. Change leaders have
to make sure that the deviation is not a result of loss of control or an unconscious
departure from the track. In this case, organisations may even devise a new strategy
that necessitates different business operations and hence actual deviance from
intended change can be observed.
As also explained in the previous section, the discovery of the usefulness of change
model to the nature of the business can cause deviant implementation.  The banking
sector and some of the BPR principles did not match or at least required
modifications. For example, the ‘maker-checker’ principle in bank A emerged against
BPR’s generalist principle. It increases costs through duplicated efforts. However, the
aim was to manage risks.
5.4. Summary of Strategic Change Implementation Experience of
Bank A
The fifteen most salient and most important codes capture the full picture of what
happened in bank A. Using them and related concepts can give a summarized
message about the strategic change implementation practice of bank A.
In this bank, the initiated strategic change happened in two phases owing to the
failure of the first one to deliver expected results mainly because of lack of
understanding on the tool which is referred to as “change model”. Therefore, this
issue of understanding the change model stood out from the data corpus. A change
model which is adapted or adopted by organizations serves as a tool which guides
initiation, design and implementation of changes especially planned ones. Such
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models should be validated in order to check if they are appropriate for the purpose
of initiating a change in a specific organization and its contexts.
As strategic organizational changes usually involve changing technical and social
aspects of organizations, carrying out them also requires employing external
consultants or assigning teams of internal experts. In bank A, both approaches were
used; the primary responsibility of designing the new organizational systems and
process being the technical teams. The ways they were established and their
interactions within and across teams also emerged as an important and salient issue.
This issue is so critical that it determines the content of the change to be
implemented and hence the success or failure of the entire initiative. The quality of
the design of organizational change depends on the team’s understanding of the
model, its capacity to generate new ideas, the composition of teams and their
relations.
Teams should also rule out conflicting self-interests and show (for those concerned)
that their task has been accomplished objectively and professionally. Failure to do so
or a perceived lack of objectivity negatively affects the implementation of initiated
changes.
Implementation could deviate from what it is planned for different reasons. In bank
A, this deviance happened for the better or for the worse in different instances. The
lesson gained is that deviance may not necessarily imply failure. The purpose of the
initiative, if defined and communicated effectively, should be considered to evaluate
this. So long as the deviance meets the purpose, it could be acceptable. However,
there were actions of passive resistance from the side of management and
tendencies to retain the status quo covering it up with fake reports. These
tendencies were associated with the way the change especially the second phase
was initiated and the way it was perceived by members of the old management.
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As the second phase was initiated after recognition of failure in the first phase which
was undertaken under the leadership off old management, it resulted in skepticism.
Heightened skepticism, lack of trust and poor communication led to office politics
which, backed by self-interest, had challenged the entire process of the initiative in
bank A.
Selection of personnel for the newly designed job positions was the most shocking
event as per the frequency of mention by participants. This event was a turning point
in the entire duration of the initiative. Participants perceive the task of the committee
which undertook the selection of personnel negatively as lacking transparency,
objectivity and characterized by favoritism. This event could have benefited from
proper positioning through a careful communication and clear and objective criteria
against which assignments were done.
In general, as became apparent from the experience of bank A, an approach which
overcomes the cause of several breakdowns, and which enhances the quality of tasks
undertaken by different actors could lead to greater success. In this approach, there
are two major foci of intervention—the soft side and the technical side of the
organization. Themes that emerged under each of these areas are discussed in detail
in the next chapter.
5.5. Major Categories that Emerged from Bank B’s Data
The approach followed in extracting categories from bank B’s data is a replication of
that of bank A as recommended by Eisenhardt (1989). Doing the first cycle coding in
the same way as it was explained for bank A, resulted in a list of codes (see annex 7)
that were arranged based on their groundedness and density measures (see annex 8
& annex 9). The following table presents the top most grounded and densest codes
that were extracted from first cycle codes of bank B data.
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Table 5.3: List of codes with highest scores of groundedness and density from bank B’s
data
NO. Top most Grounded
Codes
No. Top Densest Codes
1 Non Profit motive 1 Convincing sponsors
2 Conflict of interest 2 Non profit motive
3 Trigger for change 3 Commitment
4 Technology support 4 Resistant management
5 Level of National
development
5 Bottom up
6 Lack of leadership 6 Type of ownership
7 Bottom up 7 Lack of competitive
pressure
8 Implementation failure 8 Implementation
9 Office politics 9 Unconvinced middle
manger
10 Resistant Management 10 Brining supreme power on
board
11 Type of ownership 11 Human capacity
12 Owner of initiatives 12 Strategic direction
13 Cause of failure 13 Convincing
14 Failure Story 14 Approach
15 National Context 15 New system design
16 Evaluation 16 Lack of shared vision
17 Lack of top Management
Support
17 Power interventions
18 Aligning Benefits to
changed behavior
18 Soft side
19 Implementation
specification
19 Readiness for change
20 Motivating employees 20 Office politics
21 No compelling reason for
change
21 Excessive intervention of
board of directors
22 Lack of awareness 22 Trigger for change
23 Communication break 23 Organizational culture
24 Deviant implementation 24 Lack of trust
25 Top management
commitment
25 Implementation
specification
26 Incomplete change 26 Externally Driven
27 Model specification 27 Rational for change
28 Lack of common interest 28 Lack of ownership
29 Convincing 29 Failure story
30 Guiding principles 30 Perception management
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31 Customer needs 31 Conflict of interest
32 Lack of competitive
pressure
Employee morale,
expected nature of
competition, awareness
creation, power
interventions, government
intervention, human
capacity, pro adoption,
team establishment,
qualified personnel,
naming the initiative
32 Customer needs
Lack of integration
between actors,
contextualization, aligning
benefits to changed
behavior, lack of
integration among actors,
implementer commitment,
documented design,
sincerity of purpose, owner
of initiatives, national
context
Source: Own extraction from Atlas.ti outputs.
The last row in the table above engendered all codes with the same value of the two
measures. The inclusion of them affected the list of common codes that had to be
considered for further analyses.
In the following table, codes that commonly exist in the list of top most grounded
and top densest codes are summarized.
Table 5.4: Common codes based on groundedness and density measures
No. Code Description
1 Non Profit motive This is a concept that represents the agenda of major
shareholders who want to implicitly control the bank
and get it serve their personal interest. This interest
does not include profit the bank makes out of its
regular operation. They rather focus on things
different from profit.
2 Resistant
management
The act of bank B’s management resisting the initiated
change for the change is initiated bottom-up and not
in the best attention and interest of the board of
directors and hence top management.
3 Bottom-up Refers to the change that is initiated by experts in
bank B. It indicates that the idea of strategic
organizational change in bank B did not come from
the top.
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4 Type of
ownership
It refers to the idea that bank B is a private bank has
connections to the sources of challenges to
implement strategic organizational change in the
prevailing environment of private banking sector in
Ethiopia.
5 Weak competitive
pressure
Represents low intensity of competition in the
banking sector in Ethiopia owing to few number of
players and entry barriers backed by government’s
legislation.
6 Convincing This is related to expert effort to persuade top
management in bank B to accept strategic
organizational change in the bank.
7 Power
intervention
Power in private banks context refers to the capacity
to decide on the resources of the bank and its main
source is company ownership. Therefore, those with
direct or indirect connection with major stockholders
of the bank are in possession of power in bank B. If
convinced, those with power have great potential to
enhance the success of implementing organizational
change
8 Trigger for
change
Trigger for change refers to the immediate reason that
caused the commencement of the initiative in the
bank.
9 Office politics A rivalry in bank B motivated by a need to seize power
or to influence those with power as a result of which
to manipulate the bank’s management and advance
self-interest.
10 Implementation
specifications
Design components of the organizational change
which specify the content and process of change.
11 Customer needs Represents what the customer demands from a bank.
12 Failure story Stories that are related to the failure of the change
initiative in bank B.
13 Conflict of
interest
These are interests in the context of bank B, especially
associated to top management members and major
shareholders who have personal interests that conflict
with organizational interests.
14 Owner of
initiatives
The feeling and perception created in bank B
following the bottom-up initiation of the change. This
implies the owners of the initiative to be experts of
the bank.
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15 Aligning benefits
to changed
behavior
This is a reinforcement mechanism that is
recommended to be part of the implementation
specification to make the change real.
16 National context Represents the socio-economic conditions of Ethiopia
especially in a way it affects the condition it affects the
operation of bank and to the extent it necessitates
engaging in a search behavior towards meeting
changing environmental pressures.
17 Top management
commitment
This idea refers to the level top management of bank
B is committed towards implementing the change
18 Naming the
initiative
Naming is a strategy used by bank B’s experts who
initiated the strategic organizational change in the
bank. As per this strategy, not identifying an initiative
with a name which has not assumed to have positive
perception by the majority was among the techniques
used to make the change successful through reduced
resistance.
Source: Own compilation
5.5.1. Source of Initiative
Source of initiative refers to where the idea for changing the bank came from. In
bank B, the need for business process redesign came from experts in connection
with the bank’s announcement to implement core banking system. It was an expert’s
suggestion finally turned to be a bank wide (strategic) initiative.
For the bank’s top management and owners both the acquisition of core banking
and business process redesigning were not self-driven. While the application of core
banking had been imposed by NBE, processes redesigning had emerged from the
bottom in the form of expert suggestion. This fact had led to important concepts
that have impacts on implementation. Among these concepts, trigger for change,
bottom up, resistant management, owners of initiatives, lack of common interest,
and naming the initiative were persistent across the data as indicated above. In the
sections below, they are briefly described along with evidences from the data.
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5.5.2. Trigger for Change
Trigger for change refers to the immediate reason that caused the commencement
of the initiative in the bank. As described above, the NBE’s demand to use
technology and expert recommendation in making the bank suitable for the new
technology through redesigning the old processes triggered the bank to this
initiative. The following is a data segment taken from a participant’s explanation of
the issue:
When our leaders came with the idea of implementing core banking, they
realized that the bank needs some adjustments so as to be suitable to the new
system. However, some of the bank’s experts used this opportunity to raise an
idea of initiating a bigger change in the bank. This was not a simple task,
though. They had to convince top management. The top management was
reluctant to accept. With struggle, the idea of undertaking a bigger change
gained acceptance eventually (1:3).
The above explanation indicates that the extent of change anticipated by the
management of bank B was not initially big (i.e., strategic). With expert
recommendation, the plan to implement a new technology demanded by the central
bank and perhaps to make minor adjustments grew up to take a shape of strategic
organizational change.  Therefore, the triggers for the initiated change were initially
government requirements but for the strategic change initiative expert
recommendations were significant triggers.
5.5.3. Resistant Management
Even though the application of the technology was not compromised by the top
management of bank B for government’s sake, the emergent process redesigning
agenda had not been welcomed by the top management group. The idea turned to
be a change initiative through extended efforts of especially one expert who had
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previous exposure in handling similar change projects in government banks. This
expert had managed to convince top management members with the idea per se.
However, as the change demanded commitment, they started to resist indicating
how implementation had been challenging. This made the change in the bank
incomplete as evidenced in the data. One of the participants who understood this
process expressed his idea as follows:
However, this initiative was emerged without acceptance by the top
management. It failed. It was just a fatal exercise. It took too much time; it
costed us a lot… (2:17).
As expressed by this participant, the fact that the change was initiated bottom-up
without top management salute resulted in undesired consequences because of the
resistance from the management side. This was somewhat expected by the experts
who initiated the idea of business process redesign and convinced the management
of the bank. Speculating the possibility of resistance, they even preferred not to
name the initiative as the infamous business process reengineering.
5.5.4. Naming the Initiative
Through naming, experts who initiated the change tried to reduce possible
resistance from organizational members through intervening in their perception
process. They introduced the initiative as business process redesign instead of
Business Process Reengineering (BPR). The reason behind doing so was BPR’s
previous application, performance and low level of acceptance in governmental
organizations. Their benchmarks, their plans, and their exposure, imply the idea was
to apply BPR, however. One of the experts who participated during the initial stage
stated the issue in the following way:
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As the name BPR might not be liked [by the organizational community], [we
said] ‘let’s simply start it as a structural change that goes bottom up; let’s do a
process reengineering anyway’ (1:4).
This indicates how naming an initiative matters even though it was not effective in
bank B because of the fact that the idea was raised bottom-up. Source of the idea
implied ownership of the initiative in the bank and hence management became
passive resistant.
Despite experts’ effort to make the change effective, management remained at least
a passive resistant because the condition in the bank allowed this to happen. In line
with this, the categories and codes discussed in the upcoming sections emerged
from bank B data.
5.5.5. Lack of Common Interest
As can also be inferred from the above discussions, there was no common interest
among organizational members who were expected to act towards designing and
implementing the initiative to bring about a real strategic change in bank B.
Management, owners, and the workforce had different interests in connection with
the initiative. In the absence of common interest, the experience in bank B proved
the difficulty of implementing organizational change. The following paragraph is an
explanation by a participant regarding the absence of common interest among the
major stakeholders.
You see, to be changed, there must be some triggering factors. …some banks
are changing just because of the National bank’s direction…. During such
events, the workforce, the management and the board should have common
thinking. It all depends on the leader (1:108).
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In the absence of common thinking and interest, initiating a change will be very
challenging to realize. Central to the task of creating the interest that makes the
change a common agenda to all organizational stakeholders is the leadership. This in
the case of bank B has roots in the type and structure of ownership.
5.5.6. Company Ownership
This category contains ideas that emerged from bank B’s data and have something
to do with the fact that bank B is a private bank. It is owned by private shareholders.
Among these shareholders, as shared by participants, some have an implicit interest
to control the operations of the bank and have significant pressure (influence) on the
leadership of the bank while others are short-sighted and thus focus on dividends at
the expense of long term survival and profitability of the bank.
In the presence of such ownership conditions, initiating a strategic change can be
influenced in ways that are explained in the next sections.
5.5.6.1. No compelling Reason for Change
As briefly asserted in the previous section, in the ownership condition bank B was in,
it was very difficult to have a common compelling reason among owners to
necessitate change the bank. As a result, owners did not happen to support in
whatsoever means or to commit themselves to change initiatives. Participants
perceive that bank business is profitable irrespective of the operational efficiency of
the bank. The following is an excerpt taken from the description of a participant
about owners:
…they get their money [profit]; they are doing whatever they like to. Whether
you did it properly or not, whether your morale is affected or not they do not
care; because the change from the very beginning didn’t come from them. The
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idea should come from the top leaders and major stockholders should agree on
it (1:132).
This was an explanation which implies that in the absence of a reason which is as
compelling as threat of profitability, owners cannot be curious about the operational
efficiency and effectiveness of the bank. In the context where profitability is almost a
guarantee; why do they worry to change the bank then? In an attempt to specify the
condition in which an initiated change could be successful, this participant
recommended buy-in from top leaders and major stockholders.
5.5.6.2. Nonprofit Motive
This is a concept that represents the agenda of major shareholders who want to
implicitly control the bank and get it serve their personal interest. This interest does
not include the profit the bank makes out of its regular operations. They rather focus
on things different from profit. That is why this concept is labeled non profit motive.
The following data segment describes this fact.
As far as you get your loan, you do not care if the bank goes bankrupt.
Therefore whether or not the manager is visionary is not as such important.
Whether the manger can change the bank doesn’t matter. As far as the
manager serves the shareholder’s interest, the manager continues in power. All
these facts disturb the theoretically sound approaches of change the rest of the
world is working with. There is no dividend and profit issue; the issues of change
matters when these issues are valid (5:29).
This explanation makes clear how the condition of ownership and related interests
uniquely affect bank business operations. Hence, getting loan for other businesses of
an investor (i.e., shareholder of the bank) is in this context identified as one of such
nonprofit motives. Credit access is repeatedly mentioned by participants amongst
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such motives. Owners with such interest focus more on getting loan in whatsoever
way including compromising bank’s profitability. The above excerpt explicates why
managers are reluctant (which was considered as passive resistance) to the change
initiated bottom-up in bank B.
The following paragraph shows how much this motive is strong in the private
banking sector.
For your information, (it might not be important for your study), in our country
most of the bank shareholders do not want dividend from their banks; their
most important thing for them is being powerful and being able to control the
management. By controlling the management their big benefit is credit. This is
an inflation era. The biggest thing for them is getting loan not getting divided.
There is no capital market like in the rest of the world. Owners do not buy and
sell shares. Their most important thing in here is their dominance (5:28).
This search for credit is not through the normal operation of the bank; it happens
through control and manipulation. It is not logical to expect commitment for
changing the bank from these stockholders. They systematically control the board of
directors so as to get their interest served by the bank. In a bank being led by this
kind of board of directors, it is not simple to get the idea of change accepted and its
initiation and implementation sponsored. The issue of power and its uses matters in
such an environment as one participant put it:
The question is does the board allow this to happen? Because the actual board
is referred to as shadow board; the real board operates behind the curtain. They
have their own interest. They have no shared vision. They may focus on getting
loan; if they do not stop this, banks cannot come to the right track. You see, to
change these who should have the broader picture? It is the management. Is
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there anyone who accepts to change the bank towards this broader picture?
Very hardly! (1:140).
The rivalry within bank owners is to gain control over the board and gain power. For
these types of owners the performance efficiency of the bank which may at times
necessitate organizational change and competitiveness of the bank, which may in
turn demand changing the bank’s way of doing business, does not matter much.
This implies that the existence of stockholders with nonprofit motives could
negatively affect implementation of organizational change. The following data
segment is taken from one participant’s explanation to show how strong the
situation was.
You see you can’t fully implement. Unless you go through reconciling with the
interests that come especially from the board, even you can’t survive. You have
to compromise (1:82).
As per this view of a participant, serving nonprofit motives are even threatening the
job security of managers and/or employees of the bank. This is because the motive is
supported by those who have power.
5.5.7. The External Context
The national and industrial context in which bank B operates also emerged to have
an association with the implementation practice. In addition to the issues pertaining
to ownership and associated interests described above, customer needs, weak
competitive pressure, and national context make up the context in which bank B is
operating.
5.5.7.1. Weak Competitive Pressure
As explained in Chapter Four, the banking sector in Ethiopia is characterized by few
domestic players enjoying legislative entry barriers. These barriers are preventing
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foreigners in general and domestic new entrants in a form of increased capital
requirement. On the other hand, the country is the second most populous in Africa
providing very limited access to credit and saving facilities which in turn gives way to
indigenous informal institutions such as “iqquib” as substitute service providers in a
relatively lower transaction cost. These are all indicators of low intensity of
competition within the industry.
In the absence of competitive pressure, it is very likely that a bank earns profit no
matter how it operates. What else could trigger a bank to initiate a risky strategic
change business then? One of the participants discussed this issue in the following
way:
I think one thing that does not motivate many people for change is the fact that
the market is not saturated yet. You will make profit whether or not you
implement changes successfully. Therefore, you do not bother about change
implementation. Now, all commercial banks are profitable; despite this we talk
about 6th and 7th rank, still there is money. We are talking about reduction in
performance while the bank made around 300 million Birr. They got it without
doing strategic things. They got this without treating customers in a different
way. You can get profit for simply opening the office (4:33).
If this is the case, banks will not be motivated to improve the way they do their
business. Hence, it is very difficult to get committed top management for an
implementation of change as it is not demanded by owners who are making money
anyway. The following paragraphs also reinforce the above argument:
Our bank is still traditional. We simply lend and get profit. There is no
competition. Sometimes you may think “why should they worry?” They are
getting money almost certainly. What would improving the system bring
(1:103)?
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However, as access to credit is far from the ordinary customer, there is no reason to
deposit only. This rather could motivate especially those who have a need for credit
access to look for the traditional option. This takes the money which could otherwise
have been deposited to banks. This could make mobilizing deposit challenging in
the future.
5.5.7.2. Customer Needs
The other direction from which an organization could be triggered for change is
when finding innovative ways of satisfying customer needs is a way of survival in
business. The question of how pressured Ethiopian banks (to satisfy the needs of
their customer through sophisticated banking services) are can indicate the level of
commitment the bank management could have to search for innovative banking.
One of the interviewees expressed his insight on this issue in the following way:
Do not innovate if it is not a must; because why should you prefer more
expensive ways to less expensive ones? Our society is non banked society. It is
cash society. Having money in a pocket is common in the society (5:38).
This indicates the level of pressure to innovate for the customer as the important
question of the customer is access. There is no easy access to credit even for those
who are exposed to a bank.
5.5.7.3. National Context
In addition to customer-related and industry-related issues, national context has also
emerged as important factor in shaping the context within which a strategic change
can be framed. Participants relate bank operations to the economic development
level of nation. As the level of economic development changes, the way banks do
their business also changes. The following is an excerpt explaining this:
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The quality of banks is dependent on the economic development level of a
country. The development level of a country determines the nature and type of
a bank product. For example Ethiopian economy is different from the European
economy. In such economies there are more than 280 banking products. In
Ethiopia, the number of banking products might not even be 100. If you ask
what is the difference? [The answer is] the nation’s economic development and
level of technological development.
For example why are we using the new technology? The economy is developing,
and technology is also developing. Therefore, the transformation of banks
requires economic and technological development. The society is also
demanding more from banks; therefore, [banks] introduced mobile banking,
ATM, etc… (2:41-42).
Legislative trends are also important components of national environment in the
context of Ethiopian commercial banking sector. For example, government’s
legislation which demands a fixed percentage of private bank’s deposits to be
invested in government bills put pressure on private banks. This may trigger private
banks to be more active and search for new ways of winning customers to mobilize
more deposit. One of the participants expressed his contention regarding
government’s intervention in the following way:
Ethiopia is importing much of its goods from China. But the government gives
the privilege to give banking service to all imports from china to only
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia [government owned bank]. What do you say this?
This is unfair. The other is the issue of 27% deposit to the National Bank
required only from private banks. This is not the case in government banks. This
created huge deposit shortage on private banks which in turn creates a problem
in giving credits (2:38).
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This indicates that one of the possible sources of pressure for banks to look for
better ways of attracting customers could be the national legislative frameworks. The
other legislative issue raised by participants is also the already existing government
restriction on foreign investors to enter the financial sector and the possibility of
better performance if this restriction is lifted. In the data segment below, a
participant explained other contribution foreign investors could have in addition to
intensifying competition and sophisticating bank products.
The coming of foreign banks could also benefit in a form of solving hard
currency shortage. The government instead of fully preventing them from
entering the domestic market can restrict their operation to the foreign
exchange and foreign currency related banking services and reduce the present
problem in the import-export business. Therefore, for me, the restriction might
have a different reason instead (2:39).
As indicated in the above quotation bank managers are not afraid of foreign banks.
Rather they expect better environment following their entry. Moreover, if such
changes are expected in the national environment due to global pressures, the
national competitive situation will be different from what it is today. This requires
strategic approach from the side of the banks; which means another trigger for
strategic organizational change.
Others even call for greater competitiveness following expected deregulation. The
following data segment is an indicative for such propositions by participants.
You device a strategy based on your objectives. What Ethiopian banks have to
focus on is the fact that we are in the era of globalization and Ethiopian
accession to the WTO may end up with deregulation of the industry. This will
make the competition too stiff. Therefore, before the time comes these banks
should be prepared in advance different ways (4:46).
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Indicating the need for such a change obviously has impact on the success of
implementation through increasing the commitment of top management and
owners during change initiatives.
5.5.8. Power
Power in the context of private banks refers to the capacity to decide on the
resources of the bank which naturally emanates from ownership of the company.
Therefore, those with direct or indirect connection with major stockholders of the
bank are in possession of power in bank B. This concept has relevance because if
convinced, those with power have great potential to enhance the success of
implementing organizational change.
5.5.8.1. Supreme Powers Aboard
The success of implementation in an organizational change is affected by
organizational power and in the way power is applied. The impact of power
intervention will be either positive or negative on the success of implementation.
This is, in fact, an indicator for the need to bring those with the highest power on
board during change initiatives as discussed below:
…who is the supreme power in that bank? In the case of a private bank it is the
shareholders—represented by the board of directors. The leader should get his
proposal approved by them. Then the change will be implemented successfully.
However, there are several interest groups that will strive to divert the initiative
out of track for their own sake. Sometimes, it seems that the purpose of
establishment for private banks is to give loan to shareholder (2:67).
This implies that members who are backed by those with the highest power in the
bank can execute what they intend to. In the context of the initiative, the success of
implementation needs power intervention. However, there is also rivalry among
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other interest groups to get those with power in the initiative’s side. This leads to
office politics.
5.5.8.2. Office Politics
Office politics in bank B is characterized by competition towards winning power that
gives capacity to control the bank for the sake of serving different interests. Some of
such interests are personal; not organizational. This negatively affects the rate of
success in implementing organizational changes. At times, organizational members
who are in charge of some change-related tasks might face trial in front of those
with power. They have to choose between compromising the quality of change and
their job. The following quotation is indicates such concerns:
You see, you can’t fully implement [the change]. Unless you go through
reconciling with the interests that come especially from the board, even you
can’t survive. You have to compromise (1:82).
Given this, in bank A, even the idea of changing the bank could have been curbed at
its earliest stage. According to one participant, it was due to an expert’s selfless
effort irrespective of personal threats that the idea persisted.
Had it not been for that person’s effort, it couldn’t have been realized by anyone
else. In the top management, nobody listens; however, he has an expert power.
Besides, he knows the president. The president trusts him. He is like an advisor
[to the president]. He could present same thing even three times until they
accept it. He does not quit easily. He continues to convince them (1:21).
This had happened because of power usage. Those who have power have to be
aware of how to use it. Power use could be constructive or destructive. When there
are political manipulations, things in connection with power use will be more
complicated. The safest way of handling organizational change is trying to get the
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blessing of the supreme power first and ideally to initiate the changes top down. If
the truth is the other way round, change will face fierce resistance from the top as
observed in bank B. Apart from implementation failure, such a circumstance hurts
those engaged as described by one participant below:
This kind of situation even victimizes good individuals; of course we didn’t face
such a problem. Through this process the anticipated change comes, it’s very
natural. Later on, when the idea spreads, it becomes bank wide. Even now, there
are individuals who oppose the change. You cannot avoid it; but, you can
minimize.
… In reality while those who are not responsible promote change, people with
responsibility keep quite. They are more concerned to their power and the
status quo. This is the biggest challenge. It is true (5:19-20).
The ultimate result of office politics is actions that are taken under the umbrella of
those with power. This had happened in bank B in several ways of power
interventions. If misused, power can be a challenge for the successful
implementation of a change initiative; otherwise it could be an important tool for
realizing anticipated organizational changes.
5.5.9. The Human Resource
Ultimately, the implementation of an organizational change affects personnel in one
way or another. Obviously, any kind of change initiative cannot be successful without
the involvement of people. The issue is how people come on board during
organizational change initiatives.  It requires proper selection of appropriate
personnel and proper intervention to modify the behavior of people in a way that
benefits implementation.
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5.5.9.1. Personnel Selection
If effectively executed, personnel selection plays an important role for the success of
change implementation. Practically, defining and applying merits serve as proxy to
identify potentially relevant personnel. Human side refers to the human capacity to
execute required tasks with acceptable quality and with required commitment. In
bank B, this process of personnel selection has emerged from the data as a relevant
concept. Though not as loud as it does in bank A’s data, one of the interviewees
agree in the idea of merit based selection (in bank B) as presented below:
Personnel selection should be merit based; to have personnel having better
qualification and better attitude towards customers. Then retaining the
experienced personnel is also important. Retention requires being appealing to
your workers through competitive remuneration, through freedom in work
environment, through empowering them. Working towards continuously
upgrading the workforce so as to be competent with new technologies and new
approaches is the other thing required (4:51).
Based on the above data, selection should be backed by retention if the selection of
personnel has to contribute for organizational success in general and change
implementation in particular.
5.5.9.2. Motivating
During change implementation, making sure there are motivated employees ready
to discharge their new change implementation related responsibility is the other
issue. Participants from bank B also raised their concern in connection with this
concept:
You have to do several things when managing changes. Motivating the
workforce is part of it. You have to create awareness about the change; you
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have to make things clear. You have to train them and side by side show the
benefit they can get from the change (1:137).
In the absence of such efforts, employees will have their own attitude and perception
(about the change); which do not necessarily guarantee the required behavioral
change.
5.5.10. Attitude
Attitude is the other concept that gained attention during interviews. Interviewees
showed their worry on this issue. An excerpt which indicates how attitude is one of
the causes for not implementing the anticipated change says:
We didn’t do a census, but the majority of employees do not have positive
attitude towards the change. The majority is change resistant. The reason is
there was no proper awareness creation. Besides, there are individuals who
became overloaded following the changes in structure; these overloads
dissatisfy the employees (6:18).
This means, change leaders and other involved parties should have sufficiently
informed employees about the change and its impact on them. Besides, follow up of
actual impacts of the change and taking corrective actions helps to shape employee
perception which ultimately influences behavior.
5.5.11. Aligning Benefits with Changed Behavior
The other thing that emerged out of the data is reinforcement related issue. For
employees to act to the level required for the implementation of a change there
must be a reason that convinces them. From the organization’s side, the intervention
to this end should revolve around performance evaluation and rewards. Ideally, there
must be an alignment between the required behavior and employee benefits. One
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participant expressed his disappointment about the absence of such practices in
bank B in the following way:
… If I were them, as the design is complete; I would have devised a strategy to
100% implement the designed change and to help the entire worker accept and
own the change. I am very much disappointed for there is no system to follow
up and evaluate implementation, to evaluate performance based on the new
design and to reward and punish based on performance evaluation.  The design
is just on the shelf. If you ask the staff what has been changed, what is your role
to the implementation, nobody knows (4:57).
This explanation shows how deviant the implementation is from what was designed.
There is no means to communicate what has to be done and how performance is
measured and evaluated.
5.5.12. Communication
Communication is implicit behind every other concept that emerged from bank B’s
data. As can be inferred from the previous discussions, lack of common interest
backed by power and politics led to a reluctant if not resistant group of
management which made the situation challenging to motivate the entire workforce
and bring about the anticipated change. Right from naming the initiative and
creating awareness among relevant stakeholders to the stage where every major
actor is convinced about the need for the change, the issues emerged from bank B’s
data are indicators of the need for well designed communication. A participant put it
as:
You have to convince them [organizational members]. If there is someone who
is not convinced, you have to change him/her. This is how you go. People do
not simply leave what they get used to. You have to do several things [to
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persuade them]. You have to train [them]. Some follow you early; others follow
later. It’s a process, it is change; it is not simple… (1:138).
The above explanation shows, implementation could have improved if proper
communication had been there to the level it was required.
5.5.13. Commitment
As appeared from the data of bank B, organizational actors in both sides—the
management workers—should be committed towards the fruition of an anticipated
change. However, the top management in bank B did not initiate the idea of
business process redesigning and were reluctant to accept the idea when demanded
by experts. This happened because there was no sufficient pressure forcing top
management to greater commitment towards implementing the change as
explained so far. As per one participant’s description in the paragraph below,
organizational members were neither convinced nor forced to implement the
change:
Change has to be necessitated by a problem. Here there is no problem. What
forces us to change then? Of course incentive [to get more] should also have
motivated them. People have to believe they will get more by creating more.
You have to search a mechanism that makes people restless (1:144).
The above explanation shows how lack of reinforcement creates lack of commitment.
In a condition where change is not considered as a necessity, commitment towards it
will be low.
5.5.14. Conflict of interest
These are interests in the context of bank B, especially associated to top
management members and major shareholders who have personal interests that
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conflict with organizational interests. This partly affects their level of commitment
too as explained in connection with this idea (i.e., nonprofit motive).
Conflict of interest in bank B is manifested in the following data segment quoted
from a participant’s explanation on the issue.
They want to rent their house to the bank at a rate that is higher than the
market price. The bank pays an advance payment for five or ten years. …Being
a borrower in a high inflation condition is wisdom because the interest rate is
negative. The issue is how one can get loan. When you are a major shareholder,
you can threaten the management because you have power to step down or
even to hire a management member… If you think about profitability, you [will]
have to think about efficiency; [this in turn would necessitate organizational
change] (5:28).
As explained in the above quotation, once conflicting and nonprofit benefits are
sought by major shareholders, this thinking will affect the decision of both board
members and top managers. This is not a favorable condition to have the required
commitment towards implementation of change.
5.5.15. Implementation specifications
In addition to the fulfillment of conditions explained so far, successful
implementation of organizational change requires having detailed design with
specifications of the contents and processes of the anticipated change. These
specifications have to serve as guiding principles to handle implementation
dynamics that emerge on due course. A participant explained this issue as follows:
Then we designed each activity in terms of how it should be performed, what
kind of human resource is needed, how long it takes and other efficiency related
things. We also examined the number of steps a task passes through before
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completion. …we set the goal for the newly redesigned process. Then we set
targets for each activity. We also determined a standard level of performance
(4:4).
Once the specifics of the change to be implemented are approved by relevant
authorities and documented, the task of implementation is ready to be started.
Communicating the specifications and putting them to the disposal of everyone
involved should come first. However, bank B’s success towards achieving this was
not to the level required as a participant explained:
Every worker should on the first place be informed about the standard level of
performance; then the daily performance of each worker should be registered
and at the end of the day summarized and used for performance evaluation.
…performance is as usual. Because of this the bank has just incurred a cost to
get nothing. Even other banks which didn’t initiate a change do better than us.
Or current performance is now declined from third level to seventh level. Had
our process redesign been effective, our performance would have been
improved. Therefore, the initiative is not effective. My personal opinion is it is
just wastage (4:19).
As strongly commented by the above participant, this first step was not an
experience that was actually managed by bank B. The common thing everyone
mentions is regret and wastage of time and other resources. The story of change
implementation in bank B was claimed to have led the bank to failure to implement
the initiated change to the level expected.
5.5.16. Failure story
Failure to implement the anticipated change as per the plan was confessed by
everyone participant of the study and also witnessed in the reviewed documents.
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Among these sources, the implementation evaluation report of the bank which was
conducted by taking the most successful department asserts:
…this report calls upon organizational members to be committed to fully
implement the change. Among the specific findings include the fact that
branches are not using standards of performance such as standard service
delivery time (SDT), misunderstanding of the proposed changes between front
and back offices, unreasonable bisection and disintegration among employees
taking the change as a pretext (7:7).
If the branches which were the ultimate targets of everyone, (as installing the new
technology was at the center of the initiative), do not apply what is proposed in the
newly redesigned system, it is easy to imagine what would be the case in the rest of
the departments. The following is an example of how participants express the failure
of the initiated change in bank B in this connection:
If you ask me what did the initiative brought to this bank? The answer is
definitely nothing. We spent around a year and eight months; but ended up
with nothing. Had the change brought an improvement, it should have been
reflected in the performance of the bank. However, the bank’s performance is
declining from time to time. Therefore, the initiative was not successful. Perhaps
the one year and eight months we have spent to bring about the change could
have benefited the bank more if it were used just for the regular operations. In
addition, we incurred costs in relation with the initiative (4:16).
This is how the initiative was perceived by the study participants by the time the
researcher visited the bank. Ideas that appeared pervasive and important as
explained at the beginning of this chapter have more levels of abstractions which
contributed for the construction of the implementation model which can guide
effective implementation.
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5.6. Summary of Strategic Change Implementation Practices in
Bank B
Bank B represented a case variant to bank A mainly because of differences in the
type of ownership. Practice of implementing strategic organizational change has
been influenced by this major difference (i.e., ownership type). Literally, the change
in bank B was initiated bottom-up by experts through convincing those at the top to
sponsor it. However, the extent of persuasion was not strong enough to make them
more committed towards bringing about real change in bank B. Moreover, absence
of reasons that compellingly provoke the need for change appeared to reduce
shareholders’ and hence management’s commitment towards implementing the
initiated change.
To the contrary, experts of the bank were more concerned about making the change
effective. To do so, they started their journey through convincing top management
of the bank. However, the top management did not continue having firm stand in
favor of the change. As the initiative grew up and became demanding, top
management commitment became less intense. Passive resistance is what describes
the status of top management better.
In a more latent level, implementation practices of strategic organizational change in
bank B had been under the influence of organizational interactions powered by
political behavior of self-interest driven actors from different stakeholders. Top
management was not committed to the initiated change as the same was not the
interest of major stockholders who manipulate bank’s management through their
‘shadow’ board as described by participants.
More than what they could get through ensuring effective banking operations, top
management members of bank B were presumed by participants to have gotten the
acceptance of members of the board of directors through serving nonprofit motives
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of these members. Therefore, the issue of the change initiated in bank be was not a
sincere demand by the bank’s board of directors or top management. It was rather
triggered by government’s directive to use the core banking technology and
intensified by bottom-up pressures from bank’s experts. Both of these two sources
of trigger towards the change are owned by the bank’s top management and board
of directors.
Therefore, successful implementation of a strategic organizational change requires
an assessment of the condition under which power holders operate, their temptation
to interfere in the bank’s operation with an intention to serve personal interests,
vulnerability of influential parties such as the board of directors and top
management to be trapped by manipulations from these intervening parties.  Office
politics comes into play when there is lack of leadership which overcomes these
influences and persists in unifying all towards sincere organizational purposes.
Even if the conditions of the bank are found to be in a relatively faire governance
condition whereby shareholders’ interventions are ruled out, there must be an
assessment of other conditions that necessitate change. Since the financial sector of
Ethiopia is so protected, competition is less intense which means that banking
business in the country is almost certainly profitable and this in turn makes the issue
of strategically changing the operation of the bank a less priority to stockholders
and managers.
In cases where the assessment results of aforementioned situations reveal the
necessity for change, good leadership support and commitment of those with power
create favorable condition to initiate change from whatsoever source (i.e., be it
bottom-up or top-down). Ideally, even in the absence of these conditions, banks
operating in the same environment need to have the requisite capability to be
changed. In doing so, change agents need to understand all the above conditions
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which, if not properly managed, would lead the initiative to failure. Moreover,
change agents need to devise a strategy of overcoming them while effectively
implementing anticipated strategic organizational changes.
Technical aspects of implementing strategic organizational change will be
meaningful when the above issues are considered and properly handled. In this
regard, bank B was challenged to use the right approach of initiating, designing and
implementing the anticipated strategic organizational change using the right
technical tool which results in new business processes in the bank. Bank B’s use of
old functional departments to design new business processes limited its
successfulness in bringing about process orientations to the bank.
Besides, bank B also was challenged in terms of having a complete specification of
design components of new business processes so that implementation becomes
clear. The extent the change is positioned in the mind of the workers in the bank was
also generally poor that they perceived the initiative as a simple change in the
names of the old process and nothing more.
5.7. Chapter Summary
This chapter mainly focused on description of major categories that emerged as a
result of analyzing the data gathered from the two banks. As the purpose of the
study is building data-driven theory, this chapter attempted to indicate the empirical
data the present study was based on. The next chapter will focus on the final part of
second cycle coding—selective coding and related theoretical propositions.
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CHAPTER SIX: DESCRIPTIONS OF EMERGENT THEMES
6.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses about major themes pertaining to the implementation of
strategic organizational change. Besides, relationships among major themes that led
to the propositions about strategic organizational change implementation within the
context of each bank are presented. Based on the results, final theoretical
propositions are made and implementation models for strategic organizational
change within the contexts of each commercial bank are proposed.
6.2. Themes Extracted from Bank A’s Data
In bank A, the strategic organizational change which was targeted by the present
study was analyzed based on data gathered pertaining to how the strategic
organizational change was initiated, designed and implemented. Codes that were
emerged from the primary data sources were further analyzed and resulted in those
categories which appeared most salient and most important are described in the
previous chapter. In the upcoming sections of this chapter, more latent perspectives
of second cycle coding are presented.
6.2.1. Causes of Breakdowns
As the analysis at this stage is focused on concepts that are associated with the
implementation of strategic organizational change in bank A, possible causes of
breakdowns as conceptualized by Van de Ven and Sun (2011) are among those this
chapter focuses on. Breakdowns represent actions or conditions of implementation
which deviate from anticipated change (i.e., mental model (Van de Ven & Sun,
2011)). In the case of bank A, the strategic organizational change was anticipated to
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be designed and implemented in line with BPR principles as explained in Chapter
Four and Chapter Five.
The source from which the idea of changing the bank is initiated and the strategy it
was communicated, the way the initiated change was conceptualized by different
stakeholders who were expected to be interconnected actors throughout the
transition period, resistance from management, power use and politics were found
to be major causes of breakdown in bank A. How and why these concepts are
associated with breakdowns and who should be responsible to search for remedies
and prevent change breakdowns by avoiding the conditions under which these
causes impede strategic organizational change are discussed in the next sub-
sections.
6.2.1.1. Source and strategy of initiating strategic organizational
change
In bank A, there was resistance to implement the initiated change though the source
of it and the conditions contributing to it appeared different from what is commonly
known. Source of initiative and the strategy of communicating the initiative as
discussed in the previous chapter are attributed to possibly cause a change
breakdown as they resulted in resistant management groups and individuals who
followed different tactics to defend the status quo.
In the present study, source of initiation refers to the person or entity who initiated
the idea of changing an organization. The fact that the government initiated the
change (second phase of BPR) in bank A indicates that government is the source of
initiative for the strategic organizational change in the bank. As the reason for the
government to take the initiative was failure of the previous initiative, this left
management of the bank skeptic about the ultimate intention of the initiation.
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The strategy followed by those who initiated the change was not sufficiently
designed to convince old management group who presumably considered this act
as a sign of government’s dissatisfaction by their management. Therefore, members
of the old management group tried to defend themselves. This is how the old
management perceived the condition. Consequently, the environment was engulfed
with lack of trust. These are all relatively underrepresented in the literature as causes
of resistance to change.
Besides, individuals (i.e., employees) are presumed to be primary sources of
resistance to organizational change (Burnes, 2015). However, as this same author
explains, even the seminal works of the theory of change resistance as discussed by
Coch and French (1948) recognize organizational setting as a source of resistance
instead of an individual. In the present research, a relatively less discussed source
that is manager’s resistance emerged to play significant role in implementing
strategic organizational change. A specific attention is given to the notion of
manager’s resistance in an article extracted and published from this research (Belay
& Mamo, 2016).
6.2.1.2. Skepticism
As a better conceptualization effort, this type of resistance to change is associated
with source and strategy of initiating a change which results in skepticism and lack of
trust among board of directors (in the case of bank A), those who are assigned to act
as change agents (design teams), selection committee and employees resulted in
deviant implementation.
6.2.1.3. Perception
This concept represents the way the change initiated in bank A was viewed by
employees and managers. As emerged relevant in the context of bank A, the source
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of initiative and strategy of communicating the initiated change to the presumably
change recipient group should be given sufficient attention. It affects the perception
of the change recipient (non-initiators). If the act of initiating is negatively perceived,
it will lead to lack of readiness to buy into the change. Perception is therefore one of
the possible cause of breakdowns.
6.2.1.4. Lacking Management Sponsorship to the Change
This theme represents the notion of management resistance in its strictest sense.
From this less common source of resistance, it is logical to recommend the change
leaders to manage possible emotions of the old management team and reduce its
influence on the initiated change. The ideal solution which could prevent
breakdowns is properly communicating the purpose of the change and persuading
the management group so that it supports the change. Through careful monitoring,
if the intensity of old management’s emotion is beyond controllable limits and it is
expected to grow to a level of effective resistant force, measures must be taken to
minimize or avoid negative influences of such groups.
The ideal condition is to turn extant management group of a changing organization
into a change sponsor. Building management’s sponsorship to the initiated change
should be at the centre of the initiating strategy. Mento et al. (2002) underscored
this theme as cultivating a change sponsor as one of the important steps in
implementing organizational change. The purpose of such possible mechanisms of
achieving this could be solving conceptualization problems and increasing
acceptance base among the management group.
6.2.1.5. Conceptualization Problems
Conceptualization is related to the way the initiated change is understood by
organizational members. It is created through the change leader’s communication
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effort. In bank A, as the initiated change was by default a sign of rejecting the prior
effort of existing management group, those who were in charge of leading the
second phase could have exploited better level of collaborating through carefully
designed communication about what triggered the change, what its scope will be
and build a compelling shared reason that necessitated the change. Trigger for
change, compelling reason and scope of the change are among the significant
categories that emerged from bank A’s data as discussed in the previous chapter.
Lack of proper positioning of the initiated change could lead to poor
conceptualization of the change and this in turn causes breakdowns to the initiated
change.
6.2.2. Managing Major Events and Resultant Shocks
Throughout the entire duration of a change implementation project, some events
appear important to organizational members. They served as turning points for the
general behavioral trends during transition. Specifically, two events—declaration to
initiate the second phase BPR and employee selection—were important for both
employees and the management group in bank A. These two events resulted in
shocks during the transition period as participants described. Different strategies of
handling these two events could have changed the whole organizational climate
during the transition period.
As explained earlier, the fact that the government (through board of directors)
initiated the second phase of BPR in bank A which was taken as a remedy for the
failed first phase initiation was not a comfortable message to those who were
managing the bank during the time of the first phase BPR initiative.
As the second phase followed a different strategy (i.e., used teams that were
established to carry out the design of the new business processes; which is different
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from the approach of the first phase which involved everyone in old functional
departments), those who were not participants remained skeptic and gradually
started to device and apply passive resistance strategies. Such resistances were
ranging from intentional slowdown of activities to manipulating the change
procedure through carefully orchestrated interventions especially during the
selection process (at least as perceived by technical team members). Manipulation of
the employee selection process in turn resulted in deviant implementation
(compared to the design).
For the management group, government’s initiation of the second phase was a
shock. They were frustrating because the purpose of the second initiative was
declared to be failure of the first which by default put them responsible. On the
other hand, employee selection, which is the most sensitive stage during strategic
organizational change was not at least perceived by organizational members as
objective as they expected it to be. Result of the process was described by
participants as a shocking event.
If such events are not preconceived by change leaders and accompanied by
transparent plans which make consequences especially on those to be affected clear,
the environment turns to be stressing. As time goes on, skepticism and lack of trust
engulf the environment. This logically leads to a search behavior to come out of it.
Such behaviors are obviously deviant. This makes things difficult for change leaders
to bring about the desired change. This deviation is different from what Van de Ven
and Sun (2011) refer to as reflection to intentionally deviate from the mental model.
Transparency through proper communication could have smoothed out the relations
amongst (1) the board, (2) the management group, (3) teams which were established
to design the new organizational business processes, (4) the committee which was
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established to select employees to be assigned on newly created job positions, and
(5) the entire workforce. These parties are major actors during change initiatives.
Smooth interaction which results from strong leadership and communication
enhances organizational change implementation success (see actor networking and
interaction among actors).
Major events should therefore be predetermined, and a strategy to organize them
properly and to select appropriate timing found important. The execution of such
events needs to be preceded by sufficient communication and adequate evaluation
of possible reactions. Readiness of the organization to introduce such events should
be anticipated in advance and fully assessed. These altogether represent proper
timing.
Timing is a central logic. Managers of the change could understand causes of
deviant reactions following such major events; however, determining proper timing
for these events is more proactive and effective. Especially employee selection was
perceived as premature because it started before the finish of preparing job
description by the process teams. This resulted in bad perception and lack of
integrity. The vast majority of organizational members and especially those who
were affected by the event should have been informed and if possible convinced in
advance before the execution of the event.
6.2.3. Politics and Power Use
The introduction of an initiative to strategic organizational change especially in the
same way as how it was done in bank A (i.e., externally driven by the government)
should strive for building a sufficient buy-in from the management and other
concerned parties in the organization. Failure to do so results in an office politics
which is orchestrated by a management group that is in power and is pretending to
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support the change while actually jeopardizing it. This condition is very complex as it
is submerged in covert behaviors. This is evident in bank A’s data.
A successful implementation of organizational change is not expected to happen in
such conditions. As discussed previously, building management sponsorship to the
initiated change should precede further executions of change implementation
activities. The technical aspects of designing, implementing and evaluating a planned
change such as the one initiated by bank A can succeed when preceded by sufficient
preparatory works to handle the soft side of the organization. Leadership’s role at
this stage cannot be downplayed. Communication and building collaborative
networks amongst major actors and ruling out cause of competitive or conflictive
behaviors amongst these parties should come prior to the actual technical activities
that are needed to implement a change.
As also discussed in connection with major events, lack of trust which result from
poor communication which in turn result in skepticism lead non-participating
members to engage in searching for self-defense mechanisms to protect their
threatened interests. When the management group is amongst such organizational
members, office politics will be a powerful tool and an ultimate manifestation of
manager’s resistance to organizational change.
6.2.4. Change Leadership, Communication and Networking
Themes discussed so far have negative impacts on implementation of strategic
organizational change if not properly handled. Embedded behind these themes,
leadership, communication and networking emerged as mechanisms of enhancing
implementation effectiveness through overcoming the aforementioned challenges.
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6.2.4.1. Leadership
Leadership is generic in that it is also required here as a mechanism of influencing
behavior of actors during the change. In this specific context, themes that emerged
as a source of change breakdown or as mechanisms of enhancing successful
implementation are somewhat connected to interactions of actors. Communication,
networking and persuading actors and creating an environment of trust and
confidence appeared missing in the time of transition. These indicate the need for a
change leadership.
Effective change leadership especially in environments that have potential loss of
trust among major actors makes use of well built actor networks that have bases in
transparent intents and decisions that are properly conceived and understood by all
major actors. These networks make communication more effective. Therefore a
change leader needs to nurture an environment of trust during change initiation. The
leader should use shared compelling reason for initiating the change. This is
consistent to the first step in Lewin’s model (Burnes, 2004a). Kotter’s (1995) step of
creating a sense of urgency and subsequent steps of creating vision and sharing it
are also convergent to the need for change leadership that is needed in successfully
implementing strategic organizational change in this context. These require
networking major actors and fostering effective communication among them.
In the context of bank A, effective leadership could have introduced the initiative to
the management group and get sufficient buy-in from them and foster collaborative
environment which smoothens the interaction among actors. This made smoothness
of interaction among actors an important theme which has potential contribution to
effectiveness of strategic organizational change implementation.
236
6.2.4.2. Actor networking
As an important mechanism to create conducive environment to implement a
strategic organizational change, building a strong network of collaboration among
major actors is found critical. This idea has been supported by scholars since the
beginning of scholarship in change management. For example, Howes and Quinn
(1978) explained the importance of integrating the efforts of change agents,
managers and members. Stragalas (2010) also proposed collaborative interaction
among three stakeholders—leader, employee and organization and discussed on
what needs to be done by each in order to implement organizational change in line
with Kotter’s (1995) eight step model of change.
In bank A, contrary to the aforementioned required conditions among actors, there
were weak or no integrations among process teams who designed the new business
processes, the committee which was established to select personnel for the newly
designed job positions, and those who were assigned to implement new business
processes. This indicates leadership gap which otherwise could have created a
network among these actors. This situation led to the emergence of another
important idea to be considered during change implementation—actor networking.
Each actor is then expected to interact over the network.
6.2.4.3. Communication
Communication is the means to ensure effective networking and leadership. Without
proper communication, there will be no effective initiation and positioning of a
change program. If communication is lacking, intentions of the initiative could not be
transparent, the perceptions and emotions of organizational actors could not be
managed, and destructive office politics and self-interest triggered behaviors cannot
be minimized. Risks of disintegration and dominance of political behavior over
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change supportive behavior could only be handled through leadership which has to
exploit much on communication.
Communication, especially when supported with technology is also the life vessel of
process oriented organizations on the basis of which they transfer data that are
needed to execute tasks and to evaluate performances (see change model validation
and contextualization). As discussed under the change model validation and
contextualization section, technology supported communication is an important
contributor for implementation success especially in the case of process oriented
organizational designs. For example, implementation of BPR (Hammer & Champy,
1993) and Balanced Score Card (BSC) (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, 1992) require an
automated environment. In the upcoming technical related themes that were
emerged from bank A’s data, implementation support system which is assumed to
be supported by information and communication technology is also an important
interface with this theme—communication.
6.2.5. Change Techniques and Managing Expert Buy-ins
Themes presented so far deal more on the soft side of strategic organizational
change implementation. In addition, strategic organizational change implementation
requires managing technical aspects of initiating, designing and implementing it.
Besides, if the initiated change uses a tool which is referred to in this study as
change model, it has to be validated and contextualized. These techniques demand
sufficient buy-in of experts.
6.2.5.1. Change Model Validation and Contextualization
Once the purpose and type of a newly initiated change is communicated with an
intention to persuade organizational actors (especially managers), it becomes
reasonable to discuss on the technical aspects of the initiated change. In planned
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change initiatives such as the one which took over in bank A, it is common to choose
a tool which will be used as a means to conceptualize the change. Such tools are
technical and definitely need expertise to use them. The first phase of BPR initiative
in bank A is an example of what the consequence of lacking expertise results.
Basically, such tools need to be validated and contextualized.
6.2.5.2. Validating the Change Model
The use of a change tool, which is referred to in this study as a change model, is
usually associated with planned change. Such change programs rush to use
conceptually well developed but not usable change theories (Beer, 1992). This
approach is what Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990) denounced as fallacious
application of top-down introduced change which is conceptualized using buzz
words.
If not introduced bottom-up as Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990) claim, it appears
logical that the conceptualization of changes using models such as the use of BPR in
bank A should be validated taking the specific organizational context into
consideration. Fitness of the selected change model to the specific organizational
context should be evaluated before proceeding to take the implementation actions.
This is what the present study refers to as validating the change model.
As a result of validating the change model, communicating the initiative to and
getting buy-in from relevant stakeholders becomes more effective. In bank A,
participants witnessed the importance of by reporting about the concept of
“understanding the change model”. As explained in the previous chapter, this effort
of understanding the change model gained greatest attention (as it appeared being
the most grounded category). This effort was given attention by taking lesson from
the failed initiative (which bank A participants refer to as first phase BPR initiative).
This failure is mostly attributed to misunderstanding the change model. However,
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the effort of starting with understanding the change model did not focus on wider
base of organizational members. It rather targeted the teams which were established
to design the change. This partiality resulted in more skepticism in the side of
management and employees as they were not sufficiently informed.
Apart from understanding, validating the change model encompasses efforts of
change agents to test if the basic features of the model (BPR in this case) fit to the
whole or part of the organization. The importance of validation appeared more
meaningful especially in connection with bank A’s attempt to introduce flatter
organization and one window service in line with BPR recommendations. These two
features are examples of how the decision to apply a change model’s features
without validating their fitness to organizational context creates problems.
6.2.5.3. Contextualizing the Change Model
Change model features especially those that are common in process-oriented
designs of organizational systems (same as in BPR initiatives) require automated
environment to be executed effectively. This means, when organizational
environment is not automated, the way these features should be introduced to such
organizations should be tailored (i.e., contextualized) to the specific contextual
features. In bank A however, they tried to implement one window service by
deploying generalist front line personnel prior to automating. As participants
unanimously explained it, the result was longer cycle time (than before the change)
and loss of customer. The introduction of core banking system (technology) finally
enhanced the performance of core business processes of bank A to reach the level of
their designed capacity back offices (which are not supported by automated
systems) remained as usual (i.e., no performance improvement following the
redesign).
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The attempt to make bank A’s structure flatter also appeared problematic when
implemented. Such structure results in increased span of control. If not supported by
technology, it makes things overwhelming to the top management. This was what
happened in bank A. As a result, an initially flat structure turned to be nearly as long
as the old one following subsequent introduction of several managers and assistants
to subordinate vice presidents.
Therefore, evaluating change model’s fitness to specific organizational realities and
modifying (contextualizing) model features to make the change model fit when they
are found unfit, is an obvious logic that makes implementation more effective. In
connection with this, other technical aspect of implementing strategic organizational
change emerged—putting in place a system which supports the implementation of
change (see change techniques and managing expert buy-ins).
Both validation and contextualization of the change model that is selected to be
applied to bring about strategic organizational change are integral to the major
themes that are discussed next. Initiating an organizational change requires being
pre-informed about the selected change model. Designing is naturally guided by the
specifications of change model. Implementation should also consider assumptions
and requirements of the change model which benefit the most from validation and
modification (contextualization).  Technical aspects of initiating designing,
implementation and systems are fleshed out hereunder.
6.2.5.4. Initiating
Initiating a strategic organizational change has association to themes presented
earlier. In addition, it should meet technical requirements especially in the case of
planned changes where the concept makes better sense. As discussed in Chapter
Two, the most recent conceptualization of change comes from paradoxical view
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which considers routine dynamics as mechanisms of implementing organizational
change and innovation (Graetz & Smith, 2010; Feldman et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2017;
Wang & Wang, 2017). This stage in strategic organizational change remains valid in
changes such as the one bank A initiated.
Apart from making its goals transparent and ensuring smooth interaction with major
organizational actors as discussed so far (see source and strategy of initiating
strategic change), initiating a change should address technical requirements
discussed here. This requires expert assessment. As bank A experienced it well in its
two phases of implementing BPR, initiating which refers to assessing and
communicating the need for change with defined and compelling reasons that
justify why, what and how of the initiated change, should be based on a clear
organizational stance bold enough to be communicated to and gain acceptance by
major organizational actors. Initiating should serve as a stepping stone which serves
as a common cause for actors whose collaborative networks need to be built
subsequently (see actor networking section).
The outcome of change should also be overseen at this stage. In the absence of
defined outcome, whether change is initiated simply following management fads (as
explained by Balogun, 2001) or whether a compelling reason is necessitating change
cannot be assessed. The second question that must be addressed before passing an
initiating decision is whether or not the change model (BPR in this case) serves the
change purpose. This requires measurement that is described in terms of defined
outcomes.
As explained earlier, this requires model specification. Specifying basic features of
the change model (BPR in this case) helps to make comparative analysis between
defined change outcomes and model features which are expected to serve as drivers
242
towards those outcomes. An expert assessment and judgment as to whether the
specific features of the change model are fit to the expected outcomes of the
change to be initiated are purely technical requirements that should precede formal
initiating of a strategic organizational change. On the basis of such analysis, which
demands expert buy-in; defining the change type, scope, and outcome which
justifies the use of a specific change model should serve as foundation for the
decision and action of initiating.
6.2.5.5. Designing
Designing is the other technical aspect of change which requires expert buy-in.
Technically-backed initiating serves as a spring board for an effective design of an
organizational change. In a planned organizational change such as the strategic
organizational change in bank A, organizational owners or their agents should define
the future of the organization in the same way as a client who wants to construct a
house expresses her idea to the designer. The designer then converts the idea into
an architectural, structural, electrical etc… components of the design to be
implemented by a contractor. Under normal circumstances, construction
effectiveness is a function of design accuracy and completeness. However, managing
the construction can sometimes demand improvements in the design based on
practical realities on the site. This is the same as what Van de Ven and Sun’s (2011)
reflection refers to in implementing organizational change.
Specifying the future organization that is necessitated by present challenges that
demand the change comes from the previous stage of initiating. These ideas should
now be converted into broader specifications of change. Basically, designing as it
emerged from bank A’s data, requires: (1) defining the future organization in terms
of its components, actors, outcome measures, and follow up and evaluation systems
and technologies that support these systems, (2) specifying the transition which
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includes model specification (adoption or adaptation with specification), designing
organizational systems and structures, designing system performance measurement
and evaluation systems and (3) specifying rollout decisions and actions. Rollout
decisions and actions include checking design completeness, verifying whether
personnel selection is done in consistency with design specifications, ensuring if the
designer-implementer interlock is normal, assessing appropriateness of timing
(avoiding premature implementation) which is explained by aforementioned
conditions, having a complete plan of action which specifies the steps or phases and
orders, and finally specifying how new routines can be turned on and old routines
can be irreversibly abandoned. The specification of the final decision of turning on
new routines marks readiness for implementing the designed change which in turn
requires specifications as presented next.
6.2.5.6. Implementation and Systems
As explained in the previous section, putting in place the new organizational routines
with a support of organizational systems and technologies represents
implementation of strategic organizational change. This is how implementation is
conceived in the present study.
Initiating, which emerged as one of the major events that appeared demanding
careful management especially in connection with its effect on old management
group, required expert buy-in to analyze the decision and recommend actions of
initiating before actual declaration of the organizational change. In the same token,
implementing is full of shocks that demand careful management and hence it should
be preceded by expert buy-in to analyze readiness before actions. The following
paragraphs present sub-themes that collate around implementing as emerged from
bank A’s data.
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6.2.5.6.1. Timing
Timing refers to the assessment of whether or not the organization is ready to start
enacting new routines in place of old ones. In the previous sub-section, specific
aspects of assessing readiness to implement the change were defined being
components of design to be specified. Timing is here assessed based on these same
specifications (i.e., whether or not design is complete, right personnel is put on the
right place, the right technologies are put in place, all human aspects (perceptions,
trust, politics etc…) are taken care of). Affirmative responses to these questions can
be taken as indicators of readiness and hence appropriate timing to take the
strategic change implementation action.
6.2.5.6.2. Deviance tracking
Once the changed organizational routines are enacted to bring about strategic
organizational change, implementation success can be measured through assessing
the match between designed change and implemented actions based on
specifications. To do so, deviance tracking and management systems must be
enacted across all organizational systems. Such systems are formal communication
systems which also serve as channels of getting performance feedback,
measurement, and evaluation. Effective tracking of deviance should also ensure that
all new organizational actors and units have access to or are being accessed by the
communication network. Once this condition is proved to prevail with the support of
experts, the actual tracking of deviance and resultant actions or reflections (Van de
Ven & Sun, 2011) can be carried out.
6.3. Proposed Implementation Model for bank A
Implementation of strategic organizational change requires understanding major
causes of change breakdown (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011), managing major events
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together with resultant shocks, being informed with and keeping track of office
politics and power use (Kotter, 1995) by extant managers, and strong change
leadership (Balogun, 2001; Kotter, 1995) which exploits well developed actor
networks through which effective communication (Mento et al., 2002) takes place.
Moreover, implementing strategic organizational change requires handling technical
aspects which normally benefit from sufficient buy-in of experts. These two groups
(i.e., behavioral & technical) of themes are major extractions of bank A’s data. An
implementation model of strategic organizational change in bank A should therefore
be composed of these themes.
Figure 6.1 is an attempt to portray relations among these five major themes and
their components. As can be inferred from previous discussions, themes emerged
from bank A are interlocked together. These interlock put greater pressure on
change management and hence failure to do so threatens success in change
implementation.
The implementation of strategic organizational change in bank A took place in a
context within which interlocking factors contributed to the unfolding of change in a
certain way. Therefore, the proposed implementation model for strategic
organizational change which was developed being grounded in bank A’s context,
explored these interrelations first (as presented so far) and tried to exploit on them
(elaborated next).
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Figure 6.1.  Relations among the major themes emerged from bank A’s data
Source: Own sketch
As depicted in the figure, implementation of strategic organizational change is
interlocked in cyclically linked relations with prior actions and decisions (i.e., initiating
and designing of the strategic change). Moreover, an effort of enhancing
implementation success needs to be cognizant of causes of breakdowns in order to
design and plan actions that lead implementation into success which cannot be
achieved without proper initiation and designing. Besides, as major causes of
breakdowns are mainly behavioral, management of major events, leadership and
communication over well developed network among major actors cannot be
ignored.
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At the centre of these themes is a flux. Within the flux which finally leads to
organisational change, there are forces that can affect the nature of interlink, the
pattern of change, and eventually the final destination (i.e., actually implemented
change). Figure 6.2 tries to depict the central flux forces by extracting them from
figure 6.1.
Figure 6.2: Central interlocking forces that shape strategic organizational change
implementation
Source: Own sketch
There is a triple helix among initiating, designing, and implementing whereby one
offsets the effectiveness of the other. Therefore, implementation of strategic
organizational change cannot be effective if something went wrong in any one of
the two (i.e., initiating and designing). In other words, effectively implementing
strategic organizational change requires proper execution of initiating and complete
designing of the anticipated change. This requires leadership that regulates the
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offsetting impact of one on the other. As a mechanism, the change leader should
enact actor networking and communication strategies. These concepts have
connections to Balogun’s (2001) and Kotter’s (1995) explications about the role of
change leaders. The cyclic nature is also an account already made by Oakland and
Tanner (2007). However, the specific causes that make these interactions smooth (as
emerged here) are not explicitly addressed in the extant literature.
Behind each of the three in the figure, there are conditions that enhance or impede
smooth interlock among them. Change manager’s role is to ensure nothing among
these conditions is positioned in such a way that it can disturb the desired interlock
among initiating, designing and implementing. The way a change leader handles
them can affect the interlock among the three stages either positively or negatively.
The total impact of the interaction among the three is what determines the nature
and scope of change that results from an initiative as testified by the data gathered
from bank A.
Once an organizational change starts to unfold being shaped by those attributes of
prevailing organizational condition as presented in a wider spectrum in figure 6.1,
and as a result of the interlock among the three in the triple helix depicted by figure
6.2, the organization is set into a continuous flux. The three are interwoven through
an infusion of factors (concepts represented by codes and categories) to cause some
kind of implemented change; once a change starts to unfold it then starts to serve as
a gear that rotates the other two components (initiation and design).
As learnt from the first phase BPR implementation in bank A, the changes that were
actually implemented gave rise to the second initiative (which served as the major
unit of analysis in this study). Then there is designing. This cyclic interaction among
the three continues as far as there is some kind of change even at any scope.
Practically, this is what has been happening and is happening at bank A right now. It
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is expected to continue this way. Therefore, the context within which implementation
of strategic organizational change should be framed (modeled) is proposed to be in
a complex ever changing interaction with initiating and designing together with
corresponding factors’ dynamism and inbuilt flexibility that ensures the emergence
of a changing organization. The lubricant that facilitates smooth move and prevents
the entire change from being stuck is communication.
Figure 6.3 tries to portray the entire organizational context being affected by the flux
that results from the infused impact of the triple helix of implementing strategic
organizational change. As the issue of concern here is implementation of strategic
organizational change, the external environment plays significant role into an
organization’s context. In bank A too, (1) owners (i.e., the government) played key
role in initiating the change, and (2) global trends and management innovations
influenced the choice of organizational design change (when BPR was chosen to be
applied as a tool). Obviously, a change in an organization results in some output to
the external environment. Final proposition of an implementation model for strategic
organizational change is made based on cross-case analyses results. More
discussions that are enfolding the extant literature are made after the cross-case
analyses results are presented.
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6.4. Strategic Organizational Change Implementation in Bank B
Based on data gathered from bank B, strategic organizational change implementation
has connections to several themes. These themes are related to behavioral and
technical aspects of change. In the behavioral side, nature of change triggering forces,
level of top management commitment, and strength of change deterrent reasons
emerged with important impacts on implementation effectiveness of strategic
organizational change in bank B. Moreover, as it is also common in such levels of
change initiatives; technical aspects of initiating, designing and implementing change
also emerged with important contribution towards implementation success.
In this section, more latent themes that emerged from bank B’s data are discussed. In
the next sections, implications of these concepts for a successful strategic change
implementation as per the reality in bank B are dealt with.
6.4.1. Strength of Triggers of Change
In a planned organizational change, the initiative usually has triggering causes. As
emerged from bank B’s data, nature of these triggers determines the acceptance of
the idea of initiating the change on the first place and the degree of top management
commitment once the change is initiated. As indicated in the figure, nonprofit motive,
prevalence of competitive pressure in the market and nature of the customer are
infused to shape this theme. As discussed in the previous chapter, these ideas are
related to the fact that bank B is a private bank. This affects power structure of the
bank and hence bank’s commitment towards implementing strategic organizational
change.
As emerged from bank B’s data, if major stock holders who have strong nonprofit
motive are actively interfering in the bank’s management, the likelihood that the
bank’s top management will be committed towards successfully implementing the
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change would be lower than the condition when there is no such interference. The
other condition which should be taken into consideration is the strength of market
competition in terms of threatening bank’s profitability. As explained in the previous
chapter, profitability and market competitiveness in this context are somehow different
from what is normally known in the field of management. It is very difficult to imagine
that an investor could be interested more in gaining control over bank’s management
than showing concern on profitability. Therefore, as successful implementation of
strategic organizational change normally gives sense when the organizational
condition is favorable with respect to nonprofit motives and market competitiveness.
Achievement of this can benefit the bank and ultimately its stockholders.
Implementation in circumstances such as bank B’s demand assessing the extent to
which business oriented environment is fostered to serve as a strong change trigger.
This idea of assessing business orientation emerges from the fact that major
shareholders in private banks in Ethiopia such as bank B might be tempted to serve
their hidden personal interests under the shadow of banking business. Therefore,
before initiating a change in private banks, the environment has to be examined
carefully to make sure that the interests of all shareholders are related to the banking
business. This requires taking some actions such as those that are discussed in the
upcoming sub-sections.
6.4.1.1. Mitigating Challenges from Nonprofit Motives
Initiating strategic organizational change in the existence of significant nonprofit
motive among major shareholders can hinder successful implementation. Therefore, it
is logical to check the level of such motives through the following ways:
 Scrutinizing composition of owners with an intention to have an insight
about the possibility of dominance as it may serve as a source of power
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to control the bank’s direction and hence realize nonprofit motives at the
expense of the bank’s performance.
 Evaluating the power of the board of directors with respect to passing
decisions right away with no need to have consultations with major
shareholders.
 Assessing the power of top management with respect to making big
decisions within the agreed upon framework of bank directions or
strategies with no need to get blessings from formal members of board
of directors or from major shareholders.
6.4.1.2. Stimulating the Bank to Envision a Future that Stretches
Beyond the National Boundary
This helps overcome the challenges that are connected to lack of competitive pressure
as the domestic banking industry is not saturated yet. If shareholders are motivated to
have aspirations of becoming a globally competent bank in real senses, they would
not focus on the dormancy of the domestic market.  The purpose is to create a feeling
of competitive pressure which possibly triggers the organization towards change. This
will be achieved through the following measures:
 Targeting the bank’s attention towards the global market in order to
help shareholders come out of their comfort zone in the dormant
domestic banking sector. This makes everyone concerned about how the
bank operates, how it should be operating in the future, and what
remedial actions should be taken to bridge the gap between the actual
performance and the envisioned one.
 Ensuring internally driven change initiatives. The ultimate purpose of the
previous measures is to achieve this. One of the major causes of failure in
implementing the initiative in bank B was the fact that the change was
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initially triggered by the government (in a form of technology use) and
augmented by bottom-up-driven strategic organizational change; none
of which represented the interest of the people at the top. To ensure that
the change is a truly internally driven initiative, owners and top
management should be triggered by some factors that necessitate
change. Provided that the above conditions are created, the need for
competitiveness and performance efficiency could trigger an initiative for
a strategic change.
6.4.1.3. Customer Satisfaction
Satisfying customers can also serve as a triggering force towards change. In an
environment where market players are very few compared to the size of the market,
competition obviously is simple. However, even a slight effort towards satisfying
customers irrespective of whether or not competition is strong could force the
organization to sincerely consider the need for organizational change. Therefore, focus
on customer needs will force the bank to alter the way it does business with the
customer. This leads to an authentic initiative for strategic organizational change.
6.4.2. Managing Change Deterrents
The discussions (during in-depth interviews) in bank B were engulfed by failure stories.
The practical causes of these failures were discussed in the previous chapter. Here,
more latent causes that underpin behind these change breakdowns are discussed
being labeled as change deterrents.
6.4.2.1. Managing Impacts of Self-Interest and Office Politics
The prevalence of nonprofit motive among major shareholders and weak competitive
pressure in the market can disrupt successful implementation of strategic
organizational change. Combined, these forces will lead to conflict of interest and
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office politics (backed by power). Therefore, the management of these forces helps to
reverse the conditions from change deterring into change fostering. The most
important mechanism is working towards making the supreme power in the
organization a change sponsor. This converges with the idea of Mento et al. (2002).
6.4.2.2. Bringing Supreme Powers Aboard
This theme has links with the prevalence of change triggering conditions (in the minds
of stockholders). If the interest of shareholders can be generally related to investment
returns from bank’s successful operations, they will demand the management to
ensure this. Bank’s top management will be committed towards implementing
successful strategic organizational change if it is found critical in terms of fulfilling
shareholder interest. In the absence of such condition, top management will give more
attention to what these owners (i.e., important sources of power) demand them to do.
Power use plays a determinant role in such circumstances. How those with possession
of supreme power in the bank (more likely those with the biggest share) use their
power maters where top management focuses on. Therefore, to gain commitment of
the bank and its top management during implementation of strategic organizational
change, those with supreme power should be convinced to come aboard.
6.4.3. Top Management Commitment
The use of power if shaped this way curbs top management’s passive resistance into
commitment. Proper use of power also prevents office politics and self-interest from
deterring change implementation. Commitment of top management towards change
can change the level of implementation success. Top management can give direction
and leadership to a change that is initiated and accepted by the bank’s shareholders
and hence by top management. This condition marks organizational readiness to enter
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more technical aspects and actions of implementing strategic organizational change as
detailed in the next sub-sections.
6.4.4. Initiating
In bank B, technical efforts were started to be exerted when the intention to redesign
the bank’s business processes was initiated bottom-up. The initiating experts had a
burden of persuading those with who have power (in addition to persuading other
organizational members). They were consciously doing it even by taking care of the
potential negative impact of naming the initiative on the receptivity of the bank
community. Despite their effort, they realized latter that the bank’s top management
was not as committed as they expected.
It emerges logical, therefore, to assess the readiness of the bank towards committing
its resources and top management to the initiated change before entering the next
level of designing and implementing the change. At the initiating stage, the
foundation for a successful implementation of strategic organizational change can be
laid through clearing the ground for getting the supreme power aboard.
Consequently, the act of initiating a strategic organizational change could get greater
receptivity from the organizational community.
6.4.5. Designing
Designing should precede the implementation of a strategic organizational change.
For the change to be assessed for implementation success, it is obvious that what is
designed should be compared with what is implemented. Therefore, it is clear to
oversee the logical interdependence between designing and implementing a strategic
organizational change. Moreover design quality has impact on implementation
success.
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In the context of bank B, the design of the anticipated change was the first technical
action taken towards implementing the initiated change. The degree of management
commitment was emerged with its real figure there. The simplest approach to
implement a business process redesigning is to order every organizational unit to
study its own business processes and present the output to a centrally established
group. This was not perceived effective by participants as every organizational unit
normally has no requisite expertise to carry out the task of designing.
As a means of increasing implementation effectiveness, designing the anticipated
change is sought to be complete in terms of specifying the change scope and content
and the process of enacting the new routines in line with the who, where and how of
doing business. All these require expert buy-in to the process of designing. This is
where the bank’s top management commitment in deciding on resources and facilities
that ensure the participation of experts and all concerned parties in the design
becomes important. When implementation is preceded by such kind of designing, it
will become more successful than when it is not.
6.4.6. Implementing Mechanisms
The implementation of the change initiated in bank B was not perceived as successful
by most of the participants. This was also confirmed by a team which was established
to evaluate implementation success. It emerged that lack of success is caused by poor
top management commitment. As the change was declared to be discretionally
designed and implemented by each old functional department and only later did the
management try to adjust organizational structure and deploy personnel thereof,
organizational members were not impressed by the proposed strategic organizational
change. This reduced their commitment to implement the initiated change.
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The other reason observed was absence of a reinforcement mechanism to prevent
organizational members from rejecting the new process and maintaining the old
process (status quo). Such reinforcements could be more effective and objective if
backed by implementation support systems (technologies). Besides, deployment of
such systems will irreversibly replace the old with new organizational routines. Details
on implementation mechanisms that are emerged from bank B’s data are presented in
the upcoming sub-sections.
6.4.6.1. Systems that Ensure Implementation of Organizational Change
These systems should be designed and put in place in a way they prevent deviant
behavior from organizational actors and ultimately ensure implementation of the
anticipated change. The issue of ensuring successful implementation of change has
two major phases. The first one is committing everyone for the change. This could be
achieved as a result of progressive actions that are described in the previous sections.
The second one is the use of regression preventive systems. Strategic organizational
change should be implemented in an irreversible way through the support of such
systems. The achievement of this requires doing the following:
6.4.6.2. Implementation Specifications
These are specific actions that are required to be undertaken to actually implement the
anticipated change. To make the change irreversible, these specifications should be
made integral to the organizational system. Organizational policies, directives, bylaws,
procedures, manuals, and performance standards that are approved by the
appropriate authority and endorsed at relevant organizational unit levels are typical
examples of implementation specifications. Out of these specifications, the job designs
which engender job descriptions and specifications could also be derived.
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6.4.6.3. Performance Measurement and Evaluation
The other important reinforcement mechanism to implement the anticipated change is
to measure and evaluate performance as per specifications. This makes
implementation specifications at the center of implementers’ attention. This could
have prevented the failure in bank B which was witnessed in a form of abandoning
performance standards and not referring back to them.
6.4.6.4. Reward and Benefits System
The next logical component of the organizational system in this regard is to align
benefits and rewards to desired performances based on input from performance
measurement and evaluation as presented above.
6.4.6.5. ICT Supported Systems
Implementation will be cumbersome if not unrealistic in the absence of carefully
designed information and communication systems. In bank B’s departments other
than retail banking operations which is supported by the newly installed core banking
system, implementation was totally out of control. There is no mechanism either to
support or to control implementers. That’s how the absence of ICT supported systems
makes implementation very difficult and time taking to have a record of performance
measures. Besides, it is costly and non-value adding to exert much effort and spend
much time in keeping the record of performance which could otherwise be
automatically generated as performers do their tasks through the support of ICT.
6.5. Interlink among Major Themes from Bank B’s Data
Explanations behind each of these themes are shaped by the codes and categories
discussed in the previous chapter. The analyses of interrelations among major codes
and categories were supported by ATLAS.ti’s network manager. A diagrammatic
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representation is annexed to this report (see annex 13). As depicted by figure 6.4,
implementation of strategic organizational change is interlocked with other themes.
Each them can be described in terms of its attributes which were discussed as major
codes and categories that emerged from bank B’s data.
Figure 6.4: Relations among emergent themes from bank B’s data
Source: Own Sketch
Apart from its technical link with designing, implementation is intermingled with
change deterrents at the centre. In addition, the initiating, designing and
implementing natural process in planned change is disrupted by deterrents. The
change is initiated bottom-up as discussed in Chapter Four. Then it had to get top
management approval. The impact of ownership type and intensity of market
competition were also emerged as important themes in the context of bank B.
The strongest force which plays vital role in smoothing out change deterrents and
facilitating interaction among major actors who, if convinced to collaborate can bring
about strategic organizational change is possession and use of power. The important
261
source of power is company ownership in bank B’s context. Therefore, a strong link
with major shareholders reflects possession of power. The contribution of power is
also addressed by Kotter (1995) and Balogun (2001). Sufficiency of power that is
bestowed to actors with responsibility of leading the change is recognized by these
authors. However, political motives, as identified through the analyses of bank B’s data,
have grounds that are unexpectedly supported by top management and even owners
of the bank. This is because of the unique context of banking sector in Ethiopia.
Context-related contributions of the present research are discussed in more details the
next two chapters.
If this power is conditioned towards successful implementation, management
resistance can be turned into commitment. Through top management commitment,
the human side of the organization will be mobilized towards better efforts to
implement change. After shaping the condition in a way that gears behavior towards
commitment, technical aspects of the change are also needed. These mainly include
the specification of actions to be taken and reinforcement mechanisms tailored
towards this end.
6.6. Proposed Implementation Model based on Bank B’s Data
As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, power use, change deterring
factors, and initiating and designing techniques were emerged to have impact on
implementation success of strategic organizational change in the context of bank B.
The interlock among these major themes is shaped by infused interactions amongst
specific attributes of each theme as discussed so far and indicated in figure 6.5.
The direction towards which organizational power is applied determines how the
initiated strategic organizational change proceeds towards implementation. If applied
in the opposite direction for reasons explained above, power may overwhelm change
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initiators and stop the effort towards implementation. If the opposite is true as
depicted in the figure, it supports and accelerates what change initiators’ act towards
implementing the change. An initial effort exerted to convince supreme power of the
bank about the need for change sets the implementation gear on motion and changes
the entire organizational context which is represented by the outermost moving arrow
encircling everything else in figure 6.5.
In addition to power, the analysis of need for organizational change which is usually
associated with competitive position in the market is recorded in the literature. For
example Kotter’s (1995) first step of establishing a sense of urgency is related to this
notion of competitiveness. Balogun’s (2001) first step is also about analyzing
competitive position. However, the need for change, in the context of bank B, has
latent meanings which require context sensitive interpretations. The context requires
dealing with top management and intervening owners who have motives to be served
prior to serving organizational objectives. The question is how can a change be
implemented successfully while these parties are not committed or even resistant? This
is what makes the context unique. Detail comparative discussions in line with the
literature are given in the next two chapters.
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The analogy of the gear simplifies the whole bulk of ideas that underlie behind the
dynamics of strategic organizational change phenomenon. The proposition that can
be induced about change implementation to be used as an input for the
recommended model can easily be made in connection with this analogy. As it can
be seen in the figure; source of initiation and organization power are major
constructs that explain successful implementation of strategic organizational change
in the context of private commercial banks in Ethiopia.
6.7. Chapter Summary
In this chapter, themes that emerged from within case analyses of each bank’s data
are discussed. In addition to the description of themes, relationships among them
were also explained. On the basis of these explanations of relationships among major
themes, implementation models are proposed for the contexts of each bank. As the
final proposition of an implementation model for strategic organizational change is
to be made based on the result of cross-case analyses of data, the proposed models
have no detailed explanations. The next chapter deals with cross-case analyses and
discusses final themes and their relationships in a way that lays foundation of
theoretical propositions. Based on these propositions, the implementation model for
strategic organizational change that takes the context of commercial banks in
Ethiopia is proposed.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS
7.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the findings from the two case studies are juxtaposed and compared.
The purpose is to explain additional insights in a way which is discussed by
Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003) that could otherwise have been overlooked through
a single case study. For simplicity purpose, the last sets of concepts that emerged
from each case are put side by side as a starting point for the comparative
discussion. The next part deals with the final set of constructs and factors together
with propositions which served as the input for the proposed implementation model
for strategic organizational change.
7.2. Comparison of the final concepts extracted from the two cases’
data
Cross-case comparison was started by looking at the final set of extracted items. As
presented in Chapter Five, through the prolonged iterative process, categories
presented in the following table were extracted from each case to be retained for
further analyses and discussions.
Table 7.1: Comparative presentation of emergent categories from bank A’s and bank B’s
data
No. From Bank A From Bank B
1 Change  model-context match Aligning benefits to changed
behavior
2 Communication Bottom up
3 Conflict of self interest Conflict of interest
4 Deviant implementation Convincing
5 Implementation specifications Customer needs
6 Implementation support system Failure story
7 Office politics Implementation specifications
8 Perception management Lack of common interest
9 Personnel selection Lack of competitive pressure
10 Separation of designers and
implementers
Naming the initiative
11 Skepticism National context
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12 Team relations Non Profit motive
13 Transparency Office politics
14 Understanding Change Model Owner of initiatives
15 Timing Power intervention
16 Resistant management
17 Trigger for change
18 Type of ownership
19 Top management commitment
Source: Own compilation
The above table juxtaposes (Eisenhardt, 1989) the final list of categories which were
retained for further analyses as explained in Chapter Five. Literally, there are only
three categories that are common to each list (see shaded cells). However, a closer
exploration on the similarities and differences resulted in new insights that are
discussed in this chapter.
7.2.1. Similarities
Amongst the final list of items extracted from each case as presented in Table 7.1,
the search for similarities results in three identical categories (see shaded cells). There
are also concepts that are similar but labeled differently. This happened because the
two data sets were analyzed separately in different times. Moreover, during the
analysis, the researcher was open to let any concept to emerge from the data instead
of forcing the data to fit to a prior list of codes as detailed in Chapter Three. Looking
for similarities amongst categories with different labels resulted in additional insights
as presented in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: Links between similar items from bank A’s and bank B’s data
No Bank A Item Corresponding Item from Bank B
1 Understanding change model -
2 Personnel selection -
3 Separation of designers andimplementers Bottom up
4 Conflict of self interest Conflict of interest
5 Perception management Convincing, Naming the initiative
6 Communication Convincing
7 Skepticism Owners of initiatives
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8 Office politics Office politics, Power intervention
9 Deviant implementation Failure story
10 Team relations -
11 Implementation specifications Implementation specifications
12 Change  model-context match Naming the initiative
13 Implementation support system Aligning benefits with changed behavior,
14 Transparency -
Source: Own compilation
As a result of this closer look, categories that represent ideas about (1) those who
participate in initiating change in banks (i.e., employee engagement), (2) about
communication with slightly different intentions (such as convincing, perception
management), (3) about skepticism among different groups (both top-down and
bottom-up directed), (4) about power and politics, (5) about implementation support
and failure related issues, and (6) about the use of a specific change model are found
common.
Comparative analyses on themes that were emerged from the two cases also results
in additional insights. As presented in table 7.3, there were themes that are also
common across both cases.
Table 7.3: Comparison of themes emerged from the two cases
No. Themes from bank A Themes from bank B
1 Major events and shocks Strength of trigger of change
2 Causes of breakdowns:
 Skepticism
 Lack of trust
Change deterrents:
 Self-interest
 Politics
3 Politics and power use Supreme power aboard
4 Leadership, networking and
communication
Top management commitment
5 Change techniques:
 Model validation and
contextualization
 Initiating, designing and
implementing
Initiating
6 Deviance Designing and implementing
techniques
Source: Own compilation
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Juxtaposing the results from the two cases, it can be seen that themes that are
related to (1) causes that lead the initiated change not to deliver as expected (though
they are slightly different across-cases), (2) power uses during change initiation and
associated politics, and (3) leadership, networking and top management
commitment are common across-cases. These themes are related to the behavioral
aspects of change.
The two cases have designing and implementing related themes in common.
However, initiations of the changes were quite different—one is externally imposed
and introduced top-down (bank A) while the other is internally initiated and bottom-
up-driven by taking advantage of an external inducement to introduce technology
(bank B). Because of these differences in initiation, the environments under which
strategic organizational change was implemented in each case were also different
demanding different approaches to implementation. As a result, initiation, (though it
has technical aspects such as model selection (in bank A) and naming the initiative
(in bank B) which requires expert buy-in), is more of a behavioral aspect of change
implementation.
Moreover, as it is depicted in Table 7.3, management of major events and resultant
shocks and the strength of change triggering forces are not common across the two
banks. Change trigger related theme that emerged from bank B is not expected to
be common to the other case (a government owned bank) as it is peculiar to private
sector banks in most of its features. However, a closer look into more latent concepts
behind the differences resulted in new insights as detailed in the upcoming section.
7.2.2. Differences
As presented in Table 7.2, in addition to the four items from bank A that do not
match with those form bank B, (i.e, understanding the change model, personnel
selection, team relations, and transparency), the following table gives others from
bank B that do not match with those of bank A.
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Table 7.4: Items form bank B that are not linked to those from bank A
No. Orphan Items from Bank B Corresponding Category
1 None profit motive Company Ownership
2 Type of ownership Company Ownership
3 Lack of competitive pressure Context
4 Trigger for change Source of initiative, Context
5 Customer needs Context
6 Lack of common interest Company Ownership
7 National context Context
8 Top management commitment Commitment
Source: Own extractions
Going back to Table 7.1, these orphan items of bank B do not match with those in
bank A either literally or when examined from their latent meanings. To clarify the
reasons behind these disjunctions, their corresponding categories which were used
to collate similar codes together during the first cycle coding are indicated in Table
7.4 above.
7.2.3. Why differences?
Here, the question to be addressed is why these items do not have corresponding
items from the other case? Items that do not have matches in the other case are
referred to as orphans (see Table 7.2 and Table 7.4).
From bank A, understanding the change model, personnel selection, team relations,
and transparency were found to be orphans. With respect to understanding the
change model, the reason for the difference was not because this concept is not valid
to the context of bank B. While bank A openly declared to use BPR, bank B chose not
to use the name and instead to refer to the initiative as process redesigning. Because
of this, the issue of using a model was nonexistent in bank B and hence the category
which emerged from bank A found orphan.
In bank B, the change was initiated for the first time. Perhaps, the next move in this
bank too will be to restart the initiative with a better understanding of the change as
this first attempt is a failed experience. The approach bank B is handling its initiative
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is very much similar to bank A’s failed initiative. Nevertheless, understanding the
change model is still valid for bank B’s context despite the attention it was given.
As the two banks approached their designing task differently, the issue of team
relations did not appear common to both. Besides, in the case of bank B, designing
teams had been established in all departments. That means there was equal
treatment for team members. Each handled their task in the same way without
discriminatory treatments by top management. As a result, there was no need for
team interaction and there was no significant team related event to capture the
attention of study participants from bank B.
In bank A, however, teams played significant role. Besides, there was a division as
core process teams and support process teams. Members of the second group
perceived the way management treated the teams as discriminatory. The issue was
so hot even during the interview time. This affects the relation across teams; and
ultimately negatively affects team performance. In the worst case, there was a
support process team that stopped its operation before the completion of the
process design document.
This indicates how team relation affects implementation of the change. The solution
is to try to gauge the perception of participant parties among each other and make
every possible effort to make the interaction smooth and healthy. Even if this theme
did not emerge vividly in bank B, it is still valid for any change initiative. More
important than not, team relations (interactions) was retained to serve as an input for
the developed model.
Personnel selection and transparency are also very important categories in bank A’s
context but not emerged from bank B. This again does not indicate that these issues
are not relevant for change implementation; rather, it shows the difference in the
depth of implementing the initiated strategic organizational changes in the banks.
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There were also orphans in bank B. As presented in the third column of the above
table (table 7.4), the orphan items from bank B were categorized into ownership,
context and commitment. These three categories made it easier to understand the
reason behind the emergence of these orphans.
Having no correspondence between ownership related items is expected as the two
cases have different type of ownership. The other area of difference is context.
Context is a category emerged from bank B’s data. It has four components namely
(1) trigger for change, (2) lack of competitive pressure, (3) national context, and (4)
no compelling reason for change.
Except national context, the rest three cannot be common for the two cases. These
variations are expected across private and government-owned banks. The reason is
again related to ownership structure. Therefore, these differences are also normal.
The implication is the reason behind initiating a change in private banks is different
from that in government banks.
As clearly emerged from the data, government banks initiate changes following
government’s direction to do so. Despite the effectiveness question, it is not seen if
government bodies do not care for the profitability of the bank as far as their blotted
out interests are served.  In contrary, there are some private owners who are
interested in advancing their personal interest even compromising the bank’s
profitability. Therefore the soundness of the reasons for initiating a change must be
compelling to all shareholders including those with covert interest. Besides, the
motivation to serve customer needs will be affected depending on the degree of
subordination of individual owner’s personal interest to organizational interest.
But why is there a difference in the level of significance of the concept that is labeled
as national context? The reason might go to the fact that the market competition is
not fair across government and private banks. The national environment is more
favorable to government owned banks due to government’s directives. Therefore,
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the impact of national context is not equally important to both banks. The expected
outcome will be forcing private banks to come out of their comfort zone and search
for new ways of winning customers. This has positive impact on implementation of
change as owners and other stakeholders will be more committed.
The third category of different concepts is commitment. Lack of compelling reason
and top management’s level of commitment are mentioned here. The reason for the
difference with respect to no compelling reason is already dealt with. What’s left is
top management’s commitment. In both cases, top management commitment was a
problem. The difference lies on the extent of power that confronted less committed
management members. In the case of bank B, owners were not interested in the
change; therefore, no one cared whether a management member is committed for
the change or not. The very reason for this was the source of the initiative. In bank A
on the other hand, the change was initiated top-down. Therefore, the strength of top
management resistance obviously differs depending on whether the initiative came
top-down or bottom-up. This contributed for the difference in the pervasiveness of
the proposition made about source of initiative and hence commitment.
7.3. Cross-Case Themes Taken Forward
As a result of cross-case comparisons of major categories and themes in the previous
sections, issues that stand valid taking the contextual differences across the two
cases into account are presented hereunder.
Table 7.5: Cross-case themes that emerged from cross-case analyses of the two banks
No. Common Codes/Categories Corresponding Common Themes
1  Nonprofit motive
 Market competitive pressure
 Customer
Strength of change triggering forces
2  Employee selection
 Initiation Major events and shocks
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3  Employee involvement
 Persuasive communication
 Perception management
Ownership of initiative
4  Skepticism, lack of trust
 Self-interest, politics Causes of Breakdowns/Deterrents
5 -- Power use and politics/Supreme
power aboard
6 -- Leadership, actor networking and
communication
7  Model validation and
contextualization and naming
 Designing and implementing
 Specifications
 Completeness
Technical aspects of change
8  Implementation support system
 Deviance tracking
 Action/reflection
 Top management commitment
Deviance
Source: Own compilation
As summarized in the above table, major themes (see the third column) which are
identified as a result of the cross-case analysis are defined. These themes (except the
fifth and sixth) also have sub themes as indicated in the second column. It was
attempted to make this final set of themes comprehensive to capture important
issues that have authentic meanings across-cases. This was done so by going one
step back to the categories that were presented in Chapter Five and selecting those
which have common meanings across-cases. A brief description of the major ideas
represented by each theme is given in the upcoming sub-sections.
7.3.1. Strength of Change Triggering Forces
Planned changes are usually triggered by some forces (Oakland & Tanner, 2007).
However, in the case of Ethiopian commercial banking sector, the strength by which
these forces are perceived plays an important role in triggering the change. Because
of these contextual differences, the commonly known reasons for change (e.g. those
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identified by Oakland & Tanner, 2007) were found to be relatively weak to trigger a
strong need for change. This indicates that if commercial banks are operating in a
condition where important stakeholders do not feel (i.e., perceive) a critical need for
a strategic organizational change, change triggering factors do not hold true.
Weak market competitive pressure, which does not make profitability a challenge,
plays an important role behind this in the case of private banks. In the context of
government banks, agency problem contributes for this. Moreover, especially in
private banks nonprofit motive makes it difficult to persuade major organizational
actors (e.g. major stockholders, top management) about the need for a strategic
organizational change. Though the degree may be different, in the context of
government owned commercial bank too, making the top management a sponsor to
an initiated strategic organizational change was found being very difficult. The
question is how a strategic organizational change can be successfully implemented
taking the strength of change triggering forces into account.
Therefore, for the context of Ethiopian commercial banking, persuading those who
have significant impact on the success of strategic organizational change or
assessing if there is sufficient support for strategic organizational change emerged a
critical component of addressing the issue of implementation success. It appears that
the degree to which a need for a strategic organizational change is perceived by
major organizational actors who, if convinced, could have the potential of initiating
and/or executing strategic organizational change determines the strength of triggers
for change.
The purpose of assessing strength of triggers for change in a context of a specific
bank is to gain an insight into the likelihood of getting sufficient buy-in from top
management of banks and other important powers (especially share holders in the
case of private banks and relevant government officials in the case of government
owned banks). If perceived necessity for initiating a strategic organizational change
in a bank is low, successful implementation of change requires inducing additional
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efforts to share the change vision (as Kotter, 1995 recommended) with these parties.
The difference here is the fact that the targets of these additional efforts are top
management groups and major stockholders which is not the case in other contexts
where businesses have to win market competition to be profitable.
In this context, customers and their growing needs are considered as mechanisms of
moderating the situations which reduce strength of perceived need for strategic
organizational change. Even though market competitive pressure is weak and there is
high nonprofit motive among major stockholders, focus on local and global
customers and on volume of profit earned by other players in the domestic market
can be a justification for private banks while government’s reform efforts are already
serving as triggering  forces to introduce a strategic change. Besides, focusing the
attention of Ethiopia’s commercial banks on international banking practices as a
mechanism of enhancing each bank’s readiness for competing with international
banks following a possible deregulation of the sector (provided that the country is
under WTO accession) can strengthen perceived trigger for change.
7.3.2. Managing Major Events and Resultant Shocks
During strategic organizational change, major events that result in shock to the
status quo can affect implementation. There is a possibility for these events to
become shocks if they are negatively perceived by key organizational stakeholders.
Therefore, these events need to be considered in advance and planned carefully in
order to minimize or avoid their negative impact on successful implementation of
strategic organizational change.
These themes mainly emerged from analysis of bank A’s data. However, they are
taken forward because even though bank B’s participants did not reveal challenges
emanating from such events, their importance is naturally pervasive. Therefore, they
are assumed to make sense across both banks.
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As detailed in the previous two chapters, especially initiation of the change and
selection of personnel were threatening to the status quo in bank A and hence
captured the attention of most  management members and employees (at least as
described by study participants). These shock events lead to behaviors that are most
probably not supportive to the initiated change. Resistance to the initiated change
was witnessed in bank A for example.
The event of initiating the strategic organizational change faced challenges because
of the fact that the initiated changes were not perceived positively by organizational
members including top management. The immediate reason for this perception was
the absence of feeling of ownership to the initiated change. In the case of bank A,
top management was even skeptic about the purpose of the change. This condition
made initiation a source of speculations between those who feel no sense of
ownership to the initiative and those who act as change agents. The same was true in
bank B too. As the change was initiated bottom-up, the management group did not
appear to have ownership to the initiated change.
Employee selection and assignment to the newly created job positions was emerged
as the other major event that resulted in shocks. Though it was not as important for
bank B’s participants as it was for those of bank A, employee selection and
assignment to newly created job positions following a strategic organizational
change is assumed to be a common practice. With this assumption, employee
selection is also considered as one of the major events that demand change leader’s
attention to create conducive environment for implementation.
Taking these two examples of major events that can provoke undesirable behavior in
the side of change recipients, it is imperative to see what could be the possible
mechanism of managing such events so that they could not deter implementation of
strategic organizational change. Prior identification of such events and
corresponding preventive mechanisms (i.e., management mechanisms) is important.
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Therefore, devising a strategy of preventing shocks should be noted as an issue
which is sensitive to each organization’s context. Communication, actor networking
and leadership were emerged as other big themes and mechanisms that can reduce
the impact of unfavorable behavioral reactions. This issue builds on Balogun’s (2001)
recommendation of identifying causes of barriers to change as a mechanism of
enhancing implementation success.
Such reactions usually start with active or passive resistance to what change agents
demand from those who feel they do not have ownership to the initiated change.
The ideal strategy of initiating should therefore target getting  everyone feel involved
in the process, making clear the consequences of the initiative, and showing how the
initiative does not target anyone’s interest. This theme brought the notion of
resistant manager into the literature adding to what Burnes (2015) explain about
source of change resistance.
7.3.3. Ownership of Initiative
Initiating as one of the major events during strategic organizational change turns to
be a shock to the status quo if not properly managed. The most important
component of this theme that serves as an important factor which affects
implementation of strategic organizational change is the feeling organizational
members have about the owner (or source) of the initiative. Ownership of the
initiative matters more especially when there is no trust between the perceived
owners and non-owners of the initiative. In such situations, non-owners suspect
owners of using the initiation as means of attacking non-owners’ interests. This is a
sufficient ground for a fierce resistance to the initiated change to engulf the
organization.
What should the change agent do to succeed in implementing the strategic
organizational change then? Employee involvement, persuasive communication and
perception management were emerged as sub-themes as a result of cross-case
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analyses. If effective, involving the majority of employees in different ways during the
change initiative helps each employee to understand the purpose of the initiative
and possible consequences thereof. Prior information about the need for the
initiative and persuasion of major organizational actors also helps to avoid shock
following initiating as an event. Perception is an individual behavioral process which
does not necessarily need fact-based justification. However, exposing the individual
to various attributes of the initiated change will gradually shape and ultimately
change the perception including that which is relates to ownership of the initiative.
Mento et al. (2002) addressed the need to get sufficient buy-ins from different
stakeholders. These authors recommend creating and cultivating sponsors for the
change, making target audiences recipients of change, through strategically and
continuously communicating the change as mechanisms of overcoming these
problems. This is also a major step in Kotter’s (1995, 2007) model. However, they did
not explain the needs to do these by substantiating the reasons which are discussed
here. This indicates how a closely examined context reveals new insights.
7.3.4. Causes of Change Breakdowns/Deterrents
Level of effectiveness of strategic organizational change implementation varies
depending on how completely the anticipated components of the change were
turned into action or the extent to which outcomes of the stipulated change has
been achieved. If anticipated changes happen to serve much less than a newly
emerged idea being implemented (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011), specific causes of such
failure (that are referred to as causes of change breakdown or deterrents of change)
need to be scrutinized.
The importance of indentifying barriers (Balogun, 2001) or change breakdowns (Van
de Ven & Sun, 2011) are valid in the case of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia.
However, the causes of breakdown are different from what Van de Ven and Sun
(2011) identified. In the studied context, in addition to lack of trust and skepticism (as
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discussed in the previous sub-section), office politics and self-interest were major
sources of change breakdown in both cases. These causes are new reasons which can
be added to the body of knowledge in organizational change implementation.
7.3.5. Supreme Power Aboard
Power use and politics are conceptually inseparable as there is no office politics
without the use of power. In this case too, it is better to note the two possible uses of
power—one which is meant for organizational causes and the other which is for
personal interests. The second type of use is a misuse of power. Office politics is
sponsored by such type of misused power that intentionally manipulates the
organization and serves personal or group interests mostly at the expense of
organizational interest. This concept refers to office politics. In the two cases of the
present study, it acted against the implementation of the initiated changes. What can
the change agent do to remain effective in implementing strategic organizational
change in the face of organizational circumstances that are under challenge by office
politics and self-interests?
Bringing supreme power aboard! However, it is much challenging than said in the
specific contexts of the present study. Top management group is among those with
significant power possession in organizations. But, if top management is among
those who resist the initiated change, how can implementation of strategic
organizational change be successful by overcoming change deterrents? This is why
the term supreme is used here. If those who are supreme powers in the context of
the changing organization are not aboard, and if management is among the resistant
group; implementing the change will be an unsuccessful trial.
More important than the efforts to bring about change related actions into practice,
change agents’ success in bringing supreme power aboard determines
implementation effectiveness. If the support of those who have power is not
satisfactory, any effort exerted before getting the supreme power aboard will turn to
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be a waste. This in turn indicates the importance of readiness which is discussed in
later sections of this report.
In the literature (e.g. Mento et al., 2002; Kotter, 1995; Balogun, 2001; Oakland &
Tanner, 2007), empowering those who will guide (lead the change) is recorded in a
straight forward sense. In the case of the present study, however, conditions that
made empowerment relevant are linked to the specific contextual features of
commercial banks in Ethiopia such as the existence of nonprofit motives, market
competitive pressure, and supreme power’s support.
7.3.6. Leadership: Actor Networking and Communication
These themes (as described in the previous chapter) are interlocked together. Backed
with all conditions that are described in the previous sub-sections, leadership, actor
networking and communication play decisive role in creating conducive environment
to implement strategic organizational change.  All the issues described in the
previous sub-sections (i.e., sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.5) need to be integrated and geared
towards the direction successful implementation of strategic organizational change
requires them to be. This is where leadership plays. In the broader theme of
leadership, actor networking and communication are explicit to emphasize their
importance for change leadership.
Behind the explanations of the previous sub-sections, there are major actors playing
some role. Leadership should influence the behavior of these actors so that they can
contribute towards implementation. This, as emerged from the empirical data, can be
achieved through building a strong network of actors. They can communicate and
coordinate their efforts towards realizing a successful change through this network.
Building such networks can make the interaction among these actors smooth. This is
a required condition that must prevail in a changing organization before the
technical tasks of implementing a strategic organizational change can be enacted.
Actions and interactions among actors are what can bring strategic organizational
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change into a reality. The network built by the change leader serves as an action-
interaction chain.
As the action-interaction chain is assumed to play an important role to define the
common interest and brig about commitment by overcoming the challenges of
change deterrents, the leader should evaluate issues that are represented by
emerged themes so far and examine their implications to the actions and
interactions. The health of the action-interaction chain is dependent on the level of
influence the leader puts on change deterrents.
Depending on the degree of involvement of teams or groups as major actors during
the change initiative, the importance of the chain varies across-cases. To be specific,
while action-interaction chain appeared more relevant to bank A (where there were
several teams involved), the involvement of supreme power appeared rather more
important than the chain in the context of bank B (where there were lesser team
involvements).
Team intensive involvements in bank A made the actions to be far from the grass
root and hence resulted in weaker perception of ownership to the initiated change.
This made the issue of who did what so hot in bank A and it resulted in a need to
make things through carefully designed networks of actors. On the other side, the
level of commitment towards implementing the change in bank B has been highly
dependent on the degree of support from those with real power. Possessors of the
highest power in the bank’s context, which are labeled as ‘supreme powers’, need to
play leadership role to make the implementation of strategic organizational change
effective. That is why major themes that emerged from bank B’s data are collated
around power.
7.3.7. Technical Aspects of Change
So far, the focus of the discussion was on the soft which is behavioral side of
organizational change. Implementation of strategic organizational change also
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requires taking actions that are carefully designed and articulated. These actions
bring actual changes to an organization. However, for these actions to be effective,
all what were discussed previously are important requirements.
Technical aspects have groups of themes collated under them. In addition to
initiating which is already described, model validation and  contextualization (which
includes naming), designing the anticipated strategic organizational change,
determining implementation specifications and performance outcomes of change
are in the first group of technical aspects of change. The more specific and complete
these technical aspects the easier the implementation action.
The second group of technical aspects deals with post-implementation monitoring
and evaluation activities. The intent is to propose a remedy for or accept as it
emerged when implementation is different from the designed contents of strategic
organizational change. The action or reflection concept (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011) is
pervasive throughout these tasks of implementation.
7.3.7.1. Change Model Validation and Contextualization
In the context of planned approach to change, the use of a model is common. In the
present study, the two cases were oriented by a change model (one was explicit in
naming the initiative as BPR while the other did not prefer to name it this way as
discussed before). The issue about what tool (which is referred to as change model)
is fit to the context on hand needs validation before deciding to use a model (such as
BPR in this case).
A second concern is to what extent does the change model fit to the specific
organization’s specific change needs. An attempt to address this issue could lead to
discovery of a need to contextualize (modify) some features of the change model so
that the mismatch between the model and the context will be ruled out. This second
issue overlaps with the designing task. The practice, thought the specific reason
differs, is also acknowledged by Balogun (2001) as choice of change design.
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7.3.7.2. Designing and implementing
Designing the specific features of the organization which initiated strategic
organizational change is the other technical task that has to be done before
implementation. In connection with designing, completeness of the design and
adequate specifications emerged as salient and important concepts as discussed so
far.
Successful implementation of strategic organizational change needs to be guided by
complete and specific design. In the absence of such design, it will be difficult to
keep track of implementation and detect deviance on the basis of which to take
corrective action or to modify design. Implementation needs to be monitored and
evaluated based on what is specified in the design.
7.3.7.3. Implementation Deviance and Tracking
Deviance refers to the implementation of change related decisions or actions that
deviate from the design. As the intention of the present study is to propose a model
that serves as a guideline to implement strategic organizational change, monitoring
deviant behavior based on complete and specific design is an important theme to
focus on.
Implementation success requires putting in place deviance tracking system. In the
absence of such system, change agents will be overwhelmed by too much detail that
is needed to keep track of and to analyze. Therefore, implementation needs to be
supported by a system which is referred to as implementation support system. This
system, especially when supported by information and communication technology
(ICT), makes deviance tracking an easy task and helps change agents to act or reflect.
7.4. Final Propositions
Cross-case themes presented in section 7.3 should be conceived appropriately in
order to proceed to the discussion of the implementation model for strategic
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organizational change developed by the present study. To help this
conceptualization easier, the interlock among the major themes and sub-themes
described so far is portrayed diagrammatically (see Figure 7.1).
Figure 7.1: Interlock among major cross-case themes
Source: Own Sketch
As depicted in the figure above, a strategic organizational change can be triggered
by forces that may come from (1) market competitive pressure, (2) the government
or from (3) customer needs. Or, in the case of an organization that is undertaking
some sort of strategic change, feedback on implementation can also serve as a
trigger for initiating change.
For the trigger to gain strong perceived importance, defining the need for change
and making it a common interest for all relevant stakeholders through proper
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communication is required. This creates fertile ground for the start of an endeavor to
implement a strategic organizational change. This is what a change leader does (see
the centre of figure 7.1).
Successful execution of anticipated organizational change also needs detail (i.e.,
specific) and complete design on the bases of which to enact change related tasks
and routines. Implementation also needs technology supported systems.
As a mechanism of ensuring successful interaction among actors who initiate, design
and implement strategic organizational change; leadership that exploits on
networking and communication is required. Leadership targets are not only ensuring
successful implementation but also overcoming challenges from change deterrents.
For this, circumstances often require bringing supreme powers on board. Finally, the
implemented change needs to be tracked for possible deviations from designed
specifications. Replacing the old status quo with new routines often becomes
effective when the new routines are backed by automated systems. The application
of such systems also supports performance tracking and results in easier control.
In the upcoming paragraphs, propositions that are made about what contributes
towards successful implementation of strategic organizational change are presented.
For ease of understanding, these propositions are organized with the help of a triple
helix of initiating, designing and implementing (see the triangle in fig. 7.1); and
linking them with power, leadership, networking and communication with respect to
explaining the intricacies among the triple helix while protecting them from
deterrents.
7.4.1. Initiating
Initiating, in this study, refers to the act of introducing (or declaring) an
organization’s plan to undertake a strategic organizational change. Before and after
the actual task of initiating, there are issues that deserve the attention of change
leaders in order to make the entire initiative successful. Therefore, initiating should
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be analyzed with respect to important issues before, during, and after the act of
declaring the change as detailed in the upcoming sub-sections.
7.4.1.1. Pre-initiating Considerations
At this stage, foundation for smooth action-interaction chain is laid. It starts first by
recognizing the need for change through examining internal and external triggers.
This recognized need should then be converted into a persuasive message to
different actors whose buy-in is required for the smooth execution of the initiative.
Besides, pre-initiating stage should also identify potential confrontations from
different individuals or groups who could perceive the initiative from a perspective
that threatens their interest which is protected by the status quo. Such perceptions, if
not anticipated in advance and mitigated, will lay the foundation for deterrents. A
proactive measure is preparing messages with an intention to address these
perceptions and ensure sufficient buy-ins from potential actors.
The outcome of successfully initiating strategic organizational change should be
ensuring sufficient buy-ins from major actors including (1) owners (or board of
directors), (2) top management, (3) employees, and (4) change agents. This is where
the leadership of change initiatives starts.
As indicated in Figure 7.1, (1) source of initiative, (2) involvement, (3) transparency, (4)
selection and (5) naming of a model (if any) are attributes that emerged from data in
connection with pre-initiating preparations. In addition, triggers are related to this
theme. The change leader should examine the specific context of the organization in
terms of these attributes and components on the basis of which to decide on pre-
initiating aspects. That means, initiation should be conditioned to the specific context
of the initiating bank. Strength of trigger, source of initiative, and name (label) of the
initiative are discussed hereunder.
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7.4.1.1.1. Justifying triggers’ strength
Strength of triggers is one of the conditions that set pre-initiating context. While
there are some who need to be convinced about the need for change for genuine
concerns, there are also others with motives that make them either reluctant or
resistant to the initiative. Pre-initiative preparations should anticipate possibilities of
both types of parties and design the initiating message accordingly. Based on these
assumptions, for this pre-initiating stage, the following can be proposed:
Proposition 1a: Initiating can be more effective if backed by strong perceived triggers
that are sufficiently justified to persuade those with genuine concerns
about the need for change.
This proposition has two important messages—(1) triggering forces must be justified
and (2) justification works for those who have genuine concern. The first one
converges with what Van de Ven and Sun (2011) discusses; while the second one is
peculiar to the context and hence it is a new insight. By referring to genuinely
concerned parties, the first proposition implies the existence of others who for some
reason need pretexts to denounce the need for the change. An anticipation of such
parties could lead to the following propositions:
Proposition 1b: For parties who have motives other than genuine organizational
concerns, justifying what necessitates the change is less effective than
designing an initiating message (strategy) which ensures supreme
power’s buy-in.
Better success can result from proactively ensuring the engagement of those with
power instead of reacting to the behavior of those with private motives. This is a
solution in such circumstances because it requires dealing with parties who posses
power or who have affiliations to those with power.
In the specific cases of the present study, the issue of private and usually nonprofit
motives appears more authentic in the context of private banks. In the case of the
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government bank, initiating lacked transparency at least as perceived by old
management group who felt threatened by the initiative. Besides, lack of competitive
pressure in the banking industry makes the task of justifying the need for change
very difficult.
In general, assessing the condition under which change is initiated and tackling
challenges of successfully implementing strategic organizational change require
understanding the following:
o If there is a nonprofit motive that is strong to the extent it controls
organizational power, it is not time to initiate change.
o If business performance related pressure that is triggering change is
not significantly perceived because of shortsightedness (e.g., present
profitability), formal initiation should be preceded by creating
awareness and aligning the initiative with the pressure.
o If there is no competitive pressure to trigger the change, it is not time
to initiate a change unless the span of competition is widened and
owners or their representatives accepted organizational change as their
agenda.
o If the reason for initiating the change is not aligned to the interest of
any of the three aforementioned parties (i.e., owners, management and
workers), implementing the change will suffer from lack of
commitment.
The central idea behind the above explanations is how aligned the change initiative is
to the interest of the owners, the management and the workforce of banks. The
supremacy of competing self-interest detracts the level of commitment for the
initiated change. Therefore, the strength of such interest should be examined using
the above indicating conditions (measures). This leads to the next proposition:
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Proposition 1c: Nonprofit motives of owners who serve their private interest under
the umbrella of a commercial banking business lead to lesser
support and commitment towards an initiated strategic
organizational change.
The other factor that affects the degree of alignment of bank owners’ interest to the
performance of the bank is the existence of competitive pressure posed by
competitor banks in the market. The absence of this pressure obviously tempts
owners to focus on short term benefits (dividends) instead of strategic investments
that may necessitate strategic change. Therefore, the following proposition is made:
Proposition 1d: The extent to which market competitiveness affects profitability
determines the degree of acceptance of initiated strategic
organizational changes.
The source of initiative has also impact on the effectiveness of initiation as described
in the next sub-section. This idea affects sense of ownership to the initiated change.
7.4.1.1.2. Source (origin) of initiative
Source (origin) of initiative refers to the party who takes the action of initiating. As a
result of this action, this party will be perceived by the other majority (usually
referred to as change recipient) as originator or source of the initiative. This notion
has implication for implementation success. More explicitly speaking, reactions to an
initiated change usually emanate from non-initiators. Therefore, influencing
organizational behavior during change initiatives requires understanding initiator-
reactor interface.
If origin of initiating is distant from top management of the organization in which the
change is initiated, formal introduction of the initiative should be preceded by
convincing the top management about the importance of the change. This
explanation is emerged from the experience of bottom-up driven change that was
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initiated by experts in one of the cases. In addition, there existed a distance in the
case of the initiative that was externally driven by the government.
As a result, the following are explained:
o Externally driven initiative (e.g., by the government) cannot be
successful unless there is an effort to make it a shared interest amongst
owners, management and employees or there is an effective
reinforcement mechanism.
o If the initiative is emerged bottom-up, it will not be successful unless
the people at the top (board of directors and top management) accept
it and make it their own agenda.
Therefore, the initiator should manage to make the initiative a common agenda to
all. The issue is about creating a sense of ownership to the initiated change; and
timing is a critical issue. It is better to take this effort before a clear initiator-reactor
demarcation starts to be perceived. This perception affects the degree of sense of
ownership to the initiated change.
Proposition 2a: The degree to which the need for change is shared among owners,
management and the workforce of a specific bank at a specific time
is affected by who initiated the change.
To make the demarcation between who originated the idea and who did not (i.e.,
initiator-reactor demarcation) blurred and get wider base of actor buy-in, pre-
initiating stage should include analysis of how to get sufficient involvement of others
so they will develop a sense of ownership to the initiative. Involvement alone does
not bring this result; there must be sufficient transparency in the process. Therefore,
the following proposition is made:
Proposition 2b: Involving sufficient number of others who do not originate the idea
in a sufficiently transparent process while at the same time striving
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to blur the demarcation between the two (i.e., initiator-reactor)
enhances a sense of ownership to the initiative.
There are also other reasons that affect the perception of organizational actors which
need to be taken care of at the pre-initiating stage. As emerged from cases of the
present study, the use of a change tool (BPR) in this case needs careful
communication.
7.4.1.1.3. Selection and naming a change model
If the trigger for change is justified in connection with the use of a carefully selected
tool (i.e., change model), how it should be communicated during initiating makes it
part of the pre-initiating preparations. As the use of such tools usually have track
records within and outside the initiating organization, positioning them may
sometimes require to think over labeling the initiative. In the present study’s case,
the private bank, as a late adopter (in the context of the banking sector in Ethiopia),
it preferred not to use the name BPR as the prior experience of government
organizations including the other case bank is perceived to have negative
connotations.
Therefore, the selection and use of a certain tool (or change model) should not only
serve the change need of the organization but also its implications to perceptions of
organizational members should be managed. In doing so, naming plays an important
role. The following proposition was generated from these explanations:
Proposition 3: Selection of a change model determines not only the effectiveness of
the organization in terms of addressing anticipated (needed) changes
but also the perception of organizational actors and hence their
reaction to the initiative.
Balogun (2001) extensively addressed the issue of analyzing organizational context as
a prerequisite to make strategic change design choice. The aforementioned
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proposition builds on this and extends on additional factors that determine selection
of change model (i.e., design choice) as discussed so far.
7.4.1.2. Post-initiating Considerations
Initiating also requires assessing ex post facto as the pre-initiating things discussed
so far are no guarantee to avoid misunderstanding and to blur initiator-reactor
demarcation. Pre-initiative efforts definitely reduce negative reaction from non-
initiating group. However, it is not expected to achieve no resistance or any other
negative reaction. Therefore, after the initiative is declared formally to organizational
members, their reactions should be monitored and evaluated in order to devise a
strategy which increases implementation success.
7.4.2. Deterrents of Implementing Strategic Organizational Change
Deterrents of implementing strategic organizational change or causes of change
breakdown are other important issues which have implications on implementation of
strategic organizational change. As indicated in Figure 7.1, office politics, conflict of
self interest with organizational interest, lack of trust, and type of bank ownership are
major causes of change breakdown. These causes are interlocked each other. Based
on this, they are categorized into two groups as described below:
7.4.2.1. Type of Ownership, Conflict of Self-interest and Office Politics
Depending on the type of ownership, each case bank revealed different owner
behavior which does not create favorable condition for implementing organizational
change. However, ownership appeared as a stronger issue in the case of the private
bank compared to that of the government owned bank. As explained in several
sections of this report so far, there were nonprofit motives which were shared by
several study participants from bank B. These motives are peculiar to each individual
shareholder. This created a condition whereby such types of shareholders strive to
gain control over the management of the bank in order to get their personal interest
served at the expense of bank’s interest. These interventions made top management
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less concerned and committed to the initiated change and more loyal to those
shareholders as means of ensuring longer tenure at the top management position.
Intentions of serving self-interest can only be turned into action when they are
backed by power holders. As personal interests naturally lead to competition with
those who have similar personal interests or with others who have intention of
protecting bank’s interests; this situation is a fertile ground for office politics. Office
politics among different interest groups leads to change breakdown.
In the case of government owned banks, government authorities (as owners of the
bank) have interests of political programs getting served by the bank. Such interests
were reflected by intentions of assigning personnel who are expected to be loyal to
such political programs at the expense of bank’s demand to assign best personnel
based on merit. This was why personnel selection was one of the major events which
resulted in shocks in bank A. They were complaining (at least based on perception)
about government’s intervention to train political programs and select personnel
based on inclinations towards those programs. These, were not recommended by
designer teams as criteria of selecting and assigning personnel on the newly created
job positions following BPR. An assignment of personnel who is not fit to a position
as demanded by designed strategic organizational change results in implementation
failure.
7.4.2.2. Perception, Skepticism and Lack of Trust
These groups of causes of breakdowns are related to behaviors of non-owners
during change initiatives. These groups include managers and employees. When
either a manager or an employee has perception of change related decisions or
actions that lead to skepticism, it will erode trust. Lack of trust negatively affects the
action-interaction chain and hence leads to change breakdown.
As a mechanism of shaping perception of organizational members in a way they
develop trust in those who are acting as change agents, pre-initiating efforts of
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involving several organizational actors was discussed earlier. In addition, perception
management can also be appropriate throughout the change initiative especially
prior to and following major events such as employee selection. This can be achieved
through strong leadership and networking of different actors in addition to
transparency.
7.4.3. Leadership, Power, Networking and Communication
Thus far, behavioral aspects of change were presented. These were areas that
demand change leadership. As a tool, the change leader can build networks amongst
major actors. These actors can then communicate and collaborate. This results in
integrated actions during implementation of strategic organizational change.
7.4.3.1. Change Leadership
Leadership of change plays an important role in directing actors who have role in
implementing strategic organizational change towards the organization’s strategic
direction. An initiative which changes an organization towards an envisioned
direction is what differentiates a strategic change from the rest. Therefore, a change
leader is an important actor during strategic organizational change. Without a
change leader who shows directions and influences behavior of change agents, it is
difficult to make a strategic organizational change implementation successful.
Leadership plays at the center of everything else as depicted in Figure 7.1.
In the next sub-sections, tools that are required by a change leader are discussed.
These tools are the means through which the change leader acts and influences
behavior of organizational actors towards anticipated strategic organizational
change.
7.4.3.2. Power
A change leader can have influence over change related behavior in the organization
during the transition period if backed by sufficient power. Power represents the
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capacity to decide on required resources, tools and approaches to initiate and
implement a strategic organizational change in commercial banks. The rationale to
engender this notion in the final list of propositions is related to the fact that the
success of implementation has connections with the degree of involvement of those
with power. Sufficiency of power sometimes requires the engagement of the highest
power (supreme power) in the tasks of initiating and implementing strategic
organizational change. It increases the likelihood for the success of implementation.
If the change leader has supremacy in power over those who probably can react
against the desired change behavior, it will be easier to influence and lead everyone
in the organization towards the change.
Major shareholders represent the real source of power in private banks while
government officials do possess the controlling power of government banks through
their board of directors. The degree to which the board of directors is committed
towards the realization of the change affects the top management’s and other
organizational members’ commitment towards the change. Therefore, to enhance
implementation success, the following are required to bring supreme power aboard:
 The change must be an interest to owners (government) and hence to the
board of directors so that management and the workforce will also share and
act towards its implementation.
 There is no misuse or manipulation of power towards covert interests that are
dressed up with the anticipated change as a result of office politics.
This concept is somehow related to the source of initiative. If the strategic
organizational change for some reasons does not come from those who possess the
highest organizational power, bringing them aboard should come before everything
else if the change has to be successful. This leads to the proposition presented
below.
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Proposition 4: The extent to which an initiative for strategic organizational change
gains the support of those with power affects the level of
implementation success of strategic organizational change.
This proposition implies that the change leader should influence the supreme power
to come aboard and build a hierarchy of power throughout the changing
organization so that change agents can decide with power wherever it is appropriate
with respect to making implementation of strategic change a success. In order to
ensure an integrated use of power and actions towards implementing anticipated
change, the change leader builds an appropriate network of actors as described next.
7.4.3.3. Actor Networking
Integrating actors is the central role of the change leader. This integration should be
based on shared change vision as Kotter (1995) posits. It is towards this shared vision
the change leader influences behavior of major actors. To effectively lead actors
towards unified direction, all those who share the change vision under the leader’s
influence must be part of a network. This is what is referred to as actor networking.
Actor networking is a means through which actors collaborate, work in integration
and achieve a common strategic change outcome. This leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 5: Strategic organizational change implementation requires actors to be
unified through a carefully designed network of actors.
7.4.3.4. Communication
A healthy action-interaction chain (actor network) and the involvement of power
were emerged as required conditions for the successful implementation of a strategic
organizational change in a commercial bank’s context in Ethiopia. As depicted by
figure 7.1, these two notions are integral parts of the proposed implementation
model for strategic organizational change. In the action-interaction chain, important
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constructs emerged in connection with initiating, designing and implementing
stages. There are chains of actions that are interlocked together. For these actions to
be executed smoothly there must be a healthy interface among them. This in turn
requires smooth interaction among actors. This network of actors over which they
interact should be unbroken for a healthy execution of the change initiative.
The chain of actions and interactions must move on in a volatile (unstable)
environment and the movement requires each component of the chain to remain
intact. While the movement requires energy, smoothness of the movement can be
materialized on a lubricated environment.  Power and communication play the role
of energy and lubricant respectively. In the absence of carefully designed information
and communication system, the action-interaction chain will either be stack or
broken no matter how engaged the ones with power are.
Proposition 6: Smoothness of interactions among actors that is fostered by effective
communication and leadership has affirmative impacts on
implementation success of strategic organizational change.
7.4.4. Technical Aspects of Implementing Strategic Organizational
Change
The second broad area of implementing strategic organizational change is the
technical part (the first being behavioral). Under the technical aspects of
implementing strategic organizational change, specific action oriented issues that
require expert buy-in are covered. This part broadly includes initiating, designing and
implementing strategic organizational change. Because it is strongly intermingled
with behavioral aspects too, initiating is presented earlier. Initiating has technical
aspects especially with respect to selecting a change model, defining the scope of
the change and shaping the initiating messages that need to be communicated to
organizational members.
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7.4.4.1. Designing
Apart from selecting a model with serves as a change tool, implementing a strategic
organizational change is affected by an analysis of the extent to which the change
model fits organizational context or otherwise need to be contextualized. These
issues and other specifications of the anticipated change need to be designed prior
to implementation.
Designing, has different level of dynamism between the two cases. However, it is
relevant to both cases. Therefore, it is considered as the other construct for the final
propositions that are made by this research. Designing in the first case was stronger
as it was executed by teams that were established and were off duty until they finally
finished and submitted the design document. In bank B, teams were not established.
All old departments had their own team; so there was no serious engagement and
concern. However, the design issue is still valid in bank B too even though its
experience cannot be taken as a best practice as it was not fruitful.
The result of cross-case analysis reveal that (1) model specification, (2) model
validation, (3) model contextualization, and (4) completeness of design are important
attributes that affect implementation success of strategic organizational change. In
other words, designing is the process of creating the changed organizational system.
These attributes of designing are further discussed in the next sub-sections:
7.4.4.1.1.Validating change model’s fitness to organizational reality
Designing should make sure that the change model’s features that are included in
the design are fit to the specific and unique requirements of the bank; which in turn
requires understanding the model.
If the change model to be applied (if any) is a simple management fad (as referred to
by Balogun, 2001), care should be taken to avoid a single jacket fits all syndrome. The
model’s fitness should be tested taking the unique requirements of the changing
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bank into account. The model should fit more to the organization’s (i.e., bank’s)
trigger for change (i.e., purpose) than the organization’s requirements fit to the
change model. Once the change model is proven to fit organizational requirements,
the following should be considered in connection with applying it:
o If the model has been used by other organizations, failure stories might
distort perceptions of the initiating bank’s community; this requires
managing the perceptions.
o The version of the change model (if any) that is to be applied by the
initiating bank should be sufficiently understood by all relevant
members of the bank so that misunderstandings could not deter
successful implementation.
7.4.4.1.2.Contextualizing the change model
This becomes an important component of designing when the results of validating
the model indicate a need to modify some features of the model. This modification
results in a new model which fits the specific realities of the organization. There were
attempts in the two banks to modify the model. The first bank applied maker-
checker principle for example (which is different from BPR principles) to meet the
specific requirements of the bank. In the second bank too, they tried to follow a
modified feature which can fit to the bank’s requirements. They even avoided using
the name (BPR) despite the fact that they benchmarked organizations which
implemented BPR.
7.4.4.1.3.Implementation specification
Central to designing a strategic organizational change is the determination of
components of the new organization after the change. These components include:
(1) systems and structure of interface among systems, (2) jobs in the new systems
together with specifications and descriptions thereof, (3) procedures, (4) and
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performance measures (indicators). An effective design should specify all material
aspects of the strategic organizational change such as the aforementioned ones.
7.4.4.1.4.Completeness
The challenge encountered during designing is the dissolution of designing teams
before delivering the complete design document. This happens due to several
reasons that disturb the smooth operation of teams. An effective designing task is
accomplished when a complete design document is delivered. The above conditions,
as clearly explained, lead to the following propositions in connection with designing:
Proposition 7: Executable (effective) strategic organizational change design is a
function of setting clear guiding principles that serve as criteria to
filter final components of the new organizational system.
Proposition 8: The extent to which the designing team (1) internalizes strategic
organizational change requirements that necessitated the initiative,
applies the guiding principles in setting change content, (2) identifies
features of the selected change model (if any) that fit to the content,
and (3) effectively communicates  determine the success of designing
strategic organizational change.
Proposition 9: Whether or not implementation is started having a complete and
specific design document affects level of success in implementing
strategic organizational change.
Proposition 10: Successful implementation of a planned strategic organizational
change depends on design completeness.
Aforementioned propositions are relatively confirming to the explanations in the
extent literature (e.g. Oakland & Tanner, 2007; Balogun, 2001; Mento et al., 2002;
Pryor et al., 2008).
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7.4.4.2. Implementing
Anticipated benefits of change can only be realized through successful
implementation of it. The center of the discussion in this study is implementation.
Successful implementation of strategic organizational change requires actions to be
taken and conditions to prevail before and after the start of the actual task of
implementation. As explained above, rushing to implement strategic organizational
change without having complete and specific design leads to premature
implementation. The major predecessors are what have been discussed in the
previous sections (i.e., initiation and design).
Implementing is the process of executing the anticipated, initiated and designed
strategic organizational change. It is manifested by all actions taken in connection
with applying newly proposed organizational systems. The assumption here is, even
though the success of implementation is immediately caused by these actions,
previous conditions that determine the required actions also have contributions.
Completeness, timeliness, and effectiveness can be considered as measures against
which the success of implementation in the context under study can be gauged. The
following are further explanations about each of these measures:
7.4.4.2.1. Completeness
If an anticipated change is executed as per its design in all aspects of expected
change (content of change), it is complete. However; in the investigated context,
implementation performance is practically measured in terms of improvement of
whatsoever extent irrespective of designed change content. Completeness is
assumed to contribute for the enhancement of implementation success. The
following can be taken as examples of the attributes that can describe degree of
implementation completeness:
o Pervasiveness across all organizational units or operations: If the
initiative is a strategic change, all organizational units must be changed
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in a designed way. Strategic organizational change cannot be complete
if appropriate attention is not given to both core and support
processes and to all processes within each category.
o Inclusive of both the human and the technical sides: This will prevent
the common skewness towards either of the two not both. However,
especially handling the soft side of the organization is proved to be
demanded during implementation. In the technical side, organizational
contexts should be examined in order to avoid implementing changes
(or fads) that were tested and known in automated organizational
environments unless the organization is also operating in the same
environment.
Proposition 11: The degree to which both core and support business processes are
changed in both technical and behavioral aspects can explain
implementation effectiveness of strategic organizational change.
7.4.4.2.2. Timeliness
If the anticipated change is not fully executed within the designed time framework, it
cannot be considered as successfully implemented. Timeliness can be manifested in
terms of the point of time the newly designed operation fully commences. The usual
excuse is promising “we will finish it” shortly until the issue vanishes from the
memory of people. “We will finish it” is not definite and cannot be considered as an
indicator of appropriate change leadership.
Proposition 12: The degree to which implementation of strategic organizational
change meets scheduled milestones in terms of starting time,
duration, and finishing time indicates level of implementation success.
7.4.4.2.3. Effectiveness
The newly executed change should be effective in all measures of performance that
were predetermined during designing. This issue has links with completeness. It
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emerged to be worth considering because of the need to challenge the practice of
covering up with only some features of achieved effectiveness while failing short of
designed change targets. Cycle time, because of its simplicity to measure is usually
referred to as an indicator for successful implementation of strategic organizational
change. However mere reduction in cycle time does not necessarily indicate
complete implementation success as the same may happen due to factors other than
the implemented change. Therefore, implementation success has to be measured
with other indicators of performance too. For example, cost, service quality and
customer satisfaction were among the measures that were included in the design in
addition to cycle time. However, participants witnessed that there was no attempt to
measure the output of the implemented change in terms of the other performance
indicators. The following are proposed as requisite conditions that are needed in
order to ensure effectiveness of implementing strategic organizational change:
o Inclusive measures: Successfulness of implementation should be
measured using multiple indicators. Even the way time is measured
should not be general and haphazard comparison with previous
performance; it should be based on planned level of cycle time. If
performance standards are set, there must be a mechanism to check if
they are met.
o Evaluation: Performance evaluation should be linked to performance
measures. It has to be executed in a way it captures all performance
indicators; and there must be an information support system for that.
o Benefits: Aligning benefits to performances that are integral to the
change that is newly implemented prevents regression as the same will
affect the interest of performers.
o Supporting systems: The usually referred reason for failure to include all
the performance indicators in evaluating performance is the absence of
an implementation support system that virtually generates
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performance statistics in a way it is readily available for use by relevant
authority. Otherwise the calculation of cost, keeping the records of
performance manually, and the non value adding nature of these tasks
to the main operation makes it less attractive.
The above explanations and required conditions resulted in the propositions made
below:
Proposition 13: Comprehensive performance measurement, backed by supporting
organizational and information systems, increases completeness of
implementation of strategic organizational change.
Proposition 14: The extent to which performance rewards are aligned to changed
behaviors affects implementation success of strategic organizational
change.
These propositions also confirm to the general explanation in the extant literature
(e.g. Oakland & Tanner, 2007; Balogun, 2001; Mento et al., 2002; Pryor et al., 2008).
However, the actual implementation practices in the studied context reveal new
insights too. The relatively successful changes in both cases are those which were
backed by technology (core banking). The use of software (i.e., artifact) as described
by Glaser (2017) made the difference in the effectiveness of change. In the areas
where the software was not used (i.e., support processes), implementation did not
result in expected outcomes. The inclusion of these new insights is detailed more in
the upcoming sub-sections.
7.4.4.2.4. New routines
The extent to which an organization enacts new routines to do business around is
also an indication for implementation success provided that these new routines are
aligned to the strategic directions (envisioned) and shared at the beginning. Even
though routines are known for their contribution of both stability and change, and an
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attempt is made by Lin et al. (2017) to model how routines serve as mechanisms of
implementing change and innovation, the extension of these concepts to planned
approach of change as also portrayed by the conceptual framework (Figure 2.19) in
chapter two is a relatively new insight.
7.4.4.2.5. Systems
A system is what ensures the monitoring and evaluation of change behaviors by
change leaders without being overwhelmed by bulks of information and chaos.
Besides, supporting systems by technology makes a difference in implementing
strategic organizational change as witnessed by especially one of the cases. Systems
also provide a means through which performance measurement, evaluation and
rewards are aligned to change behaviors to reinforce the change and abandon old
practices (prevent regression).
7.5. Proposed Implementation Model for Strategic Organizational
Change
The propositions which are presented in the previous sections are explanations an
amalgam of which represents a model which serves as a guideline for implementing
strategic organizational change in the context of commercial banks in Ethiopia. To
show how dynamic and complex implementing a strategic organizational change is,
Figure 7.2 is sketched. In this figure, organizational context is indicated by an arrow
which encircles the other major change implementation components. The arrow
represents dynamism in the context which demands continuous monitoring and
adjustment of organizational routines.
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Figure 7.2: Implementation Model for Strategic Organizational Change in Ethiopian
Commercial Banks /Action-Interaction Chain
Source: Own sketch
There are also external factors that are indicated outside this arrow to represent those
which emerged from the empirical data of the present research. It does not mean,
however, that there are no other external environmental factors. As implementation is
the focus of the present research, those which emerged relating to implementation are
focused on. The reset is beyond the scope of this study.
In the centre, an analogy of gears is used to represent the interlock amongst major
themes that emerged from the empirical data. They are important components of the
explanation of how a strategic organizational change in the context of commercial
banks in Ethiopia can be implemented successfully. Leadership, networking, and
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communication play a role to smoothen the interconnection in the internal
environment (i.e. the gear box).
In the present study, implementing strategic organizational change has two major
components. One is related to behavior whereas the other is about technique. The first
is included to enhance success rate in implementing an initiated strategic change while
the second is technically initiating, designing and implementing the anticipated
change. To help understand the complexity of the whole components that are
indicated in Figure 7.2, these two components are briefly described in the upcoming
sections.
7.5.1. Behavioral Aspects of Strategic Organizational Change
Implementation
This is related to soft components or softer sides of change implementation as
Balogun (2001) and Armenakis and Harris (2009) refer to. In Figure 7.2, components
which are within the encircling arrow shape behavioral context under which the
anticipated change will be implemented. While the actual organizational movement is
analogous to movements of the gears, the environment in the gear box must be
favorable for these gears to run smoothly (analogy of lubrication can be thought).
Behavioral aspect of implementation encompasses power and lubricants as requisite
preconditions to start operating.
In the same token, a bank’s readiness to start implementing strategic organizational
change (i.e., to move) is determined by (1) whether sufficient power is aboard, and (2)
whether strong actors are persuaded and shared the need for change or not
(analogous to lubricant). When the answers to these questions are affirmative, it is
time. Timing is the central component of behavioral aspect of the implementation
model. Readiness is an input for timing.
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If gears are put on to move before the box is ready to host a smooth movement, they
will be damaged and the entire system will collapse. Similarly, determining the right
time to start taking implementation actions must be preceded by organization’s
behavioral readiness. If implementation actions are taken before the organization is
not ready, the possibility of being successful is low. To the contrary, premature
implementation emerged to be a cause of resistance and ultimately change
breakdown.
There are components of the model (portrayed by Figure 7.3) which determine
behavioral readiness of an organization to start enactment implementation actions.
The interlock among these components which are depicted by Figure 7.3 determines
(1) whether an organization is ready to start implementation actions, or (2) whether
there are powerful change deterrents which demand change leader’s intervention with
supreme power in order to change the condition into readiness, or (3) whether the
change leader needs to conceptualize change triggering conditions and strategize for
positioning the initiative in the minds of  major actors who will serve as first group of
change agents once convinced and developed feeling of ownership to the initiative.
Depending on how change triggering forces are conceived and communicated,
organizational actors will develop either skepticism or trust. This is just a result of their
perception (see arrows 2 and 4 in Figure 7.3). The dilemma between skepticism versus
trust which is based on perceived sincerity of change (see arrow 2) or feeling of
ownership to the change (see arrow 4) can be manipulated by the change leader who
conceptualizes change triggers (see relationship 3 in Figure 7.3) and positions the
conceived changes into the minds of organizational members (see arrow 7 in Figure
7.3) through communication.
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Figure 7.3: Behavioral aspects of implementing strategic organizational change
Source: Own sketch
The change leader also intervenes in the initiator-reactor dilemma which determines
feelings of ownership to the initiated change (see arrow 6 in Figure 7.3) which
otherwise could be affected by perception (see relationship 1). This dilemma also
affects skepticism-trust dilemma (see relationship 4 in Figure 7.3). Skepticism-trust
dilemma turns into the dominance of one depending on the strength of perception
which leads to skepticism or leader’s effectiveness in positioning the change to be a
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common agenda (see arrow 7) which in turn increases sense of ownership (see
relationship 4).
In this part of the model, a change leader’s role is shaping behavior towards ensuring
the supremacy of organizational purpose. The change leader, if effective, shares the
envisioned strategic organizational change (which is depicted as SOC in Figure 7.3) with
sufficient number of major actors in the organization. This is what needs to be
achieved as an indicator of behavioral readiness.
Alternatively, when there is leadership vacuum, the initiated change will fail to deliver
expected results mainly for two reasons. One is because of genuine misunderstandings
and resultant misperceptions on the need for change and lack of sense of ownership
to the initiated change which results in lack of commitment. The second reason is the
dominance of those who have personal motives. These two causes were emerged as
change deterrents.
Formation and strength of change deterrents starts right from when change triggering
forces are perceived by organizational actors. Perceived sincerity of change triggers
(i.e., perceived existence of genuine compelling reason for initiating a change)
determines the level of commitment of organizational actors.
If perception is absence of such triggers, non-initiating organizational actors turn to be
skeptic. Depending on the strength of skepticism, the result could be resistance to the
initiated change. Strength of skepticism is highly affected by organizational social
fabric and degree of trust between initiators and non-initiators. Source of resistance,
unlike the unwitting tendency to consider individuals or employees as prime source of
resistance, (Burnes, 2015), emerged to be any type of non-initiating party including
mangers.
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Besides, the extent to which personal motives of some actors dominate organizational
cause leads to reaction of different actors to be positive or negative towards the
initiated change. If those who need to serve their personal motives dominate, a third
path which again starts from change triggering forces leads to change breakdown.
This path needs the existence of parties who have personal motives that at any cost to
the organization gain supremacy and sponsorship. An example to such motives is
nonprofit motive. Such motives search for power sponsorship in order to be served at
the expense of organizational purpose during change. If the sponsoring power to
these motives overwhelms that of change leader’s, office politics jeopardizes the entire
initiative through making the change leader weakened. This is why the change leader,
especially in conditions where there are parties who have such motives, ensures
bringing supreme power aboard even at pre-initiating stage. All the explanations
made in connection with pre-initiating make this condition clearer.
Readiness to start the actions of implementation (i.e., timing) is therefore a function of:
(1) non-initiating actors’ perception, degree of skepticism (or trust) and feeling of
ownership which determines whether they share the need for change or not, (2)
change leader’s effectiveness in conceptualizing change triggers, positioning the need
for change in the minds of non-initiators in a way they perceive it positively and
persuades them to trust the entire process and to develop a sense of ownership and to
share the envisioned change and to become ready to commit themselves towards its
implementation, and (3) strength of parties with personal motives who aspire to gain
control over the organization and its management and ensure these motives served at
the expense of organizational objectives.
The change leader is there to influence the entire behavioral component and ensure
readiness before enacting actual tasks of implementation. Once this condition
(readiness) prevails, heading towards technical aspects of implementation becomes
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appropriate. Compared to the major directions that can be extracted from extant
literature (see figure 2.19), the proposal made by the present study is unique. The
analysis of behavioral readiness makes the present model more dynamic and it is
sought to be an original contribution.
7.5.2. Technical Aspects of Strategic Organizational Change
Implementation
After the behavioral aspects of implementation are taken care of, the change leader
can proceed towards building strong networks of those actors who are convinced and
have a shared vision about the change. The leader facilitates collaboration and
exploitation of the network among actors. Change agents who are selected among
convinced actors should be active in communicating with other actors over the
network. Through this way, actor networking lays the foundational structure of
communication and collaboration throughout the implementation of an initiated
strategic organizational change. The existence of this network also makes monitoring
and evaluation of implementation activities easy. Therefore, actor networking, active
communication and monitoring and evaluation systems are readiness indicators for
starting technical aspects of implementing strategic organizational change.
After ensuring technical readiness of the organization as explained in the above
paragraph, executing technical tasks of implementation becomes reasonable. In the
absence of such condition, implementation is expected to proceed out of order and
expected outcomes of change might not be achieved.
The major components of technical aspects of strategic organizational change
implementation are (1) initiating (which is partially behavioral as described earlier), (2)
designing and (3) implementing. Behavioral aspects of initiating do not require
technical readiness conditions as explained earlier. However, initiating lays the
foundation for the other two technical components of implementation and hence
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requires expert buy-in as early as possible. Initiating is an interfacing juncture between
behavioral and technical aspects of the proposed model.
The other two major components of technical aspect of implementation (i.e., designing
and implementing) should follow technical readiness. Among these technical
components comes the term implementing. In terms of actions, these two
components take the initiative to the final stages.
It is apparent that implementing a strategic organizational change is not simply an
execution of some tasks. It has to pass through prior conditioning efforts which help
the entire organization (represented by networked actors who share a common vision)
to head towards an envisioned future. Once this future is clear to sufficient number of
major actors who are convinced to commit themselves towards that end (behavioral
readiness), actions and interactions should be facilitated through smooth
communications over carefully designed networks so that actors can build mutual
understandings towards the change activities and put hands on them. Besides, the
networks should also be an integral part of the monitoring and evaluation systems.
Putting all these in place represents readiness.
Moreover, the two major technical components of implementation come prior to
implementing. The proposed model in the present study focuses on these prior
components as success enhancers. If implementation starts from the third component
alone, there will be no means to ensure strategic organizational change (planned
change) implementation success. As indicated in Figure 7.4 b, implementing is affected
by prior activities of implementation (i.e., initiating and designing) while the role of
leadership is central to all the rest.
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Figure 7.4: Technical aspects of implementing strategic organizational change
As indicated in Figure 7.2, power/leadership determines both initiating and designing
while implementing is affected by both initiating and designing. Leadership backed by
sufficient power creates an environment which is ready to enact changes. Readiness is
only a required condition not an end result. The end result should be driven by
behavioral components (readiness) and technical components as described in the next
sub-sections. The contribution of power, here, is also recognized by Stragalas (2010),
Kotter (1995), and Balogun (2001); however, the specific conditions described in the
present study as explained so far are different.
7.5.2.1. Initiating
As detailed earlier, initiating affects behavioral aspects. Technically speaking, initiating
defines the required need for strategic organizational change based on assessment of
change triggering conditions. Such conditions lead to conceptualizing the required
type of change and selecting appropriate tools (change model). This stage gives input
to designing through an interdependent relation. This relationship is moderated by
leadership as designing interfaces with initiating being supported with leader’s
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networking and facilitation efforts. Results of implemented change also serve as
triggers for new change implying cyclic relations between initiating and implementing.
7.5.2.2. Designing
Designing lays the foundation for the specific actions to be taken during the final
implementation. Concrete actions are means for transforming an organization into a
newly sought strategic position and business operation. Especially in a planned change
context, designing is what specifies the content and process of change. Designing
does the plan. What implementers do is converting the design into action. Whether
the actions are appropriate can only be evaluated when there is a complete and
specific design. Effective design is one that sufficiently and completely specifies what
needs to be implemented. This stage also sets the standards of performance that will
be applied to track the progress of implementation. In doing so, designing also
encompasses developing systems solutions or identifying standard systems solutions
that can be acquired (e.g., recommending the core banking system to support core
business processes of banks).
7.5.2.3. Implementing
Implementing is the ultimate means through which anticipated strategic
organizational change is converted into a reality. Implementing, in the context of
planned approach to change, refers to the actions that are taken in order to transform
old organization as per design (plan). A strategic organizational change, if effectively
implemented, results in new ways of doing business. That means, new organizational
routines and artifacts will replace old ones. As emerged in the present research too,
the concept of implementing strategic organizational change encompasses routines
(Lin et al., 2017). To explain this stretched view of implementing strategic
organizational change, the interlock of implementing with prior technical components
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and the support of implementation with systems are described in the next sub-
sections.
7.5.2.4. Interdependence with prior components
Prior components of the proposed implementation model are those explained as
behavioral readiness (see Figure 7.3) and technical readiness (see Figure 7.4). Both
stages of readiness are requisites for successful implementation of strategic
organizational change. Therefore, implementation action should always come next to
full analyses of its interdependence with the prior components specified so far.
Implementing, as implicated by technical components part of the model explanation,
is affected by direct influences of designing and indirect influences of initiating (as
designing intervenes in between). Moreover, initiating has also direct relation with
implementing in terms of determining who participates as change agent and involving
that selected actor as early as possible to build a sense of ownership (but this is part of
the behavioral component). Besides, initiating determines scope of the initiated
change which directly affects both designing and implementing. The other relation,
which is from a different direction, is connected to the decision to embrace either
action or reflection based on performance tracking (deviance tracking) of
implementation. That is why the relationship between implementation and initiation is
two directional.
In addition to ensuring behavioral and technical readiness prior to enacting
implementation tasks, effective implementation should fulfill timeliness and
completeness criteria and should be supported by systems which necessitate new
routines to replace the old ones. In the absence of such components, it is not possible
to manage implementation and make it successful. This means, an effective
implementation of strategic organizational change is explained in terms of its
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completeness (with respect to converting all designed features into reality) and
timeliness (done at the right time within the right duration). Completeness emerged as
important concept because, organizations tend to implement an initiated change but
do not endure exhaustively implementing each and every thing included in the design.
Some even tend to regress back to the status quo after a brief period of campaign
(Burnes, 2004a). Completeness also indirectly implies scope.
Timeliness has two meanings— (1) accomplishing the task of implementing within the
predetermined period and (2) avoiding premature or delayed decisions of
implementation. Especially when strategic organizational change is under the
supervision of an external party (including members of board of directors), deadline
syndrome usually causes implementation breakdown as a result of pre-mature
implementation. These notions are all original contributions (see figure 2.19).
7.5.2.4.1. Implementation support systems and routines
In addition to the triple helix (i.e., initiating-designing-implementing interlock) which
was explained, an implementation of strategic organizational change needs to be
supported by information and communication technology backed systems. The need
for this support was evident in the back offices (support business processes of the two
case banks). Because of lack of such supports, there was no significant change in
support business processes. On the other hand, core business processes realized
anticipated changes only after they were supported by the electronic core banking
system.
This led to the present study’s proposition of a model which ensures accompanying
implementations of strategic organizational change with artifacts through which
organizational routines can be established. The use of technology is one of such
artifacts (Glaser, 2017). In addition to technology, designing other artifacts as means to
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bring about changes in organizational routines serves as success enhancing
component of implementing strategic organizational change.
When actor networking and communications and implementation performance
monitoring and evaluation systems are put in place and are supported by information
and communication technology, the changing organization is  ready to turn the
initiative to be more action oriented. When the organization has complete and specific
designs in addition to technical readiness, it is time to start the actual task of
implementation. In order to ensure that the implemented tasks can bring anticipated
changes into reality, there must be strong alignment between all conceptions,
networks, communications and new organizational routines which are systematized
through the use of artifacts (e.g., ICT based software) as explained by Glaser (2017).
When changes are supported by automated systems or other technologies, old
routines will be changed for good and replaced by new ones and hence the
organization will be changed irreversibly. The emergence of new routines then, will
take the place and further anticipations of changes will continue being focused on
those new routines. Therefore, strategic organizational change will continue to be
implemented in a form of change in technologies (or other artifacts) in modern
organizations.
This is where the present research’s findings are linked to the extant literature’s
contemporary debate on organizational change implementation using organizational
routines and artifacts (Wang & Wang, 2017; Line, et al., 2017; Glaser, 2017). This
signal’s how the proposed implementation model could serve flexibly for both
planned change contexts and within the paradoxical views of contemporary literature.
319
7.6. Enfolding Literature
In this section, the relationship the model proposed by the present study has with
extant literature is briefly discussed. To help facilitate the discussion, implementation
models that are relevant to strategic organizational change are summarized (see Table
8.1). The summarizing table is presented in the next chapter for simple comparison
with the major conclusions that are made based on the present study.
The proposed implementation model has features, when compared to models in the
extant literature (see figure 2.19); make it a contribution to the body of knowledge in
organizational change implementation. Besides, the proposed implementation model
has components that are intentionally incorporated to enhance success while
overcoming deterrents. Brief descriptions of some of these features and their links in
the literature are presented in the upcoming sub-sections.
7.6.1. Model’s Features Pertaining to Behavioral Readiness Assurance
As explained in section 7.5.1, the proposed implementation model has components
that deal with behavioral aspects (same as what Balogun, 2001 refers to as softer side)
of implementing strategic organizational change. The model focuses on these prior
components in an attempt (1) to explore empirical evidences of why implementation
fails to an extent low failure rate gained notorious unanimity of scholars and (2) to
incorporate mechanisms that overcome deterrents of and enhance success in
implementation. The present study contributes to the body of knowledge by
incorporating these two into the proposed model.
In the behavioral part (softer side) of the proposed implementation model, analyzing
readiness of the organization requires focusing on perception about change triggering
forces, source of initiative and power structure. In the literature, the notion of
readiness was also addressed by scholars (e.g., Balogun, 2001; Oakland & Tanner,
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2007). These authors are also known for giving greater attention to the soft aspect of
change implementation. Especially Balogun’s (2001) work captures most of the ideas
that emerged from the data in the present study.
As explained in section 7.5.1, behavioral readiness of an organization which is initiating
a strategic organizational change can be assessed in line with three analytical paths.
The first goes through non-initiating actors’ perception, degree of skepticism (or trust)
and feeling of ownership determining whether these groups buy into the change or
not. On this path, underlying factor is source of initiation. Balogun (2001) is the most
exhaustive work which describes readiness in terms of softer issues in order to devise a
context sensitive strategic change approach. She proposed the cultural web
framework. In the framework, several components are included to support managers
assess employee readiness. The targets are employees. What emerged in the present
research is not exclusively pertinent to employees; rather who initiates the change
matters more. This makes the proposed model more flexible and hence more
appropriate for more dynamic contexts.
The second analytical path relates to change leader’s effectiveness in conceptualizing
change triggers, positioning the need for change in the minds of non-initiators in such
a way that they will perceive the need for change positively, influencing non-initiators
to develop trust in the entire process, developing a sense of ownership and sharing
the envisioned change and so that they will accept to buy into the change. This path is
analyzed with a scenario which assumes to have a change leader. This scenario
matches with Balogun’s (2001) explanation to the extent that non-initiators are not
composed of top management or someone else with sufficient power (formal or
informal) to influence the entire context.
The third path focuses on strength of parties with personal motives who aspire to gain
control over the organization and its management and ensure these motives served at
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the expense of organizational objectives. This part builds on Balogun’s (2001) and
Oakland and Tanner’s (2007) proposal of leadership intervention to influence behavior
towards the process of change. However, their explanation does not extend to the
extent of politics which requires the involvement of supreme power (i.e., highest power
in the organization’s context).
Context of behavioral readiness for implementing strategic organizational change
does not only require changing employees (i.e., through recruiting new workers) as
Balogun (2001) posits; it can also require changing managers (as resistant managers
were evident in the cases studied). Therefore, while converging with Balogun’s (2001)
assertion that changing an organization is about changing people (managers and
employees), the notion of initiator-reactor dilemma emerged from the present
research is peculiar to the study’s context. This is a testimony for Pettigrew’s (2001)
recommendation to explore national contexts.
With respect to the proposed model’s links to the phase models of change, there are
also important findings. As discussed in Chapter Two, step-based models of
organizational change are dominant in the extent literature. Lewin’s three-step model,
Kotter’s eight step model, and others that enhance or explain these seminal models
(e.g., Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Mento et al., 2002; Pryor et al., 2008) are
recommended sources to gain an insight into these categories of models. Among
these models, Lewin (Burnes, 2004a) and Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) gave attention
to the issue of analyzing behavioral readiness (i.e., unfreezing) before rushing into the
action of implementation. This is to ensure readiness and enact implementation
related tasks once the organization is proved to be behaviorally ready. With the
exception of the content of what specific conditions should prevail in the specific
context to assure readiness, the present research also found out the importance of
behavioral readiness.
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7.6.2. Technical Readiness Features of the Model
Oakland and Tanner (2007), Balogun (2001) and Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) are
among those who discussed readiness. However, they did not address the specific
cases of deterrents that destruct organizational readiness. This research, therefore,
builds on their notion of the need to assess readiness to change, and extends the
notion by bringing insights pertaining to specific areas (i.e., behavioral and technical
readiness). In both cases of readiness analysis, the model proposed by the present
study is composed of cyclic interrelations. This nature of the model coupled with its
flexibility to fit to wider contexts makes the present research a contribution towards
Langley et al.’s (2013), Lin et al.’s (2017) concern for further development on process
theorizing (Chiles, 2003) which exploits cyclic loop (Langly, 1999) in order to fit to more
dynamic situations.
This part of the proposed model focuses on the effort of the change leader to create
networks of actors who are involved as experts from the very beginning of initiating
the change and others who have direct and indirect roles in implementing the initiated
change. The initiator-reactor interplay encompasses not only top-down but also
bottom-up driven initiatives as also posited by Wang and Wang (2017), Magsaysay
and Hechanova (2017) as employ-centric approach. However, apart from mentioning
operation oriented approaches, none of these works were as explicit as the present
study did in terms of making a clear proposition towards the triple helix of initiating-
designing-implementing.
The cyclic sequential interaction among the three as depicted in Figure 7.4 results in
the implementation of planned strategic organizational change and eventually handles
evolving change needs of the organization after the initial (planned) changes are
implemented. At this point, the new organizational feature is a function of artifacts
(Glaser, 2017). In the absence of use of artifacts (in this case automating software—
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core banking), organizations may not bring about significant changes and hence the
next change could be similar to the implemented one. This converges with Stańczyk-
Hugiet et al. (2017) and Lin et al.’s (2017) works and generally with authors of
organizational routines (e.g. Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Feldman, 2008;
Graetz & Smith, 2010; Lin et al., 2017; Feldman, Pentland, D’Adderio & Lazaric, 2016).
With respect to (1) passing through two analytical stages (i.e., behavioral and technical
readiness) of failure preventive works before actually starting implementation, (2)
integrating these failure preventive methods with implementation activities and (3)
exploiting post-implementation deviances, there is no convergence to the extent
literature. The aforementioned three are important contributions of the present study
to the extant body of knowledge in strategic organizational change implementation.
7.7. Definition of Key Terms
Initiating: a bank’s act of introducing a specific type of planned strategic organizational
change as a means to shift its way of doing business.
Action-interaction chain: the communication network a change leader builds as a
result of actor networking.
Initiator-reactor: an organizational actor’s cognitive processing of who initiated a
change (i.e., source of initiative) and the resultant position that leads to either buying
into or reacting against the change.
Timing: the point of time a change related decision or action is enacted.
Implementing: the process of executing an anticipated, initiated, and designed
strategic organizational change.
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Change breakdown: the happening of an outcome of a change related activity which
deviates from the anticipated one.
Deterrent: a variation (in expression) of change breakdown
Behavioral readiness: the stage of readiness which is related to the soft side of the
organization. It refers to the state whereby an organization is behaviorally ready to
start execution of an anticipated strategic organizational change.
Technical readiness: indicates the state where a change initiating organization puts in
place actor networks, communication systems, and other monitoring and evaluating
systems and become ready to start executing an anticipated strategic organizational
change.
7.8. Chapter Summary
In this chapter, results of cross-case analyses of important themes that emerged from
each case (as discussed in Chapter Six) are discussed. Propositions are also made
about the relationships among these identified concepts/themes. Based on these
relationships (see Figure 7.1) an implementation model which captures most of the
important issues that shape implementation is proposed (see Figure 7.2). To facilitate
the understanding of the seemingly complex model depicted in Figure 7.2, the two
major components of the model—behavioral and technical are also discussed in
separate sections (see figure 7.3 & 7.4).  These explanations of the components of the
model are finally compared with extent literature which also continues to the next
chapter. The next chapter briefly presents major conclusions and the contributions of
the present research.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1. Introduction
In this chapter, on the bases of findings presented in the previous chapters; the major
conclusions made, recommendations forwarded and indications for further research
are presented. Detail explanations are not given as the same has already been done in
preceding chapters.
8.2. Conclusions
On the basis of the final findings presented in the previous chapters, an
implementation model for strategic organizational change is proposed. The underlying
assumptions behind including these constructs in the model and proposing the
relationship as indicated in figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 are detailed in Chapter Seven.
The objectives of the present study were to:
 Explore contextual factors that influence the implementation of strategic
organizational change in the context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia
 Develop a strategic organizational change implementation model within the
context of commercial banks in Ethiopia
 Put forward theoretical propositions in connection with contextual strategic
organizational change implementation
How these objectives were responded to in the present research is discussed in this
section. With respect to exploring contextual factors that influence implementation of
strategic organizational change, the present study undertook within case and cross-
case analyses and found out factors that are related to behavioral aspects (see section
7.5.1) and others that are related to technical aspects (see section 7.5.2). These two
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major groups of factors are major components of the proposed change
implementation model as presented in Chapter Seven.
As found out by the present study, implementing strategic organizational change in
the context of commercial banks in Ethiopia requires passing through two stages of
readiness assurance efforts before embarking on the actual tasks of implementation.
The first stage deals with softer side (cognitive and behavioral components) readiness
while the second one focuses on ensuring whether the technical side is effectively and
smoothly interlinked with the soft one. The final stage of implementation then comes
with a triple helix of initiating, designing, and implementing which is moderated and
facilitated by power and/or leadership depending on prevailing conditions.
As it was sought right at the beginning of the present research, exploration of the
purely domestic context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia resulted in an
implementation model which has unique components. As the model is inductively
developed based on data gathered and systematically analyzed, it fits to the empirical
context (i.e., commercial banks in Ethiopia).
With respect to addressing the third objective, by developing an implementation
model for strategic organizational change in the context of commercial banking sector
in Ethiopia, the present study brought forward contributions to the present body of
knowledge in strategic organizational change implementation. These contributions can
be valid both in the context of implementation in general and context sensitive
implementation as referred to by Balogun (2001), Pettigrew et al. (2001) and Hempel
and Mrtinsons (2009) in particular.
As the issue of implementation is lagging behind that of formulation of strategic
organizational change (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011), the proposed implementation model
may contribute in stimulating further debates.  The fact that the present research was
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conducted based on inductive data driven approach of building theories from case
study research (Eisenhardt, 1989) also makes the present research to serve as a spring
board of further scholarly debates and theory development towards the notion of
context sensitive implementation model which is sought to contribute towards
reducing the high failure rate of implementation which is unanimously reported in the
extant literature. The enhanced features of Esenhardt’s (1989) within-case analysis are
also expected to capture attention of future researchers who will be using this
approach.
While Balogun (2001) explicated broadly about how to make a context sensitive
strategic change; Pettigrew et al. (2001) explicitly asserted the unwitting tendency to
consider context as undiscussed background. Despite the length of time since these
scholars raised the issue, the literature in strategic organizational change seems to
have hardly witnessed significant progress in addressing the issue of context or
developing a context sensitive model.
As described in several places in the present report so far, the literature in strategic
organizational change is characterized by unanimous report of high (mostly
mentioned as 70%) failure rate while it is fragmented with respect to addressing this
problem (Jacobs et al., 2013). Until recently, scholars (e.g., Packard, 2017; Imran et al.,
2016; Burnes, 2015; Al-Haddad & Kantour, 2015) report this rate of failure. This
indicates that the need for further development in the extant body of knowledge in
strategic organizational change implementation still exists.
As change models are believed to reverse this high level of implementation failure (Al-
Haddad & Kantour, 2015; Stragalas, 2010; Real & Marshal, 2005; Worley & Lawler,
2010; Kazmi, 2008; Okumus, 2003), there were efforts which result in plethora of such
models (Ford & Greer, 2005). However, since the 1990s, there were also scholars who
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(e.g., Beer, 1992; By, 2005; Armenakis & Harris, 2009; Corley & Gioia, 2011; Woodman,
2014), because of the prevalence of high rate of failure, concluded about lack of
models with practically proven contribution (usability) towards implementation
success.
Extant implementation models are criticized (1) for being programmatic or fallacious
or change managerial (i.e., top-down driven) (Guitee & Vandenbempt, 2017; Beer &
Eisenstat, 1990), (2) for not being context oriented or data driven (Parry et al., 2014;
Pettigrew et al., 2001; Barnett & Carol, 1995), (3) for not being based on scientifically
developed knowledge (Woodman, 2014), (4) for not being based on ambiguous
language (Marshak, 2002), (5) for not being action-oriented (Armenakis & Harris,
2009), (6) for being disintegrated (Al-Haddad & Kontour, 2015), and (7) for not being
employee-centric (Magsaysay & Hechanova, 2017).
Amongst the phase-based models, cyclic models, systems models, and those which
have paradoxical orientations which are reviewed in the present study, Balogun’s
(2001) is found most explicit in using the term strategic change. Besides, Kotter’s
(1995) model is also reported to be applicable for strategic organizational changes. As
Pryor et al. (2008) and Mento et al. (2002) did extensive review of models including
Kotter’s (1995), they have components that manifest strategic orientations. Therefore,
in terms of relevance, Kotter’s (1995) model, others that are significantly based on
Kotter’s (1995) model (e.g., Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Mento et al., 2002; Pryor et al.,
2008) and Balogun’s (2001) model are found closer to the issue of implementing
strategic organizational change.
Moreover, Van de ven and Poole (1995), Van de Ven and Sun (2011) and the systems
model of Maes and Van Hootegem (2011) are significant contributions in the literature
of change management. In the most recent literature, models that are based on
paradoxical views which consider organizational routines as sources of both change
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and stability are also becoming apparent. Lin et al. (2017) and Glaser (2017) made
contributions towards conceptualizing dynamic routines as means of implementing
organizational change and artifacts as means of modifying routines. Therefore, with an
intention to position the contribution of the present research to the body of
knowledge in implementing strategic organizational change, the aforementioned
models are summarized in Table 8.1. This table indicates each model’s contribution
towards addressing issues that are represented by each column.
Following the table, conclusions are made about the model which is developed by the
present study pertaining to (1) its contributions in terms of exploring contextual
factors that influence implementation of strategic organizational change, (2) its
contribution with respect to making propositions that are related to organizational
readiness for change, implementation deterring factors, flexibility with respect to
accommodating varying contexts, specifying technical procedures and systems of
control. This makes the present study’s explicit account for preventing implementation
failure which is not common in the extant literature. Moreover, the present research’s
finding that artifacts as mechanisms of altering routines which in turn serve as means
of implementing organizational change is discussed in line with the model’s relatively
new contribution in connection with incorporating technical readiness assurance
components.
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Table 8.1: Summary of major contributions in the literature of organizational change implementation
Model Consideration fromContext Readiness  enhancers
Implementation
deterrents Flexibility Procedures
Outcome/co
ntrol
Kotter’s (1995) Market competitiveness,crisis, opportunities, plan Empowerment, team,hiring, promoting… Eight mistakes ofmanagers Encourages risktaking Eight sequentialsteps Institutionalization, rewards,
Armenakis and
Bedeian (1999)
Urgency Diagnosis, need, vision,
plan, empowerment,
unfreezing
Denial/resistance -- 3 phases & 3
stages
Institutionalizi
ng, measure,
reinforcement
Balogun’s (2001) Organizational culture,organizational context
assessment, people
Cultural shift, Cultural web,
change kaleidoscope
(readiness is a
component), people
aspect
Barrier to change Design choice
based on
contextual
variables (see
change
kaleidoscope)
7 sequential steps,
fifth step is
phasing of change
Evaluate
change
outcomes,
Mento et al.
(2002)
Idea and its context,
evaluate climate for
change, integrate
lessons learned
Defining the initiative,
change plan, find &
cultivate a sponsor,
prepare change recipient,
change leader team,
-- plan should be
flexible
12 sequential
steps
Create cultural
fit – make the
change last,
small wins for
motivation,
communicate,
measure
progress, After
action review
process
(AARP)
Oakland and
Tanner’s (2007)
Figure of eight
Culture, structure,
process, behavior,
organizational resources
Managing the softer side,
need for change.
Leadership, readiness
explicitly indicated, planning
-- Learning Cyclic processes
connecting
readiness and
implementing
Effective
communication,
systems &
controls
Pryor et al. (2008) Organizational purpose,people -- -- -- -- Reinvention ofthe future,
performance
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Maes and Van
Hootegem (2011)
Socio-economic,
organizational (strategy,
structure, people,
culture)
-- -- Change system
entertaining eight
dimensions of
change to
integrate them
System model of
change
--
Van de Ven and
Poole (1995); Van
de Ven and Sun
(2011)
Analysis of situations
when each model
applies (breakdowns)
Consensus building,
responding to complaints,
political savvy, strategies
for competitive advantage
Breakdowns (in
four motors)
examples: lack of
consensus,
resistance, power
imbalance, lack of
scarcity
Selection of
models from
repertoire (based
on unit of change
– mode of change
analysis)
Action - reflection
Four typologies of
process cycles
(dissatisfaction-
search-goal setting-
implementation;
sequence of steps;
confrontation-
conflict-synthesis;
variation-selection-
retention)
Lin et al. (2017) Existing routines,existing behavioral
patterns
Stress the unfitness of
existing, Stress the fitness
of new, Shared schemata,
action disposition
Stress the fitness
of existing, Focus
on similarity
between new and
existing, Stick to
existing behavior
-- Preliminary
implementation-
deep
implementation-
new rules and
regulations
establishment
New routines
solidification
Glaser (2017) External communities,existing routine Intention to change theroutine Newly designedartifacts by actors
(deviance),
existing artifacts
Design
assemblages
-- Change in
routine
dynamics
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8.2.1. Addressing Context of Change
In terms of addressing context, with the exception of Balogun (2001) sufficient depth
of analysis is not apparent in these works (see table 8.1). Balogun (2001) extended her
discussion of implementing strategic change to the extent of proposing frameworks of
analyzing context especially at an organizational level. Balogun (2001) designed two
frameworks which help change managers analyze context at an organizational level. In
her two frameworks (i.e., cultural web and change kaleidoscope), she specified context
determinant components around which change managers can make analyses.
Following these analyses, if the organization is found ready for change, Balogun (2001)
recommended seven steps through which strategic change can be implemented.
In general terms, as per the model proposed by the present study, implementation is
not viewed as a simple step (sequence) of actions but a very complex (see Figure 7.2)
interlock of behavioral and technical components that must be systematically analyzed
to flexibly accommodate evolving behavioral dynamics and contexts on the bases of
which implementation tasks must be shaped. This requires systematically leading
interwoven behavioral and technical components towards an envisioned future
organization.
Moreover, features of the envisioned organization are not considered by the present
study as terminal; rather they will serve as starting context of newly evolved infusion of
behaviors, techniques, and systems which in turn will serve as foci of next changes.
This way, organizations evolve through a planned change to a system which continues
to improvise through exploiting dynamic routines. This means, the model starts by
analyzing extant contexts, selecting a change model (design of change), building
strong behavioral and technical success enhancers (two stages of readiness) and finally
enacting within the newly designed organizational system. This makes the model a
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hybrid which flexibly accommodates alternating planned strategic changes followed by
continuous emergent changes that exploit on organizational artifacts.
National context is the other issue the present research intended to address by
exploring on a sector which is reserved for domestic players only. This relatively
control domestic environment resulted in the findings that are discussed in previous
chapters. How are these findings related to what scholars discuss in the extant
literature?
Balogun’s (2001) more extensive work which is known for its contributions in terms of
addressing context does not encompass contextual factors that are specific to a
defined context. They are generic and pertinent to organizational level factors.
However, organizational contexts are not merely confided to organizational level
factors; the national and industry environment in which the organization operates also
affect context. The relevance of an account for national context to design a model for
organizational change is posited by Pettigrew et al. (2001).
Among the models that are reviewed in the present study and those that are selected
being most relevant for the topic of discussion, specific type of contexts such as a
nation or an industry were not mentioned to be appropriate settings within which a
model can best function. Maes and Van Hootegem’s (2011) mention of socio-
economic context is among the attempts of specifying (qualifying) context. This
expression is still too broad to understand how context interplays with implementation
efforts.
In the present study, context appeared to play significant role and hence its
representation in the proposed model has new insights as compared to how these
authors did. The difference can be attributed to the account of the influence of
national context on organizational context in terms of shaping the entire setting under
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which strategic organizational change is implemented. This builds on Pettigrew et al.’s
(2001) call for a context sensitive change implementation model.
For a strategic organizational change to be implemented successfully in the context of
commercial banking sector in Ethiopia, it is found out that addressing the issue of
nonprofit motives of owners (in the private sector case) and political motives of
government representatives (members of board of directors) significantly affect
success in implementation. Intensity of competition in the market affects the degree of
interference of the aforementioned parties (i.e., those who have motives other than
organizational objectives) in the management of banks and their value of the need for
change. This, in turn, affects their sincerity in committing themselves towards
supporting the initiative. This condition is what is broadly addressed in connection
with the softer components (cognitive and behavioral aspects) of the proposed change
implementation model.
Evolving organizational context represented by the circular arrow in Figure 7.2 is the
other feature of how the present study addressed context. The banking sector in
Ethiopia is characterized by few players resulting in weak market competition. This
reduced pressure on banks to an extent that owners and other authorities do not
worry much on profitability as described in Chapter Four. This made readiness for
change difficult. On the other hand, service provision in banking business is becoming
highly advanced forcing them to adopt at least some of the fundamental technologies.
Therefore, banks in Ethiopia are operating under paradoxes of relatively difficult softer
side and continuously changing technical (operational side) in line with technological
advancement. A strategic change in such kinds of contexts should address both
aspects of the context. That is why the proposed model also addresses the issues of
artifacts (in line with technology). This made the proposed model more comprehensive
compared to what has been done in the literature so far.
335
8.2.2. Readiness for Change
Readiness is exclusively addressed by Balogun (2001) and Oakland and Tanner (2007).
Especially the account of Balogun is similar to what is emerged in the present study.
She recommends starting the application of her seven step model once the
organizational readiness is ensured which is manifested by emergence of different
parties who buy into the change. Implicitly, in her explanation, management is
assumed to have a leadership role in achieving this. However, she does not note the
possibility of employee initiated changes, manager resistance, and owner interference
in her explanation of readiness issue. In the present study, these issues emerged as
important components that determine level of an organization’s readiness to change.
This also builds on Burnes’s (2015) contention on the source of resistance to be
individuals and in most cases employees. As evident in the present study, the issue of
employees is not the only component of readiness assessment efforts. Balogun (2001)
also takes the assumption of employee as residents while managers are usually change
leaders. The three analytical paths of readiness explained in Chapter Seven are
therefore other contributions of the present study to the body of knowledge. These
three paths represent six scenarios to which the proposed implementation model is
expected to flexibly fit.
8.2.3. Flexibility to Accommodate Varying Contexts
Context emerged as evolving factor in the present research. As explained in Chapter
Seven and in the previous sub-sections, softer side of organizational context has
emerged to be unavoidably decisive during implementing strategic organizational
change. Commercial banks in Ethiopia have relatively static parts (that do not change
much following the strategic change initiative) and continuously changing parts that
are supported by technology (e.g. core banking, mobile banking, internet banking). In
terms of dynamism, the static component is ironically more dynamic as it is politically
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infused with different interests and powers. This is dynamic because it is shaped by
cognitive and behavioral reactions of the people (owners, management, change
agents, and employees). It is too soft and dynamic for a change leader to ensure
readiness for change through properly functioning over three analytical paths that are
driven by alternating (1) skepticism-trust, (2) initiator-reactor, and (3) motive group-
organizational group politics. The leader interacts with three paths-six scenarios based
on status of the dilemma pertaining to the three paired positions of actors. The leader
then has to devise a strategy to effectively influence the behavior of actors and ensure
sufficient number of buy-ins into the change. The result of these leadership analyses
following the three paths helps to be flexible to accommodate variance in evolving
contexts.
The ways flexibility is addressed in the extent literature do not converge exactly with
what is described in the above paragraph. For example, Balogun’s (2001) which is most
explicit and relatively well equipped, described flexibility in line with the change
kaleidoscope framework. In the framework, an organization carries out design choices
based on several issues including power, time, readiness, scope and capacity. However,
the target of flexibility notion is design choice. This is equivalent to the
recommendation made by Armenakis and Harris (2009) not to grab change as a
passing fad instead of based on analysis about need for change.
In the present research, flexibility starts right from readiness assurance by the leader.
The leader is expected to apply the three paths-six scenarios to flexibly apply the one
which best fits. This is the other area of contribution by the present study.
8.2.4. Implementation Deterrents
This is also an issue that is related to the three analytical paths. Each path is serving as
a change enhancing interlock or as a change deterrent interlock depending on which
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scenario prevails in the organization. This is how a total of six scenarios can prevail.
This section deals with the deterrent side of each path. The purpose is to help the
change leader understand prevailing organizational conditions that have potential to
deter the initiated change from being implemented effectively. Such understanding
helps the leader to devise a strategy of enhancing readiness.
As summarized in Table 8.1, Kottor (1995), Van de Ven and Poole (1995) and Van de
Ven and Sun (2011) explicitly accounted for causes of break downs which the present
research also refers to as change deterrents. The present research converges with this
idea. However, the specific change deterrents identified by the present study are
different from those accounted for by the aforementioned authors. The rest of the
selected scholars as summarized in Table 8.1, do not consider such factors in their
models. The practice of considering these factors also reappeared in the recent
scholarship (i.e., Lin et al., 2017 & Glaser, 2017) as the models also become closer to
practices. This implies, in practice, understanding specific causes of breakdowns and
devising an approach which tackles them makes a difference.
8.2.5. Procedures and Implementation Outcomes
In terms of procedures, extant literature is dominated by sequences of steps (e.g.,
Lewin’s three-step model, Kotter’s, eight-step model, Balogun’s seven-step model).
There are also models that are based on cyclic sequences of steps (e.g., Oakland &
Tanner’s figure of eight model, Pryor et al.’s five Ps model). These procedures in most
cases encompass outcome indicators (measures) as means of controlling progress and
reinforcing successful practices.
The present study also builds on the importance of such means of measuring progress
and devising reinforcement. However, these procedures, in addition to softer side
readiness which is discussed so far, require technical side readiness. The change leader
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lays the foundation which makes a smooth interface between the soft and the
technical (hard) side which mainly requires expert buy-in to the process. This second
stage of readiness assurance effort recommended by the present research is another
contribution to the body of knowledge.
8.2.6. Technical Readiness and the Triple Helix of Initiating-Designing-
Implementing
The second stage of readiness assurance is found to be dealing with the technical side
of organizational change. In the study context, it was found that when everyone was
assigned as designer of required change while the design type (i.e., the change model
which is BPR in one of the cases and business process redesigning in the other) is
determined prior to the start of relevant analyses, successful implementation becomes
hardly possible. Therefore, expert buy-in should be ensured right from the initiating
stage. In addition, experts should also be networked with other major actors.
Actor networking and persuasive communication by change leaders should ensure
that those who got involved as experts are properly networked with other actors and
change related actions and interactions among actors are communicated over this
network. This network serves as a chain of actors who take part in the implementation
of the initiated change. Ensuring smoothness of the actions and interactions over this
chain (network) is required as an indicator of second level of readiness for change—
technical readiness. An implementation attempt that starts before these two stages of
readiness is emerged as premature implementation. The leader does all these to
prevent premature implementation which leads the entire initiative into a trajectory
that could not deliver the required change.
The triple helix of initiating, designing and implementing becomes more valid after
ensuring readiness. The interface among the three should be strong enough to ensure
successful implementation. As depicted in Figure 7.4, there is a cyclic relationship
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among these major steps indicating the possibility to start other round change
initiative following an evaluation result of implemented changes.
Initiating should be technically handled as determining the needed change and
selecting the appropriate type of model (design choice) that require interlocked
contributions from experts who take part in all the three. This is because the three are
related to each other in sequential interdependence logic.
Designing follows from what is specified in the initiating stage. What needs to be
changed and using what design method is usually specified by the initiating stage.
However, designer should have a smooth interaction with initiators for possible
discussion to enhance clarity or for proposals in the contents of what initiators
proposed. Chain breakdown may result in a design that does not represent the change
need of the organization.
Effectiveness of design is measured in terms of completeness, specificity and
timeliness. All of these indicators were emerged from practically faced challenges in
the two banks. The impact of technical readiness becomes apparent at this stage. For
example, if design is not complete or specific, implementation will obviously be
problematic if the interaction between designers and implementers is not smooth.
Premature implementation could also destruct not only implementation (as design
may not be complete) but also designing (as designers may perceive that their effort is
not considered by implementers and stop delivering complete design).
Backed by smooth chain of action and interaction among actors, complete and specific
design must be provided to implementers before the actual tasks of implementation
are commenced.
Implementation then becomes effective as it is backed by complete design with
sufficient specifications and smooth relations with initiators and designers for possible
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hands on demand on due course. The existence of well functioning chain keeps the
triple helix intact and enables the interaction to deliver the desired change. In addition
support of technology is proved to ensure irreversibly changing organizational
routines as detailed in the next sub-section.
In the extant literature, there is no implementation model which encompasses features
that address specific contextual issues and captures technical readiness criteria as
proposed by the present study. These features are empirically sound at least in the
context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia. Whether they are valid in other
contexts too, needs the attention and efforts of future researchers. Setting the issue
for discussion is a contribution by the present study.
8.2.7. Implementing and the Use of Artifacts as Means of Changing Old
Routines
Commercial banks in Ethiopia are hybrid organizations. They have very static back
offices which did not change much even after the implementation of the studied
change initiatives. On the other side, their core business processes are continuously
changing by adopting advanced technologies that improve banking service provision.
As a result of adopting new technologies, these banks which are otherwise unable to
bring about successful changes despite their efforts to do so managed to effectively
transform their service provision routines. Technological packages (e.g., software) are
considered as an artifact in the literature (Glaser, 2017). Artifacts appeared in
contemporary literature as means of altering organizational routines. Building on
Glaser’s (2017), the present study extends to a proposition that even in contexts where
soft side readiness is difficult to achieve, the use of carefully designed artifacts can
effectively change organizational routines. Therefore, in contexts such as the
commercial banking sector in Ethiopia, an initiative for planned change can take the
inclusion of artifacts in its design as a guarantee to bring about effective changes.
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The cyclic interface among the triple helix as depicted in Figure 7.4 is an indication
where an initially planned change, after effectively implemented (especially in
technologically supported context), will serve as a continuously changing spot. This
means, effectively implementing artifact-based change serves as a starting point for
the next initiative. This made a purely domestic environment exposed to a global
practice. Ironically, static and dynamic organizational units are being witnessed
running within same organization. This indicates the impact of artifacts in bring about
strategic organizational changes.
An incorporation of this finding in the proposed implementation model made it
unique. This model encompasses features that capture specific contextual realities that
must be addressed to implement strategic organizational change (planned change);
and at the same time, the model flexibly addresses evolving organizational contexts
both during and after the implementation of the initial initiative. The two stages of
readiness enhancing analyses reflect this. More explicitly, how the model evolves to
handle evolving change needs is manifested in its technical component. This makes
the proposed model more comprehensive than those in the extant literature.
8.3. Recommendations
Based on the findings of the research, the following recommendations are made:
 The degree of actual or potential consensus among company owners (relevant
government body in the case of government-owned banks), the management
group and the entire workforce about the need for initiating a change within
the initiating organization’s reality at that specific time of initiation should come
as a prior test for the existence of favorable conditions to initiate and
implement strategic organizational change in commercial banks in Ethiopia.
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 Technical issues regarding a change should be handled by competent
professionals who can contextualize change models into specific organizational
requirements that triggered the change; and translate it into implementable
design.
 Implementation should be commenced after putting in place necessary
organizational systems that prevent regression and enhance completeness of
implementation within anticipated time frame and predefined performance
level.
 Government, through its central bank, should enhance capacity to regulate
bank practices in a way market forces play significant roles and there will be no
room for nonprofit motives and no possibility to comfortably make profit out of
inefficiency.
 Commercial banks in Ethiopia can enhance effectiveness in implementing
strategic organizational change that encompasses the entire organization
including support business process through incorporating carefully designed
artifacts instead of tempting to apply a passing management fad.
8.4. Recommendations for Further Research
The technical components in the proposed implementation model were developed
through exploiting the opportunity of cross-case analysis of core business processes
and support business processes (embedded within each bank). The notion of applying
organizational routines as means of implementing organizational change and
innovation is a recently emerging issue (see Lin et al., 2017 and Feldman et al., 2016).
The researcher believes that the notion of dynamic routines and the use of artifacts in
changing routines are promising areas of investigation towards developing context
sensitive implementation models. Incorporating how artifacts can be designed being
aligned to strategic intents of organizations to the model which is proposed by the
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present research could be an opportunity to extend contributions to the body of
knowledge in strategic organizational change implementation.
Moreover, as it can also be noted from the introduction and literature review chapters
of this report, there is a need for the development of organizational change theories
that take non-western contexts into account. Besides, the notion of implementation
model is meagerly represented in the literature of organizational change. The present
research lays the foundation for further research specifically in line with the following
recommendations to build on or falsify the findings of this research:
 Researchers should give considerable attention to the search for contextualized
implementation support tools for a developing economy in general and
Ethiopia in particular.
 Researchers can test the generalizability of the proposed model and resultant
propositions in other contexts and come up with falsifying or supporting
findings which will help to start scholarly debates on the issue.
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8.5. Chapter Summary
The present research was initiated with an intention to build a context sensitive
implementation model for strategic organizational change. Through an in-depth
investigation into the context of commercial banking sector in Ethiopia, it is found
that, inductively developing strategic organizational change implementation model
based on empirical data reveals new insights on the topic of implementation. In this
regard, the implementation model developed by the present research has features
that contribute to theory. The flexibility of the model to accommodate evolving
contextual dynamics until a planned change is effectively implemented, and the
model’s evolution to embark on new needs for change which is analyzed based on
newly enacted routines through the use of carefully designed artifacts is its major
contribution to the theory of strategic organizational change implementation.
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Annexes
Annex 1: Participant Information Sheet
Dear Prospective Participant,
My name is Getahun Mekonnen Belay. I am a PhD student at University of South Africa (UNISA). I am
conducting a research as part of fulfilling the requirements to obtain my PhD degree. The title of my
research is “Implementation model for strategic organizational change in Ethiopian commercial
banks.”
The information you will be providing to me will be used for this research purpose only. You are
selected to participate in this study because of your experience during design and/or implementation
of the change in your organization. Your role in participating in the research will be to share your idea
about the change you have experienced in your organization. The expected duration of the interview
will be determined by you. You can stop the discussion at any time and decide to continue at other
time for the sake of your convenience. You can also withdraw at any time by your own discretion.
Participation is fully dependent on your willingness. Nothing will happen to you as a result of
withdrawing from the research.
The purpose of this study is to develop a model that will serve as a framework to guide
implementation of strategic organizational changes in banks. The information you will be providing
will not be reported in a way it explicitly discloses any information about you and your respective
bank. Identity of you and your bank is not needed for this research. Therefore, there is no
confidentiality problem. You are not facing privacy related problem as well. No risk of harm is
expected as a result of participating in this research. No financial or any kind of compensation or
reimbursement will be given to you in response to participating in this research. You will be giving the
information to the researcher just to help him conduct the research which will benefit your
organization and the banking sector as a whole in the form of information (feedback) to be exchanged
in various forms such as summary of research findings, presentation during workshops whichever will
be convenient.
The information in the interview notes, audio tapes and transcriptions will not be accessed by anybody
other than the researcher (me). I will lock paper based files containing interview notes in my own
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locker and save electronic documents and audio in a password protected file in my own password
protected computer. I will carefully destroy these files to protect you and your organization from any
harm (though not expected) after keeping these files for five years in a secured manner for my own
future reference purpose only.
I am kindly requesting you to give me information relating to the change in your bank honestly. It is
critical for the quality of the research which will have benefits to your bank, other banks and the
research community in the field.
Thank you for being willing to participate in the research and giving me your precious time.
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Annex 2: Interview Guide (Initial)
A. Background of the initiative and the respondent
1. Have your bank undergone some form of change?
2. What was the scope of your involvement in the initiative?
3. Can the change be identified as a specific type of change? Was it planned?
4. When did it happen?
a. Complete?
b. Still in progress?
5. How was the change initiative and its implementation structured?
6. Who should have initiated and led the changes in your bank? And how?
7. What were the strategic issues relating to (driving to) the change initiative?
8. How did you plan (if it was planned) the implementation of the initiative?
B. Details of implementation practices
1. In terms of major milestones (important events, documents produced, outcomes etc...), how
do you explain the story of the change initiative in your bank chronologically from its inception
to the level it reaches now?
2. How the actual implementation deviates (if it does) from prescribed (planned) one?
a. Why did you decide to deviate? (If it was a conscious decision) or why did these
deviations happen?
b. How do these deviations from prescribed procedures contribute to the success
and/or failure of the change initiative?
3. How do you explain the resultant positive and/or negative outputs and outcomes of the
change initiative?
C. Contextual issues
1. With respect to successfully implementing strategic organizational change, what are the
important success or failure factors that are unique to the banking sector in Ethiopia?  How
are these success and/or failure factors related to one another?
2. As compared to sticking to already existing products in the global market, how do you explain
the feasibility of innovative banking in the context of commercial banking in Ethiopia? How is
this related to implementing a change?
D. Designing an implementation
1. What are the major lessons that can be learned from previous change implementation
practices in your bank?
2. If you are given a responsibility to design and successfully implement a strategic organizational
change in a commercial bank in Ethiopia, how do you frame a guideline that helps you in
actually realizing the initiative in a way it is sought (to walk the talks)?
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Annex 3: Interview Guide (Revised/evolved)
A. Background of the initiative and the respondent
1. What was the scope of your involvement in the initiative?
2. How was the change initiative and its implementation structured?
a. Who were involved in the initiative?
b. What was the relationship among those who were involved in the initiative?
c. How do you evaluate this structure?
3. Who should have initiated and lead the changes in your bank? And how?
B. Contextual issues
1. With respect to successfully implementing strategic organizational change, what are the
important success or failure factors that are unique to the banking sector in Ethiopia?  How
are these success and/or failure factors related to one another?
2. As compared to sticking to already existing products in the global market, how do you explain
the feasibility of innovative banking in the context of commercial banking in Ethiopia? How is
this related to implementing a change?
C. Details of implementation practices
1. In terms of major milestones (important events, documents produced, outcomes etc...), how
do you explain the story of the change initiative in your bank chronologically from its inception
to the level it reaches now?
2. How the actual implementation deviates (if it does) from prescribed (planned) one?
a. Why did you decide to deviate? (If it was a conscious decision) or why did these
deviations happen?
b. How do these deviations from prescribed procedures contribute to the success
and/or failure of the change initiative?
D. Designing an implementation
1. If you will be given a responsibility to design and successfully implement a strategic
organizational change in a commercial bank in Ethiopia, how would you formulate a guideline
that helps you in actually realizing the initiative in a way it is sought (to walk the talks)?
2. What are the major lessons that can be learned from previous change implementation
practices in your bank?
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Annex 4: Top Most Grounded Codes from Bank A’s Data Generated by Atlas.ti
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Annex 5: Top Densest Codes from Bank A’s Data Generated by Atlas.ti
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Annex 6: List of Codes, Bank A
Output by Atlas.ti
List of All Codes
Absence of change management system
Accelerated implementation
Access to information
Access to infrastructure
Account for overlooked matters
Adhering to principles reduces resistance
Aftermath
Anticipated level of competition
Application of model principles
Attitude
Autonomous team
Awareness creation
background condition
Background knowledge
Balance of attention
Baseline
Battle
Benefits of sequential team establishment
Best practices
Bias towards the old system
Blending innovation with adoption
Business context
Capacity
capacity building
Capacity of managers
Cause of failure
Challenging the present system
change agents
Change model-context match
Change needs recognition
Changing situations
Clarity of directions
Clear stance
Clearing misconceptions
Collective leadership
Communication
Comparative position across teams
Compensation
Conception stage
Conducive environment for concentration
Confidence level
conflict of self interest
Confounded success
Consensus
Consistency
Constrained idea generation capacity
Content of change
Contextualization
Contextualization challenges
Contextually unfit
contingency
Continuous change
Continuous learning
control
Convert each leader to be a change leader
cost minimization
Cost of reactive corrections
Cover up with other successes
Crisis management
Cross team collaboration
Cross team equity
Cross team evaluation
Cross team integration
Cross team triangulation
Culture
customer feedback
Customer needs
customer perspective
Deadline syndrome
Death Valley
Dedicated unit for change
Degree of completeness
Delay
Deliverables
Designer-implementer exceptional
Designing and Implementing role
Deviant change model
Deviant implementation
Deviant strategic direction
Discontinuous change
Diversity of views
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Documented design
Dominance
Emerging structure
Emotional engagement
Employee morale
Ensuring implementation
Erroneous attributes of change to performance
improvement
Experience backed speed
Experience gap
experience sharing
Experience survey
External consultant
External factors
Facilities supply
Failed initiative
Fairness of treatment
Feasibly of new system
Feedback
Feeling of unfair treatment
Filtering ideas generated
Financial capacity
Fine-tuning
Fit to the context
Flexibility
Formulating fit strategy
Framework components
Gap analysis
Generating alternatives
Global uniformity of banking business
Goal
Government intervention
Gradual increment of participants
Handling knowledge gap
Handling Oldies
Handling the human resource
Human development
human element
Idea generation
Impact of customer satisfaction
Impact of external intervention
Impact of Implementation success on resistance
Impact of participation
Impact of previous change
Implementation capacity
Implementation controlling unit
Implementation delay
Implementation disorder
Implementation focus
Implementation Procedures
Implementation Schedule/Plan
Implementation sequencing
Implementation specifications
implementation success
Implementation support System
Implementers
Implications to personal interest
Individual dependent performance
Infrastructure
Initial absence of management commitment
Initial number of participants
initial stage of externally imposed initiative
Initial waste of time
Innovating on societal needs
Internal consistency
Internal Relations
International Impacts
Interruption
Introducing the new system
Involvement of Top leaders/board
Irrelevant authority
Job design
Knowledge gap
Lack of motivation
Lack of trust
leadership
Leadership Determination
Leadership development
Learning
Lesson from Failed initiative
Lesson from previous change
Lesser attention to back offices
Lesser attention to implementation than design
Loss of order
Major events
Management commitment
375
Management style
Manpower first!
Manpower requirement
Manpower utilization
Market segment
Means of new idea generation
Means of understanding existing system
Mentoring leads to success
Merit based selection
Mismatch between reality and mental model
Mobilizing resources
Model-national context fit
Model preconditions
Model Selection
Monitoring
National development level
National environment
National problem
Nature of National competition
Nature of processes
Negative consequences
New generation of workforce
New idea generation
New knowledge and skill requirement
New structure
new system design
No room for further improvement
Non profit motive
Objective criteria
office politics
Organizational culture
Organizational structure
Organizational structure team
Owners of initiatives
ownership
Pain analysis
Participant Commitment
participant entities
participatory
Perception management
Performance indicators
Performance loss
Performance measure
Personnel selection
Persuasion
Phased approach
Pilot testing
Pilot testing benefits
Plan
Political neutralization
Positioning personnel selection
Premature implementation
Premature information release
Preparedness/readiness
Present industry
Present system analysis
Prevention of regression
Priority ranking
Pro adoption strategy
Pro innovative strategy
Process change
Purpose clarity
Quality of team members
Randomness
Rational for a new initiative
Rational for sequential team establishment
Readiness for challenges
Real-time data generation
Reducing bias
Reducing excessive focus on present system
Reducing resistance
Refinement of ideas
Reporting relations
Reporting syndrome
Resistance
Resistant management
Responsiveness to global changes
Reward
Risk minimization
Risk of external advice
Risk of personnel loss
Role ambiguity
Role of authorities
Role of designers on implementation
Rumour
Rushing
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Scientifically proven
Scope of participation
security
Self assessment
Self convinced leader
Selflessness
Sense of achievement
Separation of designers' and implementers
service requirements
Shared understanding
Shock
Sincerity of purpose
Situational analysis
skepticism
Skill gap
source of information
Span of supporters
Stakeholder participation
Strategic direction
Success story
Succession management
Supporter base
Sustainability
System
Team building
Team capacity
Team composition
Team Dissolution
Team establishment priory
team establishment
Team management
Team member selection
Team organization
Team relations
Team representation
Team responsibility
Technical structural
Technology
Telecommunications problem
Tenure
Theory-Practice fit
Thinking outside the box
Time budgeting
Timing
Timely decision
Top-down approach
Transparency
Turning point
Turnover
Underpinning assumptions behind the new system
Understanding change model
Understanding organizational realities
Unilateral communication
Unique customer needs
unnecessary secretes
Use of independent party
Voluntary participation
Watching The "rights"
Within team collaboration
Workforce Capacity
Workforce Satisfaction
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Annex 7: List of Codes, Bank B
Code Book from Bank B Data
Abandoning Performance Measures
Aligning Benefits to changed behavior
Approach
Approval of designed change
Attitude
Attracting Competent Personnel
Awareness creation
Balanced attention
Blaming Leaders
Bottom up
Bringing Supreme Power on Board
Business Performance Pressure
Capacity of leaders
Capacity of top management
Cause of failure
Coercion
Commitment
Communication break
Competitiveness
Conflict of interest
Content of Change
Contextualization
Contextualization capacity
Continuous change
Convincing
Convincing Sponsors
Cost of unsuccessful Initiative
Creativity
Cross team relations
Cultural change
Customer handling
Customer needs
Dedicated Unit for change management
Deliverables
Designing parties
Deviant implementation
Disastrous Change
Discriminatory treatments
Disorganized initiative
Documented design
Dominance oriented owners
Emerging challenges
Employee Morale
Employee satisfaction
Employee Turnover
Empowering Top management
Empowerment of workers
Evaluation
Excessive intervention of board of directors
Expected nature of competition
Expert power
Externally Driven
Failure story
Failure to take evaluation results
Fear of the unknown
Flexibility
Follow up
Functional approach
Good governance
Government Intervention
Government owned led Competition
Guiding Principles
Human Capacity
Human Element
ICT Infrastructure
Ignored back offices
Impact of functional approach
Impact of Protected Market
Implementation
Implementation failure
Implementation Specification
Implementation support
Implementer commitment
Incomplete change
Injecting a new blood to break the status quo
Involvement of professionals
IT support
Lack of awareness
Lack of common interest
Lack of Competitive Employee Benefits
Lack of Competitive Pressure
Lack of Experience
Lack of expertise in change
Lack of integration between actors
Lack of leadership
Lack of Management Commitment
Lack of ownership
Lack of professionalism
Lack of shared vision
Lack of skilled labor
Lack of top management support
Lack of Training
Lack of trust
Lack of understanding the change model
Leadership Commitment
Learning from best practices
Level of National Development
Managing resistance to change
Misuse of power
Model specification
Motivating employees
Multinational Exposure requirement
Naming the initiative
National Context
Nature of national market
Nature of the industry
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Nature or change
New skill requirements
New system design
New System Requirements
No acceptance by top management
No compelling reason to change
No Evaluation and Follow up
No room for innovativeness
Nominal Change management Department
Non Profit Motive
Office politics
Organizational culture
Owner of initiatives
Owners' Awareness
Perception management
Performance efficiency
Personnel Handling
Personnel Selection
Pilot testing
Political legal environment
Positive outputs
Power interventions
Powerless change management Unit
Present system analysis
Private-Government Discrimination
Pro adoption
Pro innovative
Proactive Approach
Process Performance
Qualified Leader
Qualified Personnel
Rational For change
Reaction from resistant management
Reactive to external forces
Readiness for Change
Reducing resistance
Regression
Reporting relations
Resistant Management
Resource allocation
Resource Limitation
Scope of change
Scope of participation
Selfless Leader
Shareholder composition
Short Sighted Owners
Sincerity of Purpose
Soft side
Standards of performance
Steps in the initiative
Strategic direction
Struggle for change
Sustainability
Team establishment
Team member background
Team member commitment
Team Relations
Team responsibility
Technology support
Tenure of management
Top management commitment
Total dissatisfaction
Training
Trigger for change
Type of customer
Type of Ownership
Unconvinced Middle Manager
Understanding the need for change
Unfair competition between private and
government banks
Use of Experienced Leader
Using the right professional as bank manager
Worsened Situation
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Annex 8: Top most Grounded Codes from Bank B Data Generated by Atlas.ti
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Annex 9: Densest Codes from Bank B Data Generated by Atlas.ti
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Annex 10: Comparison of Top Grounded and Dense codes from Bank B Data
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Annex 11: Ethical Clearance Certificate
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Annex 12: A Network Generated by ATLAS.ti, Bank A
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Annex 13: A Network Generated by ATLAS.ti, Bank B
